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"PEACE IN ASIA" INTERNATIONAL
EXCHANGE CONFERENCE**

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REGIONAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVE, NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENCE (NMD), THEATRE MISSILE DEFENCE (TMD) SYSTEMS, AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

PROCEEDINGS OF A JOINT SEMINAR

HELD AT

THE USI, NEW DELHI

ON

27 and 28 JANUARY 2004

First Session

Regional Security Perspective

-- Chairman
Lieutenant General Tomohiro Okamoto (Retd).

Second Session

*People's Republic of China's (PRC's)
Military Capabilities and Impact on
the Respective Regions*

-- Chairman
Vice Admiral PS Das, PVSM, UYSM, VSM (Retd).

Third Session

*The Nuclear Dimension, National
Missile Defence(NMD)/Theatre
Missile Defence (TMD) Systems
and Implications*

-- Chairman
Lieutenant General Tomohiro Okamoto (Retd).

Fourth Session

*The Future of the UN and the
International System*

-- Chairman
Air Marshal Vir Narain, PVSM (Retd).

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THE JAPANESE PARTICIPANTS

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General Shigeto Nagano (Retd) is a former Chief of Staff, Japan Ground Self Defence Force (JGSDF) as well as member of the Upper House, former Legislative Minister of Japanese Government. He was an Army Captain when the Second World War was over. In 1951, he joined the Japan Police Reserve. He became the Director of Logistics Department of Ground Staff Office in 1971. He served as Vice Chief of Staff in 1976, Commander of the East District Command of JGSDF in 1977 and Chief of Staff of JGSDF in 1978. After retirement from service, he was selected member of the Upper House in 1986. He assumed the post of Minister of Judicial Affairs. After a second term as member of the Upper House, he established Japan Forum for Strategic Studies (JFSS) in 1999. Currently, he is the Executive Director of JFSS.

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Lieutenant General Shigetaka Hasegawa (Retd) graduated from National Defense Academy and enlisted in Japan Ground Self-Defense Force in 1962. He graduated from Command and Staff Course in 1970 and National Institute for Defense Studies in 1980. He served as Chief of 34th Infantry Regiment in 1985. He became a Major General in 1987 and Lieutenant General in 1992. He served as the principal of Fuji school of Japan Ground Self-Defense Force and commissioner of Tohoku district before retiring in 1996. After his retirement, he has worked for Howa Machinery Ltd. as an advisor. At present, he is taking an active part in Kyowa Society, Jidai Wo Sasshin Sum Kai (Society for Revamping the Age) under the themes of constitution and security.

Lieutenant General Tomohiro Okamoto (Retd) graduated from Hibiya Metropolitan

High School and National Defense Academy. He enlisted in Japan Air Self-Defense Force in 1967. He attended Command and Staff Course of Air Staff College in 1977. He served in Air Staff Office, Air Defense Command before taking charge of White Paper on Defense in 1981. He served as Defense Attache in the USSR for three years from 1986 onwards. He became a Major General in 1993. He served as Chief of Staff of Headquarters Western Air Defense Force and Superintendent of Fifth Technical School. Promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General in 1997, he served as Commander of the Air Developing and Testing Command and later as the Director General of Joint Staff Office before retiring in 2001. Currently he is working as a Military Advisor to NEC Corporation.

Lieutenant General Takashi Arai (Retd) graduated from National Defense Academy in 1967. He enlisted in Japan Ground Self Defense Force in 1967. He graduated from Captain Course of French Infantry School in 1976; Command and Staff Course of GSDF in 1978 and National Institute for Defense Studies in 1987. He was assigned the post of Commander of 29th Regiment in 1990. He served as the Head of Personnel Planning Ground Staff Office and became a Major General in 1992. He got promoted to Lieutenant General in 1997. He took over as the Commander of Tohoku District in 1999 and retired from that assignment in 2001. He is working as Military Advisor to NEC Corporation since 2002.

Vice Admiral Kataru Hasegawa (Retd) graduated from National Defense Academy in 1966. He enlisted in Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force in 1966. He served in Maritime Staff Office before graduating from Officers

Specialist Course and National Institute for Defense Studies, in 1987. He has been Chief of Public Affairs Maritime Staff Office; Commander of the Escort Division; and Chief of Procurement and Liaison Office Shiga prefecture. In 1991, he was promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral. He served as the Commander of first Escort Flotilla, Commander of Training Fleet, Inspector General MSO, Chief of Staff of HQ, Self Defense Fleet and was promoted to the rank of Vice Admiral in 1998. He took over as Commander of Ohminato Naval District, and later became Commander in Chief of Self Defense Fleet. He retired from service in 2001. He became an advisor to NEC Corporation in 2001.

Professor Kouji Okamoto graduated from the Faculty of Law at Kyoto University in 1960. He joined Mitsui Bussan Company and took up the assignment of lecturing at Kyoto Industrial University and, later, at Osaka Prefecture University. He has been a guest professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University,

New Delhi and also Professor of Ehime University. He moved to Osaka International University in 1992, to take up the position of Dean of the Faculty of Politics and Economics. In 2000, he was appointed Professor of Kinki Welfare University. Presently, he is the Honourable Professor at Osaka International University and Chairman of Japan-India Friendship Association.

Professor Tsuneo Yoshihara graduated from the Faculty of Economics, Kansai University, and entered Jiji Press Ltd. He worked as a political reporter, deputy sub-editor, and assistant editor of editorial office cum joint research worker before becoming Professor of the Faculty of International Communication, Hiroshima Women's University in 1995. Presently, he is working as Professor of the Faculty of International Development, Takushoku University (in charge of International Politics, Security, Japanese Politics). He has been acting as a political commentator since 1970.

Lieutenant General AVSM, VrC (Ret.) Australian Staff, command, instructional appointments at v of the Director General. He was a member team in Iraq from and Military Advisor of India in London November 198 Commander and the United Nations Yugoslavia (UNF it from 03 March retired as the Deputy in August 1994. Director of the U India. In November nominated by the United Nations, referred to as the global security international systems

Lieutenant General PVSM, AVSM (Ret.) Staff, Western C of Royal College. He has held various being those of the Sino-Indian c Wangdung in A and Military Ad Division Northern (Mil) and Secret (COSC) in the I General National the "Inter-Ser Committee" and Board" when he and Secretary C

THE INDIAN PARTICIPANTS

Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd) is a graduate of the Australian Staff College. He has held command, instructional and general staff appointments at various levels, including that of the Director General of Military Operations. He was a member of an Indian Army Training team in Iraq from July 1977 to January 1979, and Military Advisor at the High Commission of India in London from December 1983 to November 1987. As the first Force Commander and Head of Mission, he set up the United Nations operations in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), and commanded it from 03 March 1992 to 02 March 1993. He retired as the Deputy Chief of the Army Staff in August 1994. Since July 1996, he is the Director of the United Service Institution of India. In November 2003, he has been nominated by the Secretary General of the United Nations, to serve on a high-level panel, referred to as the 'Blue Ribbon Panel', on global security threats and reform of the international system.

Lieutenant General Bhupal Singh Malik, PVSM, AVSM (Retd) is the former Chief of Staff, Western Command. He is a graduate of Royal College of Defence Studies (UK). He has held various posts, the major ones being those of Brigade Commander during the Sino-Indian confrontation at Sumdo Rong-Wangdung in Arunachal Pradesh; Defence and Military Advisor, UK; GOC Independent Division Northern Command; Joint Secretary (Mil) and Secretary Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) in the Ministry of Defence; Director General National Cadet Corps. He reactivated the "Inter-Services Equipment Planning Committee" and "Joint Services Intelligence Board" when he was the Joint Secretary (Mil) and Secretary COSC. He represented India

at the UN Conference in the UK in 1993; Commonwealth War Graves Commission, which is working in 147 countries; the Imperial War Museum Trust; and the World Youth discussion in Canada.

Vice Admiral Premvir Saran Das, PVSM, UYSM, VSM (Retd) joined the Navy in January 1960. During his four decades of service, he has held several important staff and command appointments. He was Chief of Staff at HQ Eastern Naval Command during the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) operations in Sri Lanka. Later, he held the post of Fortress Commander, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, now upgraded into India's first unified theatre command. He took over as Director General Defence Planning Staff before moving to Vishakhapatnam as Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command. He retired in February 1998. He is a Member of the Council of the United Service Institution of India; of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and of the Surya Foundation think tank on national security and defence. He has the distinction of being the only retired officer nominated as member of the National Task Force on Higher Management chaired by Mr Arun Singh.

Vice Admiral Raman Puri, PVSM, AVSM, VSM was commissioned in the Indian Navy on 1 January 1966. He is a Missile and Gunnery specialist who has commanded a number of ships including INS Vikrant. A product of the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington; Command and General Staff College (erstwhile, USSR) and the National Defence College, New Delhi, he has been the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff and Flag Officer Commanding in Chief Eastern Naval Command. He has an abiding interest in

national security, international relations and science and technology policy issues. At present, he is the Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (CIDS) to Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC). He is the Founder Director of College of Naval Warfare.

Rear Admiral K Raja Menon (Retd) is a product of India's National Defence Academy Khadakvasla, Poona, from where he graduated with Gold Medal. A submariner by specialisation, he pioneered the development of the new arm in India, and was, therefore, exposed early to policy, finance and strategy. He was posted on submarine assignments to the UK, the erstwhile USSR and Germany and has had a chance to observe maritime developments worldwide. He retired in 1994 as the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Operations) in which job he was responsible for formulating strategy. He is a visiting lecturer at India's Defence Services Staff College, the Foreign Service Training Institute, the National Defence College and for the Naval Higher Command Course. He was the head of the Naval Command, Control and Communication Committee and was a member of the armed forces' Computerised Command and Control Centre before he retired. Since retirement he writes regularly for the *Times of India*. His book titled *Maritime Strategy and Continental Wars* is under publication in the UK. He has written on *A Nuclear Strategy for India* in 1999.

Air Marshal Vir Narain, PVSM (Retd) was commissioned in the Flying Branch of the Indian Air Force as a navigator in January 1951. He served with the Canberra contingent

of the United Nations Expeditionary Force in the Congo in 1962, and was India's Air Attache in Moscow and Budapest in the early 1980s. He retired in December 1987 as Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Training Command. He is a Member of the USI Council and the Chairman of the Board of Management for the USI Centre for Research.

Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, AVSM, VrC, VM (Retd) is the Director, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), New Delhi. A former Director of Operations of the Indian Air Force, he headed the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi from 1987 to 2001. Former Convenor of the Task Force to set up a National Security Council (NSC) in India and Member of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), he is the author/ contributing editor of numerous books including *Air Power in Modern Warfare* (1985); *Non-provocative Defence* (1989); *Security of Third World Countries* (1993); *Nuclear India* (1998); *Kargil 1999. Pakistan's Fourth War for Kashmir* (1999); *India's Defence Spending* (2001); *Air Power and Joint Operations* (2003); and *Iraq War* (2004). A visiting lecturer at defence and war colleges in India and abroad, he is the Editorial Advisor (Defence and Strategic Affairs) to the *Indian Express* group of newspapers.

Shri Chinmaya R Gharekhan, IFS (Retd) has been the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations in New York from 1986 to 1992. He has also been the Under Secretary General, United Nations from 1993 to 1999. At present he is a Council Member of the United Service Institution of India.

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 Security Council (NSC)
 of the National Security
 AB), he is the author/
 of numerous books
Modern Warfare (1985);
nce (1989); *Security of*
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Pakistan's Fourth War
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and Joint Operations
 2004). A visiting lecturer
 colleges in India and
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WELCOME REMARKS

LIEUTENANT GENERAL SATISH NAMBIAR, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (RETD)

OPENING REMARKS

GENERAL SHIGETO NAGANO (RETD)

OPENING ADDRESS

VICE ADMIRAL RAMAN PURI, PVSM, AVSM, VSM

WELCOME REMARKS

LIEUTENANT GENERAL SATISH NAMBIAR, PVSM, AVSM, Vrc (RETD)

Director USI

On behalf of the President USI Council and the membership of the United Service Institution of India, it is my great pleasure to welcome General Shigeto Nagano and our other Japanese friends representing the Executive Committee for Peace in Asia. It is indeed an honour and a privilege to have them with us at the United Service Institution of India in pursuance of the interaction we decided to initiate after a meeting in Delhi a few months back. An interaction we hope will be pursued with further vigour in the future for continued dialogue and useful exchanges between scholars and analysts from both countries.

This visit and the discussions we propose to engage in, take place at a very interesting and defining moment at the international level. At the bilateral level between India and Japan, there is much greater dialogue, co-operation and understanding about most global and regional security issues than at any time in the recent past. Of particular interest to both nations are aspects of piracy at sea, the vital need to keep the sea lanes through the Indian Ocean area free from interference through terrorism, and the United Nations peacekeeping. The two countries have also been in constant touch with each other in regard to the developments in Sri Lanka. Japan has long had an economic stake in India, which can only grow with the opening up and growth of the Indian economy.

At the sub-regional level, we meet at a defining moment in the history of India-Pakistan relations. The leadership of the two countries have taken some momentous steps

towards reducing tensions in the sub-continent and initiating a process that will hopefully result in a meaningful dialogue and understanding on issues that bedevil relations between the two countries. The significance of this development within the confines of this seminar rests on whether there is a role for Japan in context of its balanced and finely nuanced relationship with both India and Pakistan.

The sessions at our seminar focus on four separate aspects of the security dimension. Even so, they are inter-related because nothing on the security landscape today can be analysed in isolation. In the first session we hope to separately look at and discuss the security perspective in our respective sub-regions. The second session will necessarily focus on what will inevitably emerge from the first: the impact of the growing economic and military capabilities of the Peoples Republic of China on the region as a whole. In the third session we have elected to focus on the nuclear dimension in so far as India is concerned, and from the Japanese point of view some reflections on the Self Defence Forces and the Missile Defence System.

The USA has moved away from deterrence and containment to pre-emption as a strategic imperative. This was manifested in the operations conducted by the US led coalition in Iraq. This operation introduces elements in the conduct of international relations that merit serious debate and analysis. To that end in the fourth session we shall assess whether the international system represented by the United Nations

has been dealt a body blow or whether there is hope yet that it will not only survive, but possibly emerge stronger from the current imbroglio.

Besides welcoming our friends from Japan, I would like to thank our colleagues from the USI for their spontaneous support to this event by their enthusiastic participation.

I am sure all of us look forward to a vigorous and meaningful set of discussions over the next two days.

Before Admiral Raman Puri, the President of the USI Council, delivers his opening address, may I request General Shigeto Nagano, leader of the Japanese delegation to make a few preliminary remarks.

It is a matter first Tokyo-New international exchange held here in New Delhi. I like to take this opportunity to thank those who have made this possible.

India and Japan have a deep mutual exchange and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries have had a great impact. Majority of men and women in the world are reminded of the words of the great East Asian leader, Mahatma Gandhi, who said: "I am a Pal based on the Far Eastern Tribes." I have a deep gratitude and still admire his attitude along with non-violence. I hope to continue to form a new India as a nation.

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OPENING REMARKS

GENERAL SHIGETO NAGANO (RETD)

Leader Japanese Delegation

It is a matter of great pleasure that the first Tokyo-New Delhi (Peace in Asia) international exchange conference is being held here in New Delhi. At the outset, I would like to take this opportunity to thank all those who have made this Conference possible.

India and Japan have a long tradition of deep mutual exchanges especially since the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1952. Both countries have had a very cordial relationship. Majority of members of this delegation comprise of ex-Servicemen. We are reminded of the words of Justice Radha Vinod Pal based on impartiality and justice at the Far Eastern Tribunal after the end of the great East Asian War. We continue to have deep gratitude and admiration for him. We still admire his utterances at the Tribunal. This along with non-aligned mutual policies continue to form the basis of the reputation of India as a nation that stands for justice

and impartiality. I take this opportunity to convey my deepest appreciation for India.

Both our countries share the ideals of democracy and market economy, spirit of tolerance, magnanimity towards diversity, as well as the wisdom to draw upon the characteristics of mutual civilisations and cultures.

Under such a perspective, it is extremely important for both countries to strengthen their cooperation in order to contribute towards stability and prosperity of Asia. Since this Conference is a useful and important opportunity to thoroughly discuss what both countries can do together, and build mutual trust, as an Army person as well as an expert on security issues, I call upon all those present here to have a heart to heart exchange of ideas till we have deepened our friendship and become friends in the hour of need.

OPENING ADDRESS

VICE ADMIRAL RAMAN PURI, PVSM, AVSM, VSM

CIDS to the Chairman COSC and

President USI Council

It is my proud privilege to deliver the opening address for the joint United Service Institution of India and Executive Committee (Peace In Asia), Japan Seminar on "Regional Security Perspective, National Missile Defence (NMD), Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) Systems, and the Future of International System". Let me at the outset state that I wish the Seminar all the best and may discussions that ensue are good, sound and meaningful.

Security Parameters

I assume that you will be looking at the security environment in holistic and comprehensive terms. Security encompasses a wide range of factors in which the military aspects are very important. But there are also other important aspects, including the economy, quality of life, the environment, matters relating to development, questions of state sovereignty and the role of the state. The problems created by extremism, cross-border terrorism, questions connected with narcotics traffic are of great concern. Energy security, food security and impact of information technology are other important parameters.

I would take it that an exercise of this nature would involve a systematic identification of what is happening in the world today in regard to each of these parameters. It is the duty of all those who are engaged in strategic or security analyses to look at these problems in an objective, clinical and empirical manner, without imposing any preconceptions. In a discussion of the nature

in which the two delegations are going to be engaged in, it should be our endeavour to work towards common universal security norms.

Let me briefly mention some of the important principles. First is the principle of equal security among nations. Secondly, the desirability for the world to move towards a multipolar, polycentric and a more democratic international relations structure. These principles should apply regardless of whether countries are big or small. The question is, in the international security environment as it has developed over the last few years, how have these principles been reinforced or progressed? These principles, of course, apply to the nuclear dimension as well. I am sure this aspect will receive attention during discussion.

On the economic side, we need to look at the way the international security environment is being shaped in terms of a level playing field and rational international economic relations, including globalisation. Environment is another area that has received great attention recently.

The International Security Environment

There are regional developments that have a bearing on creating and establishing the international security environment. In this regard, the Asia-Pacific region is of relevance to our two countries. Indian participants would be looking forward to getting the impressions of our friends from Japan on their thinking with regard to the

security environment in the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the common sub-region of the national interest actors. The Japan has a major role in maintaining peace in Northeast Asia. In the area of security, not only from the threat but the broader perspective of the Pacific region as

The question of border terrorism, a number of countries you that a meeting to define and identify international cooperation problem.

The other aspect for us in India is with Asia. One point to note is the clear trend towards integration and understanding in the region. There is a need for the status quo, with the region to develop and security. This during the last Islamabad from

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security environment in this region. So far, the Korean Peninsula issue and the security in the Taiwan Strait are the most serious and common sub-regional concerns that involve the national interests and security of major actors. The Japan-US relationship will play a major role in maintaining peace and stability in Northeast Asia. The Japan-US cooperation in the area of security must be considered not only from the bilateral viewpoint but, from the broader perspective of security in the Asia Pacific region as a whole.

The question of trans-border or cross-border terrorism concerns a very large number of countries today. I would put it to you that a meeting of this kind should try to define and identify the progress made by the international community in tackling this problem.

The other aspect that is of concern to us in India is what is happening in South Asia. One point that needs to be highlighted is the clear trend towards co-operation, integration and a better security understanding in the South Asian region. There is a need for a stable environment, not the status quo, which enables all countries in the region to develop in conditions of peace and security. This aspect got high lighted during the last SAARC summit held in Islamabad from 04 to 06 January 2004.

The Asian region today represents 60 per cent of the world's population. India represents a little over 16 per cent of the world's population. Asia contains an abundance of raw materials and natural resources. Nature has indeed been bountiful. Take the case of fossil fuels on which all countries, developed and developing, are dependent and hence the strategic

importance of West and Central Asia. The Indian Ocean is the lifeline of international trade and economy. As many as 62,000 vessels transit the Indian Ocean, accounting for US \$ 740 billion in intra-trade. We need an infrastructure to ensure peaceful passage of vessels through the Indian Ocean and beyond.

The China Factor in Asian Affairs

One of the most significant developments after the Cold War, is probably the sudden growth in China's economic potential, and the consequent national power. In fact China's economic growth has been unprecedented in history. In consonance with her rising national power and in an effort to deal with her threat perceptions, China has been pursuing an assertive foreign policy. Apart from engaging global powers like Russia and the US, the Chinese have also emerged as a major force in Asian affairs. This has been as a result of its well orchestrated post Cold War twin strategy of building its power projection capabilities and yet, at the same time, seeking engagement and friendship which it actually regards as an input towards its envisioned future great power profile. China has not only gone out of its way to improve its bilateral ties with hitherto fore adversaries like Russia, Japan, South Korea, and some ASEAN member states, it appears to resolve issues by participating in various regional multilateral forums. China considers itself a developing power whose natural resources, manpower, nuclear-capable forces, seat on the U N Security Council, and growing economy give it most of the attributes of a great power. China factor needs to be given due thought while discussing regional security perspective in Asia.

Regional Groupings

We must introduce the concept of security by regional groupings and by regional understanding. This cannot be done militarily. Let us see how the system has been progressing. After the end of the Cold War, new regional organizations came into place. Even NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) is seeking to redefine its role to tackle existing and future challenges. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was established for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post conflict rehabilitation, under which 55 states from Europe, Central Asia and North America have come together. India has had a "Look East" policy towards the ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) since 1991. India has always had close historical and cultural ties with South-East Asian countries. We recognize ASEAN's political and strategic importance in the larger Asia-Pacific region. India became a full dialogue partner of the ASEAN in 1996. Strategically, ASEAN and India have a common interest in the maintenance of peace, stability and balance in Asia. ASEAN's acknowledgement of the positive role that India can play in maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region was further indicated when India was invited to join the ASEAN Regional Forum. Currently, India is closely collaborating with ASEAN countries in various fields such as trade and investment, science and technology, tourism, human resources and infrastructure development. Such linkages are expected to intensify in the coming years. Through the institution of Dialogue Partnership, attempts are being made to identify areas for focused interaction, including formulation of work programmes and action plans. India's trade with ASEAN is currently \$ 7.3 billion, and would hopefully

grow with time. India has good relations with Japan. Trade links between the two countries are looking up. Japanese firms are collaborating with Indian firms to their mutual advantage. Manufacture of Maruti Suzuki cars in India in joint collaboration is a big success story.

The Future of the United Nations and the International System

The war against Iraq in the spring of 2003 was ostensibly undertaken to implement the resolution of the United Nations Security Council and, by implication, to uphold the credibility of the United Nations (UN). That the war produced exactly the opposite result and damaged, some believe irreparably, the prestige of the organization came hardly as a surprise to anyone. It has brought to the fore a host of questions of principle and practice that challenge the UN and the international community as a whole. The very relevance of current multilateral rules and institutions has come into question. The relevance of the United Nations in the emerging world order is a topic of contemporary debate and enquiry. The United Nations is perhaps the only agency which can confer legitimacy in a crisis situation. The international community is perhaps better off with the UN with all its imperfections than it would be without it. The UN Secretary General Mr Kofi Annan has set up a high level panel on 'Global Security Threats and Reforms of the International System' to examine today's global threats and provide an analysis of future challenges to international peace and security, identify clearly the contributions that collective action can make in addressing these challenges, and recommend the changes necessary to ensure effective collective action, including but not limited to, a review of principal organs of the United

Nations. The panel includes Anand Panyarachund of Thailand and has Satish Nambiar, nominated as one of the members on this high level panel. The panel was set up on 03 Nov 2003.

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Nations. The panel is being chaired by Mr
Anand Panyarachun, former Prime Minister
of Thailand and has 16 members. Lt Gen
Satish Nambiar, Director, USI has been
nominated as one of the members to serve
on this high level panel. The Panel was set
up on 03 Nov 2003 and is required to submit

its report to the Secretary General by 15 Aug
2004. The future of the United Nations and
the international system is an extremely
important issue which I gather is being
deliberated upon during one of the sessions
of the seminar. Once again I wish the
Seminar the best of luck.

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REGIONAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVE

FIRST SESSION

Chairman : **Lieutenant General Tomohiro Okamoto (Retd)**

First Paper : Professor Tsuneo Yoshihara

Second Paper : Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, AVSM, VrC, VM (Retd)

CHAIRMAN'S REMARKS

Before we begin the first session of the Seminar, I would like to introduce the Executive Committee (Peace in Asia) in Japan. It is supported by the Tokyo Foundation. The representative of the

Foundation, who is present here is Tadamasa Fukiura. We now have Professor Tsuneo Yoshihara and Air Commodore Jasjit Singh to present the papers in this session.

FIRST SESSION : FIRST PAPER

THE SECURITY SITUATION IN EAST ASIA

PROFESSOR TSUNEO YOSHIHARA

Humanitarian Intervention and Conditional Ignorance of Armed Attack

When analysing military situation in East Asia, one cannot ignore the status of the international society as a whole. This is so because the latter has a bearing on the regions. International society is undergoing a big transformation. It is because the two major premises of the international society in the post-World War II era are undergoing a change. Such a change is not temporary or superficial but ought to be perceived as the structural change. Frankly speaking, it can be termed the re-emergence of a situation advantageous to military powers.

The first structural change in international society is that humanitarian intervention (intervention in internal politics based on humanitarian grounds) is being approved of in a wide-ranged manner. The "principle of non-intervention in internal politics" was established under the Westphalia system and was continued under the UN system also. There have been opinions, both for and against intervention on humanitarian grounds. With the military intervention by NATO forces in the armed strife between erstwhile Yugoslavia and Kosovo, one can say that prior approval of such intervention

by the international society is here to stay. In other words, if a government does something that is anti-humanitarian, it can face armed intervention by foreign countries. However, the criterion for "non-humanitarian act by an enemy" that allows armed intervention is not yet determined; it is left to the arbitrary decision of the nation resorting to such an armed action. Therefore, it is necessary to note that there is every possibility of aggression misusing the humanitarian intervention feature.

The second principle, which has undergone change, is in the condition of exercise of the right of self-defence. In the international system, "armed attack" on a country was regarded as the condition for the exercise of armed action. However, the expression in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter on this armed attack is in the present tense; i.e. if "armed attack occurs" is also included in it. However, leading scholars of international law in England and America namely, Professor D W Bowett of England and Professors MS MacDougal and Julius Stone of America have interpreted this as "anticipatory self-defence is allowed under Article 51 of the U. N. Charter".¹ However, all the countries have so far-maintained the conditionality of Article 51. But Bush

administration under its new security policy launched the policy of preemptive attack against a rogue state.' Other leading powers are also in the process of following it. In the recent Iraq War, America along with England has carried out such a strategy of preemptive attack for the first time. China and Russia opposed the attack on Iraq by America, albeit superficially, with regard to preemptive attack strategy, they agreed to its inclusion in the military doctrine. This means that out of the five permanent countries of the UN Security Council, four agreed to the preemptive attack strategy. This cannot be avoided from becoming the practice of international law.

The preemptive attack strategy launched by the Bush administration transcends the concept of preemptive self-defence agreed to by Professors Bowett, MacDougal and Julius Stone. Secondly, there is no objective international criterion for labelling a nation as a "rogue nation". In short, decision about who is the "rogue nation" will be made by the nation that resorts to force based on its own value system. As a result, hereafter there is a strong possibility that use of military force will be more to resolve international issues by the international society.

The third big change is that the NPT (Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty), which has delivered certain amount of results regarding non-proliferation of nuclear weapons has been rendered perfunctory and the trend is towards increase in the number of nuclear-capable nations. The big premise of the NPT was that "Nuclear-capable nations will not actually use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear nations or use them as a threat and the non-nuclear nations will not go nuclear". However, Russia in its first ever military doctrine, has launched a policy based on the premise that

there is a possibility of use of nuclear weapons by the non-nuclear states based on the pretext of compensating the weakening of regular forces. The same was reaffirmed during the revised military doctrine announced in Autumn 2003. Certain aspects need to be noted:-

(a) During the Gulf War and during the recent Iraq War, there has been an obvious use of nuclear threat, although the Secretaries and Ministers of Defence of both America and England have stated that it is to prevent the use of chemical weapons by Iraq.

(b) China, which is already a nuclear state, is increasing its nuclear war capability in both quality and quantity and America and Russia are also continuing their efforts in increasing the efficiency of their nuclear weapons.

(c) America was a silent spectator to India and Pakistan going nuclear, because it was preoccupied with attack on terrorist infested Afghanistan. Other countries also followed suit. The nuclear programme is taking North Korea also towards such a situation.

Due to the above-mentioned structural changes in international society, it is felt that the possibility of use of military power including nuclear weapons for the resolution of clash of interests between nations will increase.

TRENDS IN CHINA AS A REGIONAL DISTURBANCE FACTOR

China aiming at being a regional hegemony in Asia-Pacific

The biggest turbulence factor in East

Asia is China. It seriously from two movement in China hegemony in the trends in South East consequence. The contradictions in growing, based on economy and the the Chinese empire

China is making moves aimed at hegemony in Asia only two concepts namely it will either hierarchical society to another powerful society that all their size are equal. This, along with inc with the growth of China to establish race has continued control since the of the races living region were driven continent by such even if the sentiment dampens with the the will to security expected to diminish

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Asia is China. It is necessary to view it seriously from two points. One is the active movement in China to be a regional hegemony in the Asia Pacific region and trends in South East Asian countries as a consequence. The other is intensification of contradictions in China, which is rapidly growing, based on induction of market economy and the concern regarding split of the Chinese empire as a result.

China is making steady, strategic, moves aimed at establishing its regional hegemony in Asia-West Pacific. There are only two concepts among the Chinese race namely it will either reach the top of the hierarchical society or it will be forced to yield to another powerful nation. In other words, the concept of rule of the modern international society that all the countries regardless of their size are equal does not exist in China. This, along with increase in her national power with the growth of the economy is driving China to establish its hegemony. The Chinese race has continued to expand its area of control since the pre-Christian era. Majority of the races living in the South East Asian region were driven out from the Chinese continent by such expansion. Consequently, even if the sentiment of "export of revolution" dampens with the growth of the economy, the will to secure hegemony cannot be expected to diminish.

Due to this tendency, China is venturing out to control the vast oceans inspite of possessing vast territory. First it is based on the perception that to become a leading nation in the world, control over oceans is indispensable. Second is the economic reason, namely, the resource and food strategy. China's strategists unanimously emphasise that in addition to nuclear war potential with second strike capability, sea-

control capability in leading sea zones of the world and power projection capability to dispatch forces beyond the seas are indispensable.

Here, if one reflects on China's long history, it is pointed out that the dynasties that attached importance to ocean and had a navy to venture out in the outer seas prospered; those who ignored such a capability invited aggression by other countries and perished. The Ming dynasty, which had vast naval power, made several expeditions to places as far as Near and Middle East and Africa: Indonesia's communist revolution, which went quite close to being successful under the instigation of the Chinese Communist Party, could not provide effective military support as it lacked a blue water navy capability and this is often indicated as a lesson. During the Cuban missile crisis, the erstwhile Soviet Union had to abandon deployment of missiles in Cuba, as it did not have the blue water navy capability to take on the American Navy. Further, the nostalgia of a large navy of yesteryears, during the days of Peter the Great, became a major motive for building the marine navy. In case of erstwhile Soviet Union, Admiral Gorshkov, who served for long as the Navy Commander, tried to build the Navy. A similar role was performed in China by Admiral Sei Ryuka, who after serving for long as the Navy Commander was selected as a member of the Politburo.

The other important point is the economic reason. There are factors like drying up of oil fields such as the Daikei oil field, and China becoming an oil importing country since 1993. It is felt that in the near future there will be scarcity of food due to desertification, devastation of agricultural land and increase in population. The Chinese

strategists believe that after the land resources are exhausted, marine resources will assume importance. Moreover, they believe that land territory of the world has already, by and large, got sorted out and the struggle for controlling the oceans will intensify in the future.

There are many hidden oil fields and natural gas reservoirs under the sea. Magnesium deposits under the sea are also quite promising as mineral resources and they have the feature of being revived based on fluctuation in the earth crust even if extracted. On the other hand, China's dependence on rich fisheries as the source of food will be more than before, as it is likely to face food crisis. In the light of such circumstances, naval development strategy was formulated in China under the instructions of Deng Xiaoping in 1986. As a result, China's Navy, which till then only had coastal defence capability, has begun acquiring ocean capability in recent years.

Strategic advance in the Pacific Ocean, Indian Ocean and the Sea of Japan

The first stage of strategy of hegemony is to make sea zones (called 'coastal waters' in China) ranging up to three million sq km in South China Sea, East China Sea, and Yellow Sea, as inland sea. If these sea zones become China's inland sea, passage through them will not be possible unless China permits. This will put Japan and Taiwan at China's mercy. This will also be a step towards controlling Southeast Asian countries by China. At present, neighbouring countries are occupying the islands of Nansho and Seisho claiming their possession rights and using them as their air and naval bases.

The second stage is advance in the Pacific, Indian Ocean and the Sea of Japan.

"Liberation of Taiwan as the finishing touch to the revolution", often emphasised by China, should be viewed as a part of advance into the Pacific. The real intention of China is to ensure "Taiwan is no longer the island where Chang Kai Shek Administration took refuge after being uprooted in the revolution" but "is an island that has to be procured for China to become hegemony in Asia-West Pacific". China is not facing the Pacific. For hegemony in Asia-West Pacific, the Chinese must acquire territory facing the Pacific. In other words, China's goal is no longer "conclusion of the revolution" as in the past but "liberation of Taiwan" as a part of the national strategy in the 21st century. It must be noted that China's argument of "liberation of Taiwan" will not wane with time. An armed attack on Taiwan is something that Japan cannot ignore. This is so because Okinawa, which is close to Taiwan, could be the next target of "liberation" by China. This is possible if the American army base is no longer there and China needs to "make the coastal waters the near sea of China" or procure "territory in the sea zone adjoining the Pacific". Unfortunately, Japan at present does not have the military capability to obstruct such advance by China to Okinawa.

Myanmar and Pakistan as the footholds for advance in the Indian Ocean

At present, China is using Myanmar as the breakthrough for advance into the Indian Ocean. Military rule in Myanmar is isolated internationally. It is only China with which it has normal relations among the leading countries of the world. China, using this opportunity, is building a road that traverses Myanmar from China up to the Indian Ocean in the name of economic assistance. Moreover, as collateral for such economic assistance, China is being allowed to build

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van as the finishing touch often emphasised by China, as a part of advance into the Indian Ocean. China's intention of China is to no longer the island where administration took refuge in the revolution" but "is to be procured for China only in Asia-West Pacific". the Pacific. For hegemony in the Pacific, the Chinese must be dominating the Pacific. In other words, it is no longer "conclusion" but "liberation" in the past but "liberation" is the national strategy. It must be noted that "liberation of Taiwan" will be. An armed attack on Japan, saying that Japan cannot cause Okinawa, which is the next target of China. This is possible if the island is no longer there and the coastal waters there procure "territory in the Indian Pacific". Unfortunately, China does not have the military to support such advance by China.

China as the footholds in the Indian Ocean

China is using Myanmar as a part of advance into the Indian Ocean. Myanmar is isolated from China with which it is among the leading nations in the world. China, using this as a road that traverses up to the Indian Ocean for economic assistance. China is a major factor for such economic being allowed to build

naval and communication bases in Hainji and Koko Islands in Myanmar. These are the entry points to the Indian Ocean from South China Sea. This is a strategic move for advance into the Indian Ocean.

As a part of its policy to advance into the Indian Ocean, China is extending military support to Pakistan. Pakistan's medium distance ballistic missile, *Ghauri*, is said to have been developed based on technical support from China. This missile has all the main Indian cities within its range. China has been extending military support to Pakistan since the time of the cold war. The typical instance of this is the handing over of blue print of uranium nuclear warhead for Tofu DF2A by China to Pakistan in the 1980s.³ This support to Pakistan was based on the logic of "an enemy's enemy is an ally", because the Soviet Union, which was confronting China in its interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, was supporting India and also because of the border dispute between India and China. However, this is essentially a tactical move to advance into the Indian Ocean.

China has no territory that faces the Sea of Japan. However, China's territory close to North Korean and Russian borders is closest to the Sea of Japan. As a result, China is supporting North Korea under the pretext of building the port for economic development of Tomanko region and has the secret design to use it as a naval base.

Simultaneously, with these activities, aiming at enhancing its influence on other South East Asian nations, China is strengthening its ties with the ASEAN countries and the approach to the Chinese merchants settled in these countries is also being strengthened. Under such circumstances, it is a point of interest whether these Chinese merchants abroad, who control

the economy and majority of the mass media in these countries, support China or a free Taiwan or are loyal solely to the country of domicile.

Securing the long-cherished anti-America Nuclear Deterrence

People's Republic of China that was "born from cannon" is earnestly pursuing reinforcement of military power not only in its Navy but other areas too. China has successfully developed mobile long distance inter continental ballistic missiles (ICBM) like Tofu DF 31 and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) like Kyoro JL II. If the deployment starts, China will have second strike capability against America – its long-cherished desire ever since it embarked on nuclear armament based on the unfortunate resolve of the then Foreign Minister that "China will carry out nuclear armament even at the cost of not wearing pants". China's second strike capability means that America will lose its first strike capability against China. This will complete China's "minimum deterrence strategy".

China has already deployed ICBMs like Tofu DF 5. It is housed in a fixed silo but the vulnerability against preemptive attack by America is high. Since Tofu 31 uses solid fuel and multiple nuclear warheads and can be moved by road, its invulnerability is high and, thus, the chances of surviving a preemptive attack are also high. At the same time, capability to break through the ballistic defence system is also high. Further, Kyoro II loaded on strategic atomic power submarine too has high rate of invulnerability. As a result, China should be able to effectively restrain a nuclear attack or threat of one by America. Moreover, along with the successful development of "Tofu 31", it has also successfully developed the neutron bombs.

On the other hand, China, in order to have the capability to be a hegemon in the Asia Pacific region, is giving emphasis to improvement in its air and outer space war potential. China's Air Force has been sarcastically referred to as the "War Museum" because of its having many old aircraft. But, of late, high performance aircraft like the SU 27 and SU 30 from Russia and Sengeki 8 II manufactured domestically have been inducted in large numbers. Of these, SU 30 can be loaded with air-to-ship missiles. Moreover, in 1999, Airborne Early Warning aircraft (AEW) Y8 was inducted and even purchase of Airborne Warning and Control Aircraft (AWACS) A 50 from Russia is being considered.

In the autumn of 2003, China launched a manned spaceship *Kamibune* and became the third nation in the world to successfully carry out such a venture. This suggests that China is devoting considerable effort to building of space war potential and that its technical level in this regard is quite high. Spy satellite has been separated from *Kamibune* and successfully launched into the orbit. American and European military specialists regard these technical development efforts as evidence of putting emphasis on possessing the capability to shoot down America's spy satellite and Global Positioning System (GPS). China already possesses Anti-Satellite Attack Weapons (ASAT) that can attack America's GPS with laser from earth. Moreover, China's endeavour is to possess indigenous GPS satellite. America's GPS is sufficient for civil demand but the reason behind China trying to develop an indigenous GPS system is none other than for military usage, such as guidance or control of ballistic missiles.

Second highest defence expenditure in the world

China's defence expenditure has been increasing continuously in recent years. The official defence budget announced by China every year shows a rise of two digits for the last over ten years. This only includes training of People's Liberation Army, maintenance and repair of equipment but procurement cost of armaments and R & D expenditure is not included in it. Moreover, the purchase cost of weapons from Russia is also not included. Therefore, the sudden surge in the official defence budget does not directly reflect the increase in weapons and equipment. However, this indirectly suggests that the modernisation of weapons and equipment of the People's Liberation Army is progressing at a rapid pace. As a result, expense on account of training on latest scientific weapons, and their repair and maintenance has increased. This in turn is pushing up the official defence budget.

There are various estimates made by different institutions and scholars regarding China's actual defence expenditure. These projections put it at 1.7 times to 10 times more than the official figure. Mr Wang Shaoguang puts it at 1.7 times, America's Department of Defense puts it at 3.2 times, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) at 4.5 times, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) puts it at 5.5 times, American Armament Control Disarmament Bureau puts it at 8 times and RAND puts it at 10 times.⁴ RAND'S estimation, which happens to be highest, has been calculated based on PPP (Purchase Parity Price).

China's actual defence expenditure is next only to America. According to the

Department of State *Expenditure and 2000*⁵, America's was the highest in 1999, was second with \$100 billion, third with \$43.2 billion, that of China's defence

Will the Chinese

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Defence expenditure in the

Defence expenditure has been rising sharply in recent years. The budget announced by China shows a rise of two digits for the year 2000. This only includes training of the Army, maintenance and procurement cost of weapons & D expenditure is not included. However, the purchase cost of weapons is also not included. The sudden surge in the official figures does not directly reflect the actual spending on weapons and equipment. It merely suggests that the expansion of the People's Liberation Army is progressing. As a result, expenditure on upgrading the latest scientific equipment for repair and maintenance in turn is pushing up the total.

Various estimates made by different scholars regarding defence expenditure. These range from 1.7 times to 10 times the official figure. Mr Wang Jizhong at 1.7 times, America's RAND puts it at 3.2 times, the Center for Strategic Studies at Stockholm International Institute (SIPRI) puts it at 4 times, the Arms and Armament Control Authority puts it at 8 times and the RAND puts it at 10 times.⁴ RAND'S estimate is the highest, based on PPP (Purchase

power parity) defence expenditure is calculated. According to the

Department of State in *World Military Expenditure and Army Transfers 1999-2000*⁵, America's defence expenditure was the highest in 1999 at \$281 billion and China was second with \$88.9 billion. Japan stood third with \$43.2 billion, which is about half of that of China's defence expenditure.

Will the Chinese empire collapse?

When viewing China as a disturbance factor, in addition to the scenario when it would enhance its national power and gain hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, one also needs to consider the possibility of collapse of the Chinese empire due to intensification of various contradictions. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, People's Republic of China became the largest colonial empire. It has the largest area ever in its history and has 55 other races under its control. Collapse of such a vast empire will have an adverse influence on the neighbouring nations, quite different from the emergence of a hegemonic China.

One factor that can be cited for the collapse is that the People's Republic of China exceeds the scale of a nation that can be controlled unilaterally by one political authority. One of the main reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was a huge nation was the same.

The second reason could be the intensification of contradictions arising out of the induction of market economy system into the communist economy (generally controlled economy). These points are described in details in Gordon Chang's book *The Coming Collapse of China*.⁶ Market economy and capitalist economy are based on the political thought of freedom. It can be said that there is a limit to the use of market forces only for the management of the economy, while

maintaining autocracy of the communist party. However, if the autocratic rule of the Communist Party is slackened, the demand for independence by other races will rise. In fact, independence movement by the Uighur race in the Uighur region is already gaining momentum. Terrorist activities too are frequent. Hereafter, there is a possibility that separation and independence movement by the Manchu race (the Manchu Empire), Mongol race (former empire) and others, will strengthen.

The third reason is inherent in the economic system it adopts. A nation at a specific stage of economic development becomes highly unstable. It is because of factors such as imbalanced growth of economy, rise in the education level of the people, progress of the mass media, clash between native and alien cultures coming in along with foreign technology and management techniques and changes in the socially dominant strata. China too is facing such an unstable phase.

Compared to the erstwhile Soviet Union, China is more flexible in addressing the shortcomings of Communism such as induction of market economy. Moreover, since it is meticulously pursuing the assimilation policies regarding other races, the movement for separation or independence is weak compared to the movements of minorities in the Soviet Union. In any case, China is steadily building its position as a hegemonic nation in Asia-Pacific. At the same time, one cannot ignore the impending risk of a collapse.

Situation in Taiwan Strait and Japan's security

China has announced that if the movement for independence strengthens in Taiwan, China would liberate it by force. This

was stated in view of the intention of Taiwan to revise its Constitution, change the name of the country, national flag and national anthem. Japan and Taiwan have common economic and security issues at stake. If Taiwan is liberated by China, by force, it will sound the death-knell for the Japanese economy, as the 'near sea' will become inland sea for China.

China's strategy of aggression on Taiwan is believed to be not one of sudden use of force, but to register a victory without any war. China will adopt the method of establishing its control through diplomatic and economic means. Moreover, one needs to take note of the presence of thought or an attitude of "revolutionary optimism" among the Communists. To be more precise, when the situation is bad, they do not try to carry out things by force. As believers of historical materialism, they have no doubt that someday their objective will be fulfilled. Hence they do not do anything unreasonable. Therefore, if America maintains a cooperative relation with Taiwan on security, aggression against Taiwan by China can be restrained.

China continues to make attempts to disassociate Taiwan from America, though with no success. But the strategy on the economic front is delivering results. At present, Taiwan is making large investments in China, which can prove fatal for Taiwan. Economic superiority can bring about disadvantage from political and security points of view. Earlier Nazi Germany carried out a plan to rebuild its national economy, after the defeat in World War I, based on borrowings from East European countries. It was successful in making these countries follow it by using the same loan. What needs caution is that if the situation becomes advantageous for armed aggression against Taiwan, China

will not hesitate to use force. In Japan, there is a strong opinion that since China is attaching so much importance to economic growth; it is not likely to resort to armed action, which will invite international criticism. However, one should not forget that even a practical person like Deng attacked Vietnam, a Communist country, to "teach it a lesson" and suppressed young students who were demanding democratisation by force at the Tiananmen Square.

Whether China resorts to aggression against Taiwan or not depends on the capability of America to intervene. And America's intervention will strongly rely on whether Japan allows the use of Okinawa Base or not. In addition, decline in the capability of sea control by America in Taiwan Strait is also a matter of concern as the retaliation capability of China against the American Seventh Fleet has increased with the induction of high performance anti-ship missile loaded Sovremenny missile destroyer and SU 30 loaded with air to ship missiles.

In the case of an armed action initiated by China against Taiwan, it will use a preemptive attack strategy used by the Bush administration to justify its action. The US Department of Defense in the Cabinet Report of 2003, titled, *Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China*, mentions that China has adopted 'preemptive attack' as a suppression strategy, as well as a military doctrine.⁷ It is believed that this is aimed at averting the US criticism as well as keeping in mind the international opinion in general. In case of an attack, the following methods could be adopted:-

- (a) Simultaneously, with imposition of economic sanctions and freezing and confiscating of Taiwanese assets in

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use force. In Japan, there is a notion that since China is of great importance to economic growth, it is likely to resort to armed action, despite international criticism. One should not forget that even after Deng attacked Vietnam, he tried to "teach it a lesson" by sending young students who were traumatised by force at the end of the war.

China resorts to aggression or not depends on the situation. America is likely to intervene. And China will strongly rely on its own power. It owns the use of Okinawa. In addition, decline in the control by America in Taiwan is a matter of concern as the policy of China against the US Fleet has increased with high performance anti-ship missiles. It is likely to use its remnant missile destroyer with air to ship missiles.

In an armed action initiated against Taiwan, it will use a strategy used by the Bush administration to justify its action. The US response in the Cabinet Report *Annual Report on the Military Situation in the People's Republic of China*, has adopted a 'preemptive' strategy, as well as 'deterrence'. It is believed that this is the US criticism as well as the international opinion in the event of an attack, the following strategy is adopted:-

Simultaneously, with imposition of economic sanctions and freezing of Taiwanese assets in

main land, China would block the Taiwan Strait by mining.

(b) As it did during previous presidential elections, it would shoot ballistic missiles in the vicinity of Taiwan under the garb of carrying out exercises.

(c) It will occupy islands close to the Continent such as Chin Men Tao, Baso Tao and so on.

(d) It will gather fishing ships in the vicinity of Taiwan so as to deprive American carrier mobile troops of their mobility and weaken American sea control capability in the Taiwan Strait. Simultaneously, it will carry out destructive activities through spies and conspirers already planted in Taiwan.

(e) It will threaten Japan by nuclear weapons capability so that Japan refuses use of the Okinawa Base by America.

America's "Nuclear Umbrella" and Nuclear Capability of China

If China deploys Tofu 31 and uses atomic power submarine loaded with Kyoro II, China will come to have second-strike capability against America. This will render the "nuclear umbrella" against China, by the US along with allied and friendly nations, meaningless. America's nuclear umbrella is considered as deterrence against China. Japan will have to cope with this challenge".

In Japan, Sato Cabinet adopted "4 Nuclear Policies" at the end of 1960s, which have continued till date. They are :-

(a) To rely on America for nuclear deterrence.

(b) Maintain non-nuclear principles i.e., not to make or possess nuclear weapons and not to allow their entry into Japan.

(c) Adopt a positive stance towards peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

(d) Promote nuclear disarmament.

The initial understanding was that in case Japan cannot rely on the U S nuclear umbrella for some reason, it should review the non-nuclear principles.

In addition to decline of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) setup and increase in the nuclear capability of China, there is a view among many countries that Japan may go nuclear too. However, unfortunately, there is no genuine debate in Japan on nuclear armament either at the government or public level. As a result, there is no debate even on issues such as "the disadvantages if Japan does not go nuclear" and "the mental preparedness Japanese people need if Japan is to adhere to the policy of a nuclear-free Japan". It is so because Japan is the only country to have experienced atomic bombing, and, such issues are beyond debate; a sort of taboo that cannot be criticised.

Based on an examination of Japan's possibility of going nuclear from the political, economic and technical fronts, Captain (now retired General) Endicott of America stated that "Japan will not go nuclear unless Japanese way of life is under threat."⁸ However, even if the nation's existence is at risk, the situation in Japan is such that one cannot expect that there could be a move to go nuclear. Moreover, when China successfully launched its manned spaceship, there was a majority opinion that "If Japan wishes, it can also do it" but in Japan, the

peaceful use and military use of rockets is clearly divided, and there has been no research about its military use.

MOVE IN NORTH KOREA TO GO NUCLEAR

North Korea's programme to go nuclear is one of the sources of turbulence in East Asia. Over a period of 40 years, North Korea has devoted all its energies to develop nuclear technology. Like other countries, excluding Japan, there is no distinction in North Korea between peaceful and military use of nuclear technology. As for intent behind the nuclear programme of North Korea, the following can be enumerated:-

- (a) To simultaneously secure absolute military superiority against South Korea by becoming a nuclear nation, as well as restrain America's armed intervention or threat.
- (b) Secure economic assistance and food by using nuclear weapon development as a threat or for trading.
- (c) Overcome problems such as power shortage.

In Japan, the concept of trading for overcoming challenge like power shortage is there but in America, the concept of securing military superiority is quite strong. However, the motive behind a country adopting a particular policy is not necessarily singular; mostly there are multiple motives. In case of North Korea too, all the above-mentioned motives could be there. At one point of time it was being said about North Korea that it is a matter of time before it collapses but Kim Regime, not only evolved the "tactic of a weak person turning defiant", but has also continued the nuclear programme. None of the countries surrounding North Korea want its collapse.

South Korea, while continuing to say that "realization of a unified Korea is the dream of the Korean people", has great anxiety regarding accepting the people of North Korea in the event of a North Korean collapse. It is because South Korea has seen the sufferings of West Germany, which was a greater power than South Korea, after it embraced East Germany. This will not only bring about decline in the living standards of the South Koreans but may also lead to political confusion as North Koreans are influenced by the communist ideology.

America too does not want the Kim Regime to last long. But if a unified Korea comes into being, reason for continuation of stationing of American forces in South Korea, will be lost. Moreover, if one takes into account the rising anti-American sentiment in present South Korea, as also the historical past of a unified Korea, it is a foregone conclusion that it will become pro-Chinese. As a result, strategic balance in Asia will tilt in favour of China. Thus, even if America expects the collapse of the Kim Regime based on a coup d'etat, it does not want North Korea to collapse as a nation.

For China too, collapse of North Korea will mean extinction of a communist country, which has maintained lip and tooth relation with it for long. In direct contrast to the concern of America, China is apprehensive that in the worst case scenario, American forces stationed in South Korea could advance northwards to the border of a unified Korea. Moreover, if North Korea collapses, the consequent large influx of refugees into China would be unavoidable. Therefore, China continues to support North Korea not only on economic, energy and food fronts but also on the military front. If a unified Korea becomes pro-Chinese, it will become difficult for Russia also to secure influence on the Korean peninsula.

Emergence of most undesirable scenario is political, economic unified Korea, the path to achieve internal unity outside. It is not difficult becomes an automaton if South Korea in technology and financial weapons development Korea, it will become a nation. Through the South Koreans, usual but a unified Korea a military superpower emergence of a new door, economic assistance out of Japan.

The continuing programme is not Japan, there is a America will put a nuclear program policy of economic pressure have not American forces and Afghanistan. adopt the preemptive Iraq.

In case North America will be the USA has yielded to it to China, which development of North and explicitly. Moscow has supported the North Korea since the Union, has been in 'six nation deliberation stop North Korea America's response view of such a situation

, while continuing to say of a unified Korea is the "reunited people", has great difficulty accepting the people of the event of a North Korean unification. Since South Korea has seen the reunification of Germany, which was divided between East and West Germany, after its unification. This will not only improve the living standards of the South but may also lead to a reunification as North Koreans are influenced by communist ideology.

South Korea does not want the Kim regime to continue. But if a unified Korea is the reason for continuation of the forces in South Korea, however, if one takes into account the anti-American sentiment in South Korea, as also the historical animosity towards the United States, it is a foregone conclusion that it will become pro-Chinese. The balance in Asia will tilt in favour of China. Thus, even if America opposes the Kim Regime, it does not want North Korea to become a nation.

The collapse of North Korea as a communist country, and the lip and tooth relation between the two, is in direct contrast to the situation in China. China is apprehensive of the reunification scenario, American policy towards South Korea could lead to the border of a unified Korea. If North Korea collapses, an influx of refugees into South Korea is unavoidable. Therefore, South Korea supports North Korea not only on energy and food fronts but on the political front. If a unified Korea is achieved, it will become difficult for the United States to secure influence on the

Emergence of a unified Korea is the most undesirable scenario for Japan. If there is political, economic and social confusion in a unified Korea, the political leaders will try to achieve internal unity by creating enemies outside. It is not difficult to imagine that Japan becomes an automatic choice then. Moreover, if South Korea injects its science and technology and funds into the nuclear weapons development programme of North Korea, it will become an imposing nuclear nation. Through the merger of North and South Korea, usual military force will diminish but a unified Korea will undoubtedly become a military superpower. In addition to the emergence of a military superpower next door, economic assistance will be squeezed out of Japan.

The continuation of the nuclear programme is not desirable for Japan. In Japan, there is a high expectation that America will put a stop to North Korea's nuclear programme. However, American policy of economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure have not yielded result. Moreover, American forces are preoccupied with Iraq and Afghanistan. Consequently, it cannot adopt the preemptive attack strategy as in Iraq.

In case North Korea goes nuclear, America will be held responsible for it. The USA has yielded the leadership for stopping it to China, which has supported nuclear development of North Korea both implicitly and explicitly. Moreover, Russia too, which has supported the nuclear development of North Korea since the days of the Soviet Union, has been inducted into the group of 'six nation deliberation'. In case this fails to stop North Korea from going nuclear, America's responsibility will be one-sixth. In view of such a situation, the focus is being

shifted to prevention of transfer of nuclear, ballistic missiles and related technology.

Nuclear Programme of North Korea

North Korea, does not possess a nuclear weapon system but is making progress. Nuclear weapon system, implies the nuclear warhead and the means of transportation and the C³I. Since North Korea has not been able to successfully make the precise detonator for plutonium bomb and make it small so that it can be loaded on the medium-range ballistic missile No Dong, it can be said to be still at the device stage.

North Korea, announced that it is also carrying out development of an uranium bomb. North Korea has five uranium mines and can produce good quality uranium. Two reasons can be considered for the development of uranium bomb :-

- (a) Since development of detonator for plutonium bomb has not been successful, it has switched to uranium bomb whose detonator is simple to make.
- (b) It has begun development of hydrogen bomb (mature nuclear bomb) and has, therefore, begun efforts for possessing uranium bomb.

However, with limitations pertaining to level of science and technology as well as funds, it will be appropriate to think that it has not yet embarked on the development of the hydrogen bomb.

If North Korea is permitted to pursue its nuclear programme, during the next two or three years, it is likely to be successful in possessing nuclear weapons. If North Korea can extract plutonium from 8000 used nuclear

fuel rods, which it possesses, it can obtain weapon grade Pu239 sufficient to make six plutonium bombs.

North Korea and Transfer of Nuclear Technology

There are certain technologies of weapons of mass destruction that are indigenously produced by North Korea but majority of them have been inducted from China, Russia, Pakistan, Iran and other countries.⁹ Originally, nuclear related technologies of North Korea were inducted from the erstwhile Soviet Union during the Cold War. Subsequently Russian scientists have individually been involved in North Korea's nuclear weapon development.

Weapon-grade plutonium, Pu 239 from used nuclear fuel rods has reportedly been supplied by China maintaining a façade of export by a private company for profit. But since such an important chemical substance is kept under the strict control of the Government, it cannot be done without the government authorities looking the other way.

For the development of uranium bomb that North Korea has just started, it is indispensable to have centrifugal separator that can enrich uranium(U) 235 to about 94 per cent. It is also reported that Pakistan was carrying out education and training of engineers responsible for nuclear weapon manufacturing. In fact, Pakistan President Musharraf promised American President Bush in June 2003 that Pakistan would discontinue such military support to North Korea.

No-Dong is reportedly the ballistic missile, which was completed under the cooperation of engineers who had developed the Soviet Union's sea launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) R-13 (NATO Code Name

SSN-4) and R-21 (NATO Code Name SSN-5) in the initial phase during the Cold War. It is for this reason that North Korea has many SLBM technologies, in spite of it being based on the Scud technology.

Possession of weapons of mass destruction (such as nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles) and related technology by North Korea is not only casting a dark shadow on the security of East Asia but is also a big threat to the international society through the transfer of such weapons and technologies elsewhere. It is because there is a strong possibility of them being exported not only to countries of South Asia or Middle and Near East, but also sold to terrorist groups across the world.

North Korea's weapons of mass destruction and related technologies are for manufacturing such weapons within the country and at the same time are a means to obtain precious foreign exchange. Production of No-Dong was started in 1997 but soon thereafter it started its export. Pakistan's *Ghauri* III and Iran's *Shehab* 3 are the missiles based on North Korea's No-Dong. North Korea seems to have a pact with Pakistan and Iran from where it receives financial support for development of No-Dong and the results of development are passed on to them as a collateral.

Export of technology is being done not only as collateral for financial assistance but also to earn foreign exchange. In December 2002, naval vessels of America and Spain officially inspected Scud missiles made in North Korea being transported to Yemen through the Indian Ocean. Ultimately, they were released based on protests of the Yemenese government and a promise not to transfer them to any other country. This case is only the tip of the iceberg regarding transfer

of weapons of mass destruction technology by North Korea, as reported by media group in Indonesia a plutonium from North Korea.

Conclusion

A big change is taking place in the vicinity of Japan. A trend seems to have emerged of the mode of presence of international terrorism is doing so as a part of international terrorism is based on the ground in the mind the China germination is already of Guam base. The in an uni-polar world critically.

Notes

1. D.W. Bow International FP Feliciano, War", Julius Consensus".
2. The White House Strategy of America".
3. <http://www.world/pakistan>
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NATO Code Name SSN-se during the Cold War. It is that North Korea has many weapons, in spite of it being based on technology.

of weapons of mass destruction as nuclear weapons, and related technology by only casting a dark shadow over East Asia but is also a big threat to the international society through the weapons and technologies because there is a strong demand for being exported not only to Asia or Middle and Near East but to terrorist groups across the world.

's weapons of mass destruction technologies are for the development of weapons within the same time are a means to gain exchange. Production started in 1997 but soon ended its export. Pakistan's *Shehab-3* are the missiles of North Korea's No-Dong. North Korea has a pact with Pakistan where it receives financial support in return for No-Dong and the technology are passed on to them.

Technology is being done not only with financial assistance but also through exchange. In December 2002, the U.S. of America and Spain intercepted Scud missiles made in North Korea and transported to Yemen in the Red Sea. Ultimately, they were destroyed on protests of the U.S. and a promise not to transport to other country. This case is a precedent regarding transfer

of weapons of mass destruction or its technology by North Korea. It has been reported by media that Al Qaeda terrorist group in Indonesia and Philippines are buying plutonium from North Korea.¹⁰

Conclusion

A big change is taking place in the vicinity of Japan. America anticipating such a trend seems to have begun re-examination of the mode of presence in East Asia. America is doing so as a part of its measures against international terrorism but more than that, it is based on the grand strategy keeping in mind the 'China of 21st Century'. Its germination is already seen in the reactivation of Guam base. The future of military situation in an uni-polar world needs to be analysed critically.

Notes

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DISCUSSION

**Lieutenant General Tomohiro Okamoto
(Retd)**

The most popular word in Japan and in the West is the terminology of BICR countries - representing Brazil, India, China and Russia. We pay attention to these four. But among these, Brazil is too far and China and Russia are not democratic countries, whereas India is. That is why India became the focus of this international conference. Further, Professor Yoshihara has explained why Japan pays attention to China. China is actually a Communist Party led; they consider the East and South China Sea to belong to their territory. They also try to have control over Japan Sea and even Indian Ocean.

Rear Admiral Raja Menon (Retd)

I comprehend Japan's inhibitions about nuclear power but cannot understand Japan's inhibition on the use of naval power as benefiting Japan now that it has legitimacy in international politics. Japan has a self-restraining 1000-odd nautical miles. On a naval chart on the oceans, there are in fact no lines. Hence the 1000 miles is something that exists in the mind, it does not exist in geography. Japan cannot also escape the fact that the second largest navy in the world today is the Japanese Navy. The most ocean going navy with the largest reach in terms of sustainability at sea is the Japanese Navy. Japan has already perfected a nuclear reactor capable of going into sea; the Japanese conventional submarines are the most advanced in the world. Use of this force is legal. Ocean is a highway that does not belong to anybody. I understand that in Japan there is an inhibition to even debate on the nuclear issue. But then that itself is perilous. When debates are suppressed it eventually

explodes. What is stopping an articulation of a reasonable Japanese maritime power?

Professor Tsuneo Yoshihara

Japanese Navy is the second largest as far as tonnage is concerned. But capability-wise, it has no striking capability. This is true of the Japanese Army, as well as the Air Force. Japan's defensive policy leaves the striking capability to the USA. What Japan has is a negative defence policy. Weapons are also restricted, based on this policy. There is no move to review this policy either. Hence, under these circumstances, Japanese Navy is not second largest operationally.

**Vice Admiral Mihir Roy, PVSM, AVSM
(Retd)**

There is a difference of opinion between the Japanese Navy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the country as such on matters such as that of Iraq. Will this continue or will this change towards cooperation?

Professor Tsuneo Yoshihara

Personally speaking, Japanese stand ought to change. But no such possibility exists under the current largest ruling Party - the Liberal Democratic Party. If the largest opposition Party - the Democratic Party - comes to power, there is a possibility that they would go back on the present state than any advancement. The Ministry controls the agencies. That is the aperture in the Japanese political structure.

**Lieutenant General Tomohiro Okamoto
(Retd)**

The government is thinking on the lines of a defence oriented strategy. Professor Yoshihara has stated this to be already outdated and the need to change this policy.

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FIRST SESSION : SECOND PAPER

THE SECURITY SITUATION IN SOUTHERN ASIA

AIR COMMODORE JASJIT SINGH, AVSM, VrC, VM (RETD)

When the Cold War ended at the end of 1980s it was obvious that the security situation around the world would change in many fundamental ways from what we all had got used to since the Second World War. Many changes, of course, had already been under way for quite some time. For example, the decolonisation process had produced more than a hundred sovereign states during the Cold War. And while, they had limited impact on the global security environment, their own national and regional security environment was deeply affected by the ongoing Cold War. Over 300 wars were fought in the territories of the developing countries with the great powers backing one or the other, even interchanging their support as happened in Somalia. Arms transfers became a key foreign policy tool for the developed countries. Much more can be said. But the main point is that the dynamics of security (and insecurity) established during the Cold War did not simply go away with the end of the Cold War. On the other hand, the Cold War left behind an enormous amount and variety of debris that continues to impinge on the regional and security environment across the world. This is not to affirm that all the debris was created by the Cold War, but only to emphasise that the period of the Cold War where strategic interests of the super powers tended to drive the strategic environment inevitably created their own consequences where many regional powers pursued their own agendas which were not

necessarily promoting future peace or prosperity.

security'Landscape

Nowhere has the debris of the Cold War been impinging on the regional security environment than in Southern Asia.* At the core is the problem that the Cold War ended more than a decade ago, but this unique historical change does not seem to be adequately reflected in the thinking and policy of leadership across the world. For example, militarisation of foreign policy has not been wound down, but in many cases new forms of militarisation, like the use of sponsored political use of religious terrorism, acquired added salience. This had acquired special characteristics during the last decade of the Cold War when it was taken forward to a more vicious system under the Taliban.

But the new century also brought much greater focus on the new and old factors that shape the security environment in this region. This no doubt was triggered at the start of the new millennium essentially by the 11 September 2001 tragedy (the multiple terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September, 2001) across the globe, to be followed by the war in Afghanistan to remove the Taliban, and the Iraq War in 2003. Iraq is outside the region that we are considering. But the war and its aftermath have a profound impact on events in Southern Asia and beyond.

* The term here is meant to include the region of Asia that covers China, Central Asia, Persian Gulf, South Asia including Afghanistan, Myanmar and parts of ASEAN countries like Thailand, etc. and northern Indian Ocean.

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Tomohiro Okamoto
(Retd)

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The roots of that tragedy of 11 September 2001 and its ramifications go back to Southern Asia when the Cold War rivalry of the two super powers played itself out in the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Both pulled out at the end of 1980s, but the fallout in the shape of the politico-strategic debris remains even now, its polluting consequences, especially in their impact in humanitarian terms, deeply affecting the situation in Southern Asia since then and even reaching out all the way across to the western hemisphere. At the same time, there are indigenous factors that shape the security environment in the region. Four issues (obviously not exclusive) are discussed in this paper as representative of the nature of the factors and trends affecting the regional security environment in Southern Asia:

- (a) Weakening of states and their institutions.
- (b) Spread of terrorism motivated by religious ideologies and political motivations.
- (c) Erosion of the arms control and non-proliferation regimes with enhanced potential for nuclear proliferation.
- (d) Changing balance of military power.

Weakening Nation States

A large number of states, especially in Southern Asia, today are much weaker than five decades ago when the colonial system withdrew from this region. The only exceptions appear to be China and India. And the worse cases include Afghanistan, Central Asian states (during the past decade), Pakistan (during the past two decades). At one level this can be seen in terms of weakening of

domestic sovereignty of states, very often by policies taken in the name of sovereign rights and national interests by small non-representative groups holding power, and external intervention to control domestic, political and economic systems. Afghanistan and Pakistan are symptomatic where the latter played a key role in subverting the sovereignty of the former for nearly three decades. At another level there are mounting pressures on national sovereignty triggered by diverse factors ranging from globalisation phenomenon to the concepts of intervention in the name of humanitarian reasons.' On the other hand, sovereignty and its sustenance are crucial to the process of nation-state building.

The basic fact needs to be recognised that regional and national stability are necessary for rebuilding the nation-state system that has been under tremendous pressure in parts of Southern Asia. Definite measures are required by the international community to reduce and eliminate the factors that adversely impact on peace and stability. India's own priorities in this context require the highest priority to be accorded to its socio-economic development. But this also requires an environment of peace and stability inside India as well as in the broader region of Southern Asia. It may be recalled that the Cold War rivalry and war in Afghanistan which actually started in mid-1970s and propelled further by Pakistan as a "front-line" state till it became the primary participant in that war in the 1990s, had a direct negative impact on India's security, the effects of which continue to plague the security environment of the region and beyond.

It is in this context that the future of Pakistan (and Afghanistan) has to be viewed. In spite of Pakistan having pursued a

conscious policy of terrorism, the bi Pakistan's stability progress continue interest. On the c been going down nearly two decad coinciding with its "strategic depth" through terrorism in the borders that it a way this cont objectives that Pak their country's po policies to destabil west and east, in on "bleeding India

Unfortunately broader world, F downhill for tv institutions it had imperial days hav the army, which being apolitical, h and politicking institutions down t comparison with a

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ty of states, very often by the name of sovereign rights. It is erected by small non-supers holding power, and on to control domestic, economic systems. Afghanistan is symptomatic where the latter is subverting the sovereignty in nearly three decades. At the same time, there are mounting pressures on the country triggered by diverse factors from globalisation and concepts of intervention for humanitarian reasons.¹ On the one hand, the loss of sovereignty and its impact is crucial to the process of

needs to be recognised that national stability are eroding the nation-state system under tremendous

Southern Asia. Definite pressure is being exerted by the international community to eliminate the factors that threaten peace and stability. In this context, require to be accorded to its socio-economic. But this also requires peace and stability inside the broader region of which may be recalled that the war in Afghanistan which lasted 1970s and propelled as a "front-line" state till it was a participant in that war had direct negative impact on the effects of which continue to affect the environment of the

In the context that the future of Afghanistan has to be viewed. Pakistan having pursued a

conscious policy of sponsoring transnational terrorism, the basic fact remains that Pakistan's stability, security, prosperity and progress continue to be a key Indian national interest. On the other hand, Pakistan has been going down the instability spiral for nearly two decades, the period curiously coinciding with its pursuit of the concept of "strategic depth" and prosecuting a war through terrorism in the name of jihad across the borders that it has formally accepted. In a way this contrasts with the strategic objectives that Pakistani elites define to guide their country's policies where they pursue policies to destabilise its neighbours to the west and east, including through the belief on "bleeding India through a thousand cuts!"

Unfortunately for the region and the broader world, Pakistan has been going downhill for two decades. Whatever institutions it had inherited from the British imperial days have been eroded. And even the army, which inherited the traditions of being apolitical, has delved deep into politics and politicking further pushing state institutions down the instability spiral. And the comparison with a rising India is stark indeed.

Pakistan has nurtured its feudal society at the cost of treating all human beings equal. Poverty has been rising, especially during the past two decades. There are now over 42 million people below the poverty line compared to about 17 million in the mid-1980s. Sustained overspending on military at around 6.5 percent of the GDP and heavy borrowing since the 1970s have led to serious fiscal problems. By the end of the century, debt servicing and military budgets consumed more than 110-percent of the country's revenue budgets year after year. Runaway population growth at 2.8 per cent per year has been compounding its problems.

Education has suffered grievously and the only option left to the youth is the madrassas (religious schools) which proliferated to over 200,000 at the turn of the century. A large number of them actually teach radical extremist interpretation of Islam exhorting the young minds to take up arms in the name of religion. With over 54 per cent of the population below the age of 25 years, unemployment has added to the woes of the youth. Given the socio-economic mess in which Pakistan elites have driven the country to, jihad itself became an occupation and a source of material and moral sustenance.

Pakistan, instead of pursuing policies to better the lives of its own people, pursued its concept of "strategic depth" in Afghanistan since the early 1970s through covert actions. It would be well to remember that Afghanistan is the territory where irregular guerrillas were armed and led into a war for geo-political goals (not the least of which was the oil and gas resources of Central Asia) by the US through Pakistan in the name of jihad. Legitimisation of the process was done by calling them "Mujahideen" — the soldiers of Islam who killed in the name of God. The process had no doubt been provided with the intellectual basis for decades. But it derived its real impetus from the Saudi policies beginning from the oil crisis of 1973 to acquire a boost during the Afghanistan war of the 1980s.² The three-decade old war and strife has resulted in near total destabilisation of Afghanistan and its institutions. Continuing instability and the challenges to reverse it today impact the regional security environment in diverse ways, of which the growth of narcotics and terrorism are but a part.

Growth and Spread of Terrorism

There are a number of significant trends

in modern day terrorism that deserve attention:

(a) While trends of the past two centuries had made society inclusive to war, the trends of the past four decades are, in addition, making war inclusive to society. Expansion of war (and violent conflict) in social depth is one of the most serious challenges to democratic principle, society and peace (and hence prosperity and progress).

(b) Terrorism is being increasingly used as an instrument of politics and foreign policy. This is a pernicious reversal of civilised approach to dispute settlement in general and the current trend of democratisation and co-operative security in the world in particular. Its effectiveness has been increasing because of the ever-greater vulnerabilities of modern society to acts of terrorism where liberal democracies are especially at risk to this method of application of violent force.

(c) Democracies by their very nature are the most vulnerable to international terrorism but are also the best qualified to deal with international terrorism. However, they have also been the most reluctant (at least till 11 September, 2001) to take assertive action against terrorism because of the need to balance concerns for human rights.

(d) As a consequence of the foregoing and by itself contributing to the above phenomenon, the State has been losing its monopoly over the instruments of violence. During the Cold War the super powers pursued this as part of their strategy for dominance. Afghanistan was the classic example where

clandestine warfare was promoted by encouraging the spread of weapons, narcotics and violence into society on the strength of religious sentiments. The debris of Cold War has further eroded the control of the State over weapons.

(e) The centre of gravity of international terrorism shifted to Southern Asia by the 1980s. It needs to be noted that two of the world's three largest narcotics producing and exporting regions are also located in the same region (in fact contiguous to India's borders on the West as well as the East).

(f) Distinction between domestic terrorism and international terrorism has been diffusing due to greater external involvement in internal terrorist violence in a country. Today there is hardly any significant domestic armed conflict that does not actively receive political support, weapons, serious financial assistance and safe havens beyond the borders where terrorist acts are committed.

(g) Terrorism is shifting from its traditional political orientation to religious-ideology driven violence. Compared to their near absence three decades ago, today religious groups constitute over two-third of the militant and terrorist entities in the world. Ideological reasons had driven the Cold War and its hot segment, the proxy wars. Towards the end of the Cold War religion was increasingly exploited for political and ideological purposes in Afghanistan to provide motivation for war and violence. The nearly two-decade war in Afghanistan was fuelled and sustained by ideological factors — domestic,

regional, and to play an increasing role in states that are democratic. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination affected serious combination of potentially explosive religion and nationalism, a blend of the destructive power

(h) Pakistan introduced a new strategy after 1971, to actively seek terror as being a part of its strategy. As Pakistan Islamisation increased its strategic thinking encouraged. Malik has interpreted the guidelines, emphasis on Holy Quran to use terror as a Quranic military strategy to prepare oneself in order to strike the enemies guarding one's stricken by original).⁵ The enemy means, it is a condition of heart is obvious to be achieved by means and The then F Aslam Beg following years

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■ is shifting from its litical orientation to logy driven violence. heir near absence three today religious groups two-third of the militant entities in the world. ons had driven the Cold ot segment, the proxy the end of the Cold War reasingly exploited for eological purposes in rovide motivation for war ie nearly two-decade war as fuelled and sustained factors — domestic,

regional, and global. Religion is coming to play an increasing role in politics even in states that have pursued liberal democratic or socialist ideologies. International security is consequently affected seriously, because "...the combination of religion and politics is potentially explosive. The combination of religion and nationalism is stronger, but a blend of the three has an extremely destructive potential."³

(h) Pakistani leadership not only introduced greater Islamisation in society after 1971, but its military leadership actively sought to rationalise the use of terror as being sanctified by religion.⁴ As Pakistan moved towards greater Islamisation in the 1970s, it also sought increased inspiration from the religion for its strategic doctrine. General Zia encouraged such efforts. Brigadier SK Malik has fundamentally erroneously interpreted the Holy Quran in search for guidelines, and has placed a strong emphasis on the interpretation that the Holy Quran enjoins upon the believers to use terror as a weapon of war. 'The Quranic military strategy thus enjoins us to prepare ourselves for war to the utmost in order to strike terror into the hearts of the enemies, known or hidden, while guarding ourselves from being *terror-stricken* by the enemy' (emphasis in original).⁵ Terror struck into the hearts of the enemies, therefore, "is not only a means, it is the end in itself. Once a condition of terror into the opponent's heart is obtained, hardly anything is left to be achieved. It is the point where the means and the ends meet and merge." The then Pakistan army chief, General Aslam Beg and other army leaders in the following years inevitably quoted the book

to exhort the officers when addressing them, especially at the senior training establishments.

(j) Transnational crime has created tremendous opportunities for international terrorism to be pursued at scale and reach which was earlier not possible. The linkages between transnational crime and terrorism are deep. Narcotics growth and trade has been a major factor in sustaining terrorism across the world. For example, annual profits from global narcotics and other transnational crime are roughly estimated to be equal to \$ 500 billion, that is, equal to 2 per cent of global GDP.

(k) Globalisation has expanded and deepened the scope and extent of opportunities for terrorism that span the globe now. One has only to look at the international connections of the actors in the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing to grasp the scale and extent of global networking. The phenomenon of international terrorism by definition requires co-ordinated international responses while each country has to undertake specific measures of its own.

(l) We have witnessed the extremist forms of violent religion and ideology being fused into political war through other means of which Afghanistan in the 1980s was a prime example. The image of Soviet withdrawal (and hence the "defeat" of a super power by Islamist holy warriors) as a consequence of the Afghan jihad provided the incentive to pursue this strategy further by regional powers like Pakistan and Saudi Arabia pursuing their own agendas besides entities like the Al-Qaeda and individuals

like Osama bin-Laden supported by them but also in search of their own ideologies and political goals. This is what makes the US position in Iraq so crucial. Any image, leave alone the reality of the United States having to backtrack from its stated policies in Iraq would be interpreted as its "defeat" with far reaching consequences for international peace and security.

(m) The global war against terrorism has many facets. While there are common features of terrorism and the war against terrorism across the globe, each of the countries actually have to counter terrorism differently because of the unique features of terrorism they face.

Arms Control and Nuclear Proliferation

The paradigm of arms control and strategic stability as it evolved during the Cold War, with all its weaknesses, has all but disappeared. But a new framework has yet to emerge. This is basically due to the fact that arms control during the Cold War had been constructed essentially in a bilateral context by the two super powers on behalf of the military blocks they led. Arms control in the shape of non-proliferation and denial regimes negotiated by the two super powers were also meant to apply them to the larger body of developing countries and thus maintain the qualitative edge for the developed countries. In fact this was one of the few areas where the two super powers buried their hostility to come together to institute the non-proliferation regimes. But the end of the Cold War also ended the bipolar context of arms control.

Arms control was difficult enough in a bipolar framework, but in a world of 191

sovereign states far less aligned than the earlier period, arms control and non-proliferation regimes have to be negotiated, managed, and sustained in an essentially multilateral framework. Only where the interests of the dominant powers converge, like in perpetuating the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) etc., is there a potential for such regimes to be kept in place. In all other cases the arms control and non-proliferation regimes have reached their apogee in utility.

But that does not mean that this would also ensure non-proliferation on the strength of existing regimes. To begin with, the winding down of the Cold War had started to alter the security environment by the end of 1980s. Some states, like Argentine, Brazil and South Africa, decided to forego their programmes for economic and other benefits. On the other hand, some states which perceived threats to their security that could only be managed by weapons of mass destruction (like North Korea, Pakistan, Libya, Iraq, and Arab states looking for chemical weapons, etc.) opted to pursue acquisition of such weapons and/or refused to sign treaties like the Chemical Weapons Convention. In turn the United States refused to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva came to a grinding halt. The United States withdrew from the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to pursue the missile defence programmes.

The issue facing the international community is how to manage arms control and non-proliferation from the bilateral paradigm of the bipolar Cold War in which the regime is rooted to reconcile with an increasingly multi-polar world where the interests of a number of autonomous powers

have to be accommodated. Arms control and strategic stability in the current phase of transition of the world with many opportunities. But it is being made to emerge which would reflect realities on one's strategic challenges on the other.

The US-Russia reduce their strategic arsenals to around 2,000 each falls far short of what is possible more than the Cold War ended and Russia in NATO structure weapons are not permitted to be destroyed. The reported Nuclear United States provides the willingness to use in non-nuclear scenarios of pre-emption. The fact that the United States nuclear testing soon would inevitably outpace Russia following suit behind. At the same time, a noticeable global abolition of nuclear

Measures to reduce nuclear arsenals (banning the three weapons) have not been adopted by the dominant powers. The United States committed to no-first-use against nuclear states, but has not adopted the doctrine of no-credible nuclear weapon states could

far less aligned than the arms control and non-proliferation treaties have to be negotiated, sustained in an essentially new framework. Only where the dominant powers converge, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty, is there a potential for such an arrangement to be in place. In all other cases, the non-proliferation regimes are at an apogee in utility.

It does not mean that this would mean a reduction in proliferation on the strength of the arms control.

To begin with, the winding down of the arms race had started to alter the balance of power by the end of 1980s. Argentina, Brazil and South Africa forego their programmes for nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the perceived threats to the United States could only be managed by the destruction of nuclear weapons (like North Korea, Iraq, and Arab states like Libya, etc.) opted to acquire such weapons and/or to develop them. In turn the United States ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The negotiations for the Final Fissionable Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva are grinding halt. The United States in the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty issue the missile defence

including the international community to manage arms control and non-proliferation from the bilateral Cold War in which the superpowers had to reconcile with an emerging bipolar world where the role of autonomous powers

have to be accommodated into any arms control and strategic stability paradigm. The current phase of transition in reality presents the world with many challenges as well as opportunities. But it appears that little effort is being made to evolve a suitable model which would reflect the altered geopolitical realities on one side and the nature of strategic challenges in the coming decades on the other.

The US-Russia announcement to reduce their strategic nuclear weapons down to around 2,000 each is a welcome step but falls far short of what could be logically possible more than a decade after the Cold War ended and Russia was formally included in NATO structures. The decommissioned weapons are not planned by either country to be destroyed. On the other hand the reported Nuclear Posture Review of the United States provides a strong indication of the willingness to use nuclear weapons even in non-nuclear scenarios and under conditions of pre-emption. There is every likelihood now that the United States may re-commence nuclear testing sooner rather than later. This would inevitably open a Pandora's Box with Russia following suit and China not too far behind. At the same time there has been a noticeable global withdrawal of support to abolition of nuclear weapons.

Measures to enhance stability and reduce nuclear risks and dangers (like banning the threat and use of nuclear weapons) have not found favour with the dominant powers. Only China and India are committed to no-first-use of nuclear weapons restraining them strictly for defence only against nuclear threat. They have also adopted the doctrine of minimum (but credible) nuclear deterrence. Other nuclear weapon states continue to pursue strategy of

first or even early use while pushing for retaining huge quantities of nuclear weapons. Overall, the salience of nuclear weapons has been increasing rather than reducing in recent years. The US/UK war against Iraq on the grounds that Iraq's WMD pose a serious threat to their security while no evidence has emerged of even possession by Iraq after 1993, and the US decision to pursue diplomacy instead of war against North Korea which withdrew from the NPT after declaring it possessed at least two nuclear weapons, sends the wrong signals that such possession by even a weak state deters the most powerful forcing it to negotiate with it. This has far reaching consequences for security in future since it provides a strong incentive for countries to acquire nuclear weapons.

Paradoxically, as the Cold War wound down, and a strengthened non-proliferation regime was put into place including the permanent extension of the NPT, nuclear proliferation actually increased. There are now only three states (India, Pakistan and Israel) outside the NPT and they are de-facto nuclear weapon states. The only way another country could acquire nuclear weapons now would be one of the following two routes :-

- (a) Legally withdraw from the NPT after giving the mandatory notice and acquire nuclear weapons. Such a country would need to have the means to withstand the pressures of the international community against its actions, and would possibly be motivated by circumstances where its security concerns cannot be met by other means. With the passage of time and the development of developing countries, more and more countries would acquire the technology which puts them closer to weapons capability.

(b) Through clandestine proliferation. The chances of a developing country adopting this route are higher where requisite incentives exist. But given the technology denial regimes in place, the probability is that such proliferation would be supported by another nuclear weapon state or a state possessing requisite nuclear science and technology.

The case of nuclear proliferation to and from Pakistan is highly instructive. Pakistan reportedly acquired nuclear weapons technology (including the design of its weapons) from China. Its nuclear device was tested in Lop Nor in 1983. In due course Pakistan supplied nuclear weapons technology to North Korea in return for supply of ballistic missiles and technology from North Korea. It is now clear that Iran received technology and materials for uranium enrichment from Pakistan. Libya has admitted that its clandestine nuclear weapons programme received assistance from Pakistan. Turkey and Saudi Arabia have been suspected of exploring possibilities of acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities from Pakistan.

Ballistic Missile Defences

The shift toward ballistic missile defences (BMD, which includes both national as well as theatre missile defences) is altering the basic deterrence paradigm toward an uncertain offence-cum-defence framework. Asia and Europe are the most affected continents by the move toward missile defences. The United States is well set on the path to further development and deployment of missile defences both at the national as well as at the theatre levels. Russia and China are likely to adopt counter-

BMD measures for their own defence as well for managing the global strategic balance. Their own search for missile defences would be expedited in this process. This would have a profound impact on nuclear doctrines and strategies among nuclear weapon states, including India. At the minimum, the level of minimum deterrence would undergo changes if deterrence has to remain credible. There is also a fundamental conceptual issue related to missile defences which does not get the attention it deserves.

Traditionally, offence and defence have competed with each other throughout the history of military conflict and wars. The fundamental difference that one has to note is that so far, any error of judgement in relation to what defence or offence could do in relation to that of the adversary's capability, the maximum that could happen was defeat or victory. But where nuclear weapons are concerned, shifting the deterrence paradigm from an offence only (which exploited the vulnerability of the other side to provide stability between nuclear-armed countries) to one that combines offensive as well as defensive capabilities could produce catastrophic results since, at one level, an error of judgement about the efficacy of defence could provide greater incentive for offensive action, and at another any failure of defence would result not merely in defeat, but in a holocaust of horrendous dimensions. States under these circumstances are more likely to resort to pre-emptive offensive in order to seek strategic advantage. At the same time, since defensive capabilities would not be symmetrical, strategic stability would become far more difficult to establish. There is also the problem of countries seeking counter-missile defence capabilities. In many cases these could only come from asymmetric strategies, including the

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At the same. move toward w intrinsically tied defences and inc space. Space ass used for war-fight mostly for comba military communic missile launch etc anti-ballistic miss phase interception weapons deploym nuclear weapons i deployment of i inevitably increa weaponisation of s is likely to result. strategies are like coming years cre even the peacefu

Changing Balance

Numerous s embedded in the policies. Rather t may, therefore, be certainties and r below :-

(a) While the years system demonstrate past two de the transfo society suc social-politic

for their own defence as well as the global strategic balance. The process for missile defences would be a long process. This would have implications on nuclear doctrines and nuclear weapon states, at the minimum; the level of defence would undergo changes to remain credible. There is a fundamental conceptual issue related to this which does not get the attention it deserves.

Offence and defence have been linked together throughout the history of conflict and wars. The perception that one has to note is a major error of judgement in defence or offence could do the adversary's capability, which could happen was defeat. If nuclear weapons are not part of the deterrence paradigm, then only (which exploited the weakness of the other side to provide an advantage to clear-armed countries) to make an offensive as well as a defensive capability could produce a balance since, at one level, an imbalance about the efficacy of defence provides a greater incentive for an attack at another any failure of defence is not merely in defeat, but of horrendous dimensions. Under such circumstances are more pre-emptive offensive in a strategic advantage. At the same time, defensive capabilities would be difficult to establish. There are many countries seeking to enhance their capabilities. In many cases, they could only come from external sources, including the

promotion of international terrorism. The risks of such terrorism with weapons of mass destruction are likely to increase in future especially since political movement toward abolition of such weapons has perceptibly slowed down.

At the same time there is a perceptible move toward weaponisation of space intrinsically tied to the issue of missile defences and increasing militarisation of space. Space assets are increasingly being used for war-fighting capabilities even if mostly for combat support functions like military communications, early warning of missile launch etc. Most of the scenarios of anti-ballistic missiles, especially the boost phase interception technology would require weapons deployments in space. The risk of nuclear weapons in space also remains. The deployment of missile defences would inevitably increase the militarisation and weaponisation of space and a new arms race is likely to result. Anti-satellite weaponry and strategies are likely to gain strength in the coming years creating serious problems for even the peaceful uses of space.

Changing Balance of Military Power

Numerous strategic uncertainties are embedded in the issue of China's future policies. Rather than speculate on them, it may, therefore, be useful to note some of the uncertainties and realities briefly summed up below :-

(a) While it faces many challenges in the years ahead, China's political system and leadership has demonstrated successfully during the past two decades that it can manage the transformation of the state and society successfully and with minimum social-political costs.

(b) China's economy has been growing at an average rate of 9 per cent or so for the past 15 years. RAND studies indicate that its economy would continue to grow at an average of 5 per cent annually doubling the GDP by 2015.

(c) While it has been reducing the size of its military forces during the past 15 years, China has the largest military in (continental) Asia and outguns any one of its immediate neighbours by a factor of three to three-hundred with the exception, perhaps, of the Russian Federation. Qualitative changes taking place in its military power would provide it with increasingly potent power projection and long-range strike capabilities in the coming years. Access to Soviet/Russian design base since 1992 has really opened up tremendous opportunities for large-scale (even if selective) modernisation of weapons and equipment.

(d) China's strategic and military doctrine has been undergoing changes toward fighting a more modern high-technology warfare. By the very nature of military technology in modern times, this favours a more offensive orientation.

(e) Over 96 per cent of China's nuclear arsenal has relevance only for its neighbours. The INF Treaty left it the unquestioned dominant missile power in Asia; and the modernisation of its nuclear-missile arsenal, including the development of space power to support it, has received special attention in the past two decades.

One problem is that all western assessments of China's rise to power and its

military modernisation are related to the capabilities of the United States and its allies. But "Given that China's national security and defence needs are really quite limited, and geographically defined close to home, the PLA's *ability to bring substantial force to bear against an adversary in its neighbourhood is not insubstantial*."⁶ (Emphasis added)

There are many areas where Indian defence planning would need to pay close attention to building requisite capabilities for the type of war which may get imposed on us. But the case of combat air power is probably symptomatic of the nature of challenges ahead. The head of the Chinese air force has publicly sought a greater role for the PLA Air Force declaring that the Chinese Air Force will strive for a transformation from the air defence type to an offensive and defensive type as soon as possible. He announced that "At the turn of the century and in the early part of the new century, the Air Force will have a batch of new-types of early warning aircraft, electronic-equipped fighter planes, and ground-to-air missiles" and that the Air Force "*must give more prominence to air offensive, gradually integrate offensive and defensive, and build up a crack, first-rate air strike force*."⁷ (Emphasis added).

China is well on the way to a massive military modernisation that acquired a new momentum after 1992 when it got access to Russian military technology. China's space capabilities now enhance its air power capabilities substantively. By 2010 China would be capable of deploying nearly 300-500 multi-role combat aircraft of the Su-27/30 class with long range precision strike and air superiority capabilities. Further down, plans to build 500-1000 of China's Jian-10 fighter (developed with Israeli assistance and believed to incorporate Lavi technologies) may fructify.⁸ Nearly 800 F-7 (MiG-21 design)

with modern fire control and interception radar and missiles would provide a strong force besides the other combat aircraft being added to the PLA air force inventory. Above all, aerial refuelling capabilities would dramatically enhance the ability of the Chinese air forces to operate from bases deeper inside China and still be able to impact on Indian territory and targets. Acquisition of AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) would fundamentally alter the ability of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force to apply combat power in a variety of offensive and defensive missions with greater impact.

One of the strategic realities of the present period is that the balance of military capabilities between China and India is rapidly shifting to India's disadvantage in operational terms. And nowhere is this more noticeable than in the air and space capabilities. This has to be weighed in the context of the fact that future wars are going to be heavily influenced by air power. There is no question that we must continue to improve relations with China and reduce the potential for disagreements and possible conflict. It would not be in our interest to think of China in any adversarial terms. But it would be less than prudent to ignore the changing realities of military power that would provide the capabilities on which altered intentions could be based. Factors beyond our control could propel the two countries into a possible conflictual situation.

Conclusion

Almost all countries of Asia require an assured environment of peace and equilibrium. The challenge is how to establish that in a durable manner so that socio-economic and human development can take place at the desired rate. There are many areas of tension and potential conflict in Asia,

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3. Fali Abd
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ntries of Asia require an nent of peace and lence is how to establish nanner so that socio- n development can take l rate. There are many potential conflict in Asia,

including those in South China Sea, China's border/territorial disputes with almost all of its neighbours although some of them have now been settled. Given the nature of many of these disputes, it is likely that they could erupt into a conflict rather rapidly. The West places great emphasis on conflict resolution. But in Asia, what we need to do is not only focus on conflict resolution challenges, but also concurrently accord a high priority to conflict prevention. This is what makes the concept of co-operative peace and security so important for Southern Asia.

End Notes

1. Jasjit Singh "The Challenge of Sovereignty in the New Millennium" in *State Sovereignty in the 21st Century: Concept, Relevance and Limits*, IDSA, New Delhi, 2001, pp. 35-48.
2. For an excellent study on the rise of Islamic jihad see Gilles Keppel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (USA); 2002.
3. Faliq Abd al Jabbar, 'The Gulf War and ideology: the double-edged sword of Islam' in Haim Bresheeth and Nira Yuval-Davis (eds) *The Gulf War and the New World Order* (Zed Books, London, 1991) P. 217.
4. For example, General Zia ul-Haq as the Chief Marshal Law Administrator wrote the foreword recommending the book written by Brigadier SK Malik of Pakistan Army in late 1970s who argued, in a self-serving misinterpretation, that the Holy Quran teaches the use of terror as a weapon against the enemy. See SK Malik, *The Quranic Concept of War*, Wajidalis, Lahore 1979, p. 58-59. Stephen Cohen had argued that Pakistani military officers on courses in the United States over the years were more interested in studying guerrilla warfare from the perspective of waging it (unlike the American officers who studies it to learn how to combat it). See Stephen Cohen, *The Pakistan Army*, Himalayan Books, New Delhi, 1984, p.34
5. SK Malik, *The Quranic Concept of War*, Wajidalis, Lahore 1979, p. 58-59
6. David Shaumbagh, "The People's Liberation Army and the People's Republic at 50: Reform at Last," *The China Quarterly*, 1999, p. 671.
7. "Air Force Commander Liu Shunyao on Air Force Transformation" FBIS-CHI-1999-1107, dated 07 November 1999.
8. SWB dated 28 August 1999, p.19.

DISCUSSION

**Lieutenant General Tomohiro Okamoto
(Retd)**

Thank you for presenting a very clear cut perspective on the military and political aspects pertaining to India. For the Japanese, your elucidation on differences between China and Pakistan is news and relationship between Bangladesh and China is also news. We had no idea about these. This is where such conferences are important.

Mr Tadamasa Fukiura

I was a delegate to the International Red Cross in 1971 and was in Dacca during the period of the Indo-Pak War. What can India and Japan do to make Pakistan a democracy?

**Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, AVSM, VrC,
VM (Retd)**

If 130 million Pakistanis cannot make Pakistan a democracy, we cannot do it. The problem is deeper. Pakistan, if you look closely, is a feudal society where still 26 families rule Pakistan. The Army and the feudal lords have combined to keep Pakistan in that state. The problem is of geopolitics – first the Cold War and now the war on terrorism, which ensure that the US will continue to support Pakistan and its military rulers who can deliver. This is the fourth time Pakistan has become a frontline state for the US. Each time it gets worse. In my opinion, India's policy for the last 55 years has been for a stable Pakistan which it cannot be unless it is democratic. We are back to starting a new chapter after 1999. We do not know how long it will take – meanwhile one can keep trying.

**Lieutenant General Gopal Krishan Duggal,
PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd)**

The Professor in his presentation made a mention of the Chinese empire crumbling. The Chinese have a history with the former Soviet Union in front of them. The various programmes in progression in China – the political, social and other reforms – and as far as the military power is concerned, Air Commodore has very explicitly traced the events. How do we see the Chinese empire crumbling? What are the indicators to this enunciation?

Professor Tsuneo Yoshihara

The capitalist market economy and the freedom that people desire will create a contradiction of sorts. There are about 55 minorities under Chinese control. If political freedom becomes a trend, then they would also want to become independent. Secondly, economic progress and social transformation are bound to create an imbalance, initially, in China because of its immense size. Hence the disparities between the haves and the have-nots will heighten. Then there is the education problem. As education makes progress, there is bound to be the growth of media. Freedom will create a problem in this too. Further, China is too big to keep its politics united.

Mr Yasuo Ohkushi

Both presenters have spoken of China's hegemony and its strategy for hegemonic control, though from different perspectives. What can be gathered is that distrust is prevalent towards the Chinese. China's evolving strategy is not based on ideology as in the past but on free economy and international cooperation. Their idea is to

enhance national power. It will gain international stature made of the huge and Indian military. Chinese strategy vis-à-vis America as well as Japanese strategy – the aim should be between the US,

Lieutenant General

In my opinion, the country, voting to of Kashmir should not be allowed

Air Commodore

Kindly look carefully. The UN in 1948 accepted by said four things:- its military forces Clause two – all must vacate the are to be taken state of Jammu purpose, India is help the state to four – when nor is to be held to state to India or when normalcy it is restored re for the non-Kash took place. Sec Muslims in the Muslims in K plebiscite about are Muslim or democratic? Or Pakistan; but th

Shri Gopal Krishan Duggal, VSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd)

in his presentation made Chinese empire crumbling. a history with the former part of them. The various aggression in China – the other reforms – and as power is concerned, Air very explicitly traced the see the Chinese empire the indicators to this

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market economy and the the desire will create a ts. There are about 55 Chinese control. If political trend, then they would independent. Secondly, and social transformation an imbalance, initially, in s immense size. Hence ?en the haves and the ten. Then there is the As education makes und to be the growth of create a problem in this is too big to keep its

have spoken of China's strategy for hegemonic different perspectives. ed is that distrust is he Chinese. China's t based on ideology as free economy and tion. Their idea is to

enhance national strength, and build military power. It will gradually strengthen its international stature. There was a mention made of the huge gap between the Chinese and Indian military power. In my opinion, the Chinese strategy would be to catch up with America as well as put in disarray the Japanese strategy vis a vis the US. Hence the aim should be to have cooperation between the US, India and Japan.

Lieutenant General Takashi Arai (Retd)

In my opinion, as India is a democratic country, voting to make a decision on status of Kashmir should be allowed. Why has this not been allowed?

Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, AVSM, VrC, VM (Retd)

Kindly look at the UN Resolutions carefully. The UN Resolutions of 13 August 1948 accepted by India and Pakistan clearly said four things:- Pakistan agrees to withdraw its military forces from Jammu and Kashmir; Clause two – all non residents of the state must vacate the state; Clause three – steps are to be taken to restore normalcy to the state of Jammu and Kashmir and for this purpose, India is to maintain its forces and help the state to restore normalcy; Clause four – when normalcy is restored, a plebiscite is to be held to decide the accession of the state to India or Pakistan. The words are - *when normalcy is restored*. Normalcy, before it is restored requires Pakistan to withdraw, for the non-Kashmiris to withdraw. This never took place. Secondly, we have 147 million Muslims in the rest of India, with four million Muslims in Kashmir. What will be the plebiscite about? Join Pakistan because they are Muslim or join India because India is democratic? One group will suggest joining Pakistan; but then what happens to the 147

million Muslims in the rest of India? I have lived through the days of Partition of this country in 1947. In the beautiful Viceregal building here, the map was drawn. On the streets millions were killed. The first responsibility of a democratic government is that it is of the people and for the people. Therefore this is unacceptable. The accession of the State to India is legal. The United States, when George Marshall was the Secretary of State, it is now on record, stated that the United States will not go against the legal accession of Kashmir to India. The Cold War changed it. Because the Valley offered places for airfields to launch airplane for reconnaissance over the Soviet Union and China – a military ally of the Soviet Union. Hence, there is long history behind all this. India made a major concession after achieving victory in the 1971 War with Pakistan with the Shimla Agreement. Pakistan agreed to it.

As regards China, I do not mistrust the Chinese. My issue is only one: I do not know what China's intentions will be ten or fifteen years hence. Their capabilities are rising. They do not seem to be worried about starting a conflict. China is building what it calls comprehensive national power. One has to read carefully the meaning of this. My understanding of China is that it is unlikely to use force unless it has a reasonably good chance of victory. As long as India can ensure that it is unlikely to be made easy for China it is okay. So what I look for in relations with China is insurance, prudence and building closer relationship. We had 1987 visit to China by the then Prime Minister Mr Rajiv Gandhi, and the 1993 and 1996 agreements on peace and tranquility on the borders. The Chinese are very slow not only in settling the border but even where the line is. Because they wish to keep this as a point. The declassified

documents of the Cold War tell us that within two weeks of the Sino-Indian War of 1962, Chou En Lai informed the Mongolian President that the war was not about territory but because India was moving too close to the United States. Therefore, it had to be taught a lesson. The Mongolian Head of State queried if the war in fact would not take India closer to the US and the reply from Chou En Lai was that in that event, there would be a socialist (read Communist) revolution in India. Chinese war was about geo-politics, grand strategy.

The other question that was raised as to whether China was trying to catch up with the United States, and if it does catch up what would be the outcome from the Indian and Japanese perspective? In my opinion China cannot ever catch up with the US. But it is acquiring leverages on the US. Last year it invested \$100 bn in the US, which was a surplus trade balance for the latter, in their government treasury with interest rates at the

lowest. China's policies have to be looked at in a much more complex, broader, comprehensive manner. China is investing its surplus in the US treasury bonds. What is required, what we have been doing earlier too but now at a faster rate, is greater understanding between India and Japan, dialogues, cooperation - economic, political and military. In India, people understand the Japanese Constitution but within that Constitution also there is great scope for working together - not against China as such, but with the common goal of peace, progress and prosperity in Asia. This will come automatically if the Japanese look at Asia in geographical, continental, terms.

Lieutenant General Tomohiro Okamoto
(Retd)

The first session could be taken to be the establishment of a common understanding.

PEOP (PRC'S IMPACT

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First Paper

Second Paper

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S (PRC'S) MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND IMPACT ON THE RESPECTIVE REGIONS



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SECOND SESSION

Chairman : **Vice Admiral P S Das, PVSM, UYSM, VSM (Retd)**

First Paper : Lieutenant General B S Malik, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

Second Paper : Vice Admiral Kataru Hasegawa (Retd) and
Lieutenant General Tomohiro Okamoto (Retd)

CHAIRMAN'S REMARKS

The second session promises to be an interesting one, considering the papers that are coming up. The first paper to be presented is by Lieutenant General B S Malik, who has

been a brigade commander on the Indo-China border. His last assignment was as Chief of Staff, Western Command.

SECOND SESSION : FIRST PAPER**LIEUTENANT GENERAL BS MALIK, PVSM, AVSM (RETD)**

Pursuance of the strategic matrix tells us that national interests, threat perceptions, strategy, and power have a definite linkage. It is to protect the national interests that a country considers the threats it faces in their pursuance. Accordingly a strategy is worked out based on the current state of the country's national power. National power gives the country its military capabilities. Various components of national power are dynamic, and as they change so does the military capability. The strategic cyclic activity is always in motion and the changed military capabilities inspire the leaders to revise their political objectives. This in turn pushes for higher, more adventurous, military aims.

Military capability is based on force structure, organisations and the tactical doctrine. All this is guided by the military resources, which are dependent on the technological base a country has. Though it is largely believed that capabilities take a long time to build, intentions can change overnight. Yet we need to recognise that a country with a very highly developed technological base like Japan does not require inordinate time period to upgrade its military capabilities. Restraint, if any, comes as in case of Japan, first from within and then from the geopolitical factors. Thus, what is happening or happens in the neighbourhood becomes important. In this context the country that impacts on the abilities of all Asian countries is China. In

order to understand what China might do in future one has to analyse what are the likely Chinese political objectives.

Experts at the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), London, opine that the Chinese leaders now face various new constraints in responding to unanticipated emergencies and to existing challenges posed by systemic economic difficulties and daunting social problems. However, they feel there has been continuity in change and have detected the following foreign policy objectives' :-

- (a) More active and pragmatic foreign policy to maximise economic opportunities and minimise diplomatic tensions.
- (b) Convergence of interest with the USA, if only perhaps temporarily allaying the long held fears of "strategic encirclement".
- (c) Flexibility in approach to the cross-strait dispute with Taiwan.
- (d) Engagement of Southeast Asia on trade matters and territorial disputes.
- (e) Addressing concerns of growing inequalities and dislocations associated with World Trade Organisation (WTO) association.

(g) Emphasis on technological modernisation, doctrinal innovation and a further diminution in the Armed Forces' formal political role.

(h) Ensuring minimal Chinese nuclear deterrence is not neutralised by prospective deployment of a US Ballistic-Missile Defence (BMD), by developing a large, more mobile nuclear force, featuring counter measure technology and multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles.

(j) Restriction through enactment of law designed to restrict exports of missile and relevant dual-use technology through a control list as well as licensing and end-use guarantee requirements. Restriction also on transfer of chemical and biological weapons-related and dual use technologies.

China's emergence as a global power has become an accepted fact around the world. Minor differences notwithstanding, both, the USA and Russia, have oriented their policies demonstrating how much they value China as their partner for creating a favourable world order in the 21st century. China has changed its foreign policy objectives, albeit selectively, to decrease friction with other countries, specially the lone superpower, the USA.

One of the distinct characteristics of the Chinese way of doing things had been aiding and abetting not only revolution but selective proliferation to suit its grand design. This particular foreign policy objective now appears to have been greatly mellowed if not altogether sacrificed. Connected, though not altogether similar, is the nature and ethos of the Chinese military system.

Structure of the People's Liberation Army (PLA)

The Chinese military was never the typical military arm of the state but it had all along been conceived, evolved and maintained as the military arm of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).² Being a single party system, this had been the Chinese equivalent of ensuring the civilian control over the military under the basic principle of "the party commands the guns". The position of military as the mainstay of the party, performing the indispensable task of backing up the CCP rule in its capacity as the main military arm.³ This position has been repeatedly reinforced by China's successive legislations including in the China's National Defence Law of 1997.⁴

The Chinese military structure unlike many others has a unique character (though under partial review lately). The PLA in China means the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, Police, Paramilitary and even militias. All of the nine million troops remain under the operational command of the PLA Departments and Military Regions (MR), and can be called in order, at a single command from China's Central Military Commission (CMC). The PLA is totally subservient to the CCP leadership, which exercises its control through the CMC.

The Chinese military has been thoroughly involved in civilian production of consumer goods like television and motorbikes. Revenue earned from this commercial activity has been the main source for its modernisation, making it difficult to guess the actual defence expenditure and strength of the PLA. However, these trends were first changed by Deng Xiaoping and later by President Jiang. President Hu has more radical thoughts on professionalism.

Steps have also political participation assert the PLA personnel matters.

Mission Orientation

Over the years, has been divided of the People's task of "safeguarding public order".

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Steps have also been taken to restrict the political participation of the PLA members and assert the Party's control over military personnel matters.⁵

Mission Orientation

Over the years the power of the military has been divided by creating a parallel force of the People's Armed Police(PAP) with the task of "*safeguarding security and maintaining public order*".

The secondary task of the PLA was redefined in the 1997 National Defence Law as "*to assist in maintaining the public order*". Due notice has been taken of the 11 September 2001 attacks on America and the PLA has been given the domestic role in defending against "*danger posed by terrorist, separatist and extremist forces*."⁶

The Chinese Strategic Thinking⁷

The Chinese perceive that while peace may have dominated the big picture in the post-cold war period, various regional anomalies that were suppressed during the cold war have erupted in the form of local conflicts, which mark the main concern of China's national security **paradigms**.⁸ Accordingly, China appears to have adopted "economic interaction" and "globalisation" as the two major strands of China's future vision that guide its national security thinking and paradigms.

It may not be widely understood that these twin strands offer safety not only in military and diplomacy but also the economic and technological security, including financial trade and investment security, as well as the avoidance of big rise and falls. It is this dynamic rather than static conceptually defined framework of national priorities that

guide the shape of China's national security doctrine. China's **unique** approach, therefore, cannot be fully understood when confined to the conventional western strategic terminology and analytical framework. The most noticeable differences that cause this confusion are as follows:⁹

- (a) Excessive political orientation of the Chinese military thinking.
- (b) Evolution of a distinctive strategic vocabulary. Even when the terminology is the same it carries different connotations, reflecting their distinct strategic culture and ethos of the last 5000 years.
- (c) Unlike the hierarchy of defence policy, strategy, doctrine and operational tactics, Chinese have military doctrine representing the highest military and political wisdom reflecting the official military line of the CCP and provides guidance to the military science, concerned with the general problems involved in the conduct of war and military art, which caters to the problems of strategy, operations, and tactics.
- (d) In actual practice, "people's war under modern conditions" has been given the status of a formal Chinese national security doctrine, which has continued to guide China's military strategy, operations and tactics in terms of their force structures, technologies, training and military exercises.
- (e) In western strategic literature, doctrine is defined as a body of "fundamental principles" by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives and despite being

authoritative these "require judgment in application". The Chinese doctrine, by comparison does not present, a similar systematic explanation of "fundamental principles" and seems to be presented more as a body of political speech, much of it being rhetoric.

However, some scholars have averred that the Chinese military doctrine of "People's War" has gone through a further transition from "people's war under modern conditions" to the latest "local war under high tech conditions".¹⁰

Against this backdrop, the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Central Military Commission (CMC) formulated the "two fundamental transformations" policy. The main objectives of this policy are¹¹:-

- (a) In preparation for military struggle – the transformation from winning localised combat under ordinary conditions to winning localised combat under modern technical conditions, and especially high tech conditions.
- (b) In troop building – the transformation from quantity and scale in quality and efficiency and from manpower-intensiveness to technology-intensiveness.

Towards winning a local war, the PRC has enunciated several principles including a "strategic frontier" that encompasses not only land, sea, air, space and oceans but also of the nation's economic trade, and comprehensive national strength; "strategic deterrence"; "active defence", i.e. fighting with decisive force and tactics to win "a quick military solution" of a conflict before other

powers could intervene." Within these concepts, the "active defence" principle encompasses the following aspects¹² :-

- (a) While handling military strategic issues, national interests form the highest standard.
- (b) Practice dialectical unity between checking the outbreak of wars and winning victory in a war.
- (c) Prepare for possible local wars and sudden incidents.

Whereas, the People's War strategy has been described as defensive, the subsequent strategies have, in their content, several offensive features. The "active defence" component of the strategy differed throughout. The "active defence" of the people's war strategy, in congruence with the "inferior" level of technology, in China at that time, was a part of the defensive strategy. *While now, along with the technological upgradation process, the "active defence" could unleash "first strikes" and punitive operations on the enemy.*¹³

Military Capabilities

Restructuring of Ground Forces. China has reduced its forces nine times, in last fifty years,¹⁴ starting with 10 Lakhs in 1985, followed by a plan to reduce five lakhs in 1997-2001. 81,000 personnel were to be retired from the PLA in 1999 in order to enhance the "military quality" of the troops.¹⁵ 36 Field Armies of the country have been reorganised into 24 Group Armies (GAs) based on the US "Air -Land Battle" concept in preparation towards forming theatre command posts and proper coordination between the Armed Forces of the country.

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The People's War strategy has been consistent, the subsequent changes in content, several times. The "active defence" strategy differed throughout.

Of the people's war strategy with the "inferior" level in the past, was a strategy. While now, technological upgradation of defence" could unleash offensive operations on the

Reaction Forces. China has reduced the number of troops 10 Lakhs in 1985, to reduce five lakhs in 1999 in order to improve the "quality" of the troops.¹⁵ The country have been Group Armies (GAs) "Land Battle" concept of forming theatre forces of the country.

Three types of GAs exist in China today:-

(a) Type A: Deployed in the north, northeast and northwest regions; emphasis on armoured divisions and mobility; total strength is about 73,000.

(b) Type B: Deployed in the south, southeast and southwestern regions; crafted for mountainous and irregular terrain warfare; total strength is 105,000.

(c) Type C: Deployed for garrison duty, prevalent in the northeast region; total manpower 100,000 to 110,000.¹⁶

These 24 GAs have further been reduced to 21 GAs by demobilisation efforts. In 1999 the PLA began to reorganise six of its 21 GAs, two in Shenyang Military Region (MR), and one each in Guangzhou, Lanzhou, Jinan and Nanjing MRs.¹⁷

13 MRs have been reduced to 11 and further to seven in 1985. Several units of the PLA dealing with railways, engineering and construction have been shifted to the civilian ministries. A General Armaments Department (GAD) was formed in 1998 to revamp the defence science and technology establishment of the country. It established branches at the MR and GA levels in early 1999 for modernising logistics and weapons development programme.¹⁸

To enhance professional trends, PLA leaders took measures to strengthen administrative and selection procedures of the officer corps and recruit directly professional civilians at sergeant level.¹⁹ PRC also announced plans to set up Shijiazhuang Army Command College, Information Engineering University, Science and Engineering University and Institute of Artillery Corps.²⁰

Out of the planned raising of 40 Rapid

Reaction Forces (RRF) units, nearly 22 have already been deployed with the MRs, GAs in the army, the navy and the air force. These different types of RRFs include the "reinforced battalions" and/or "reinforced infantry battalions" created in 1979 and designed to fight in harsh geographical and climatic conditions; "special battalions" in Jinan and Shenyang MRs, "quick action battalions" in Lanzhou MR, "ski infantry battalions" in Shenyang MR. Marine Corps was to be the "fifth arm of the navy." A closer look at the missions of the RRFs indicates the offensive nature of these elite units as indicated by the tasking of the "special battalions" of the ground forces²¹ :-

(a) Surprise attacks on enemy command and control centres.

(b) Disrupt and destroy enemy supply lines and distribution system.

(c) Interrupt main enemy lines of communication and disrupt enemy assembly areas.

(d) Conduct armed reconnaissance behind the enemy lines.

(e) Cooperate with tactical and operational air assault in the course of GA main engagement.

(f) Infiltrate and disturb the stability of the enemy rear zone.

(g) Deploy forward observation teams to guide long range artillery strikes and air support.

(h) Organise and coordinate guerrilla activities with the People's militia.²²

The Beijing MR's special reconnaissance troops, formed like the US

Green Berets, conducted wilderness survival training in Shanxi's Guancenshan district in June 1998. Among the responsibilities of these troops were fully learning driving of military vehicles, hand-to-hand combat, parachuting by night, sea-borne and mountain infiltration, other special operational skills, and pass a test of wilderness survival under conditions of severe physical and psychological exhaustion.²³

Mechanisation of the PLA Ground Forces. The strength of the ground forces has come down to 1.6 million with more than 40 manoeuvre divisions and some 40 manoeuvre brigades. Major combat units are divided into 21 Group Armies, of a standard NATO Corps size, having two to four manoeuvre divisions or even brigades with support elements. The GAs are subordinate to seven Military Regions or the joint administrative headquarters that control forces in multiple provinces. These forces are reinforced by local PLA and PAP units for defence of specific locales, as well as reserve and militia units that are being reorganised and given new missions for the 21st century.

Despite all these changes the most powerful 38th and 39th GAs in the Beijing and Shenyang MRs have retained their divisional structure and priority for the introduction of new equipment. The Chinese newspapers have reported that in 2002 only two brigades were issued new tanks and APCs. However, from 1997 to 2001 three former Motorised Divisions (truck mobile) were transformed into mechanised units with tracked or wheeled APCs in the 1st and 124th Amphibious Mechanised Infantry Division in the Nanjing and Guangzhou MRs and the 127th Light Mechanised Infantry Division in the Jinan MR.

The 38th and 39th GA each have three Mechanised Divisions. Mechanised infantry

units are also organic to the PLA's 10 armoured divisions and 13 brigades. Thus, after the so called reduction of 1997-2000, about 40 per cent of PLA manoeuvre units are mechanised or armoured. That is almost double the percentage before the reduction. With the creation of the two amphibious mechanised infantry divisions, the ground forces now have a larger amphibious force than the PLA Navy. Moreover, in addition to the amphibious lift assets found in the Navy, "army ship transport units" have been identified in the Nanjing, Shenyang and Guangzhou MRs.²⁴

Enhanced Amphibious Capability. Acquisition of amphibious capability was never a concern of the PLA, till about a decade back, but was suddenly put on a high priority in the 1995 guidelines by the General Staff for training of the PLA. Training for "sea crossing" operations has developed in intensity over the last three years as reflected in the acquisition of new equipment and creation of new units. Further, in May 2001 and 2002, the PLA conducted large scale joint amphibious training exercises. Amphibious training was predominant in the coastal MRs of Nanjing (likely with four divisions and a brigade from three GAs) and Guangzhou (likely with four divisions and a brigade from the two GAs) and additional amphibious events were also conducted in the MRs of Jinan (two divisions) and Shenyang in an inland reservoir in 2001 (one armoured division). Not only this; in 2002 five divisions and a brigade in the Nanjing MR and three divisions from the Guangzhou MR were identified doing amphibious training. Though at the same time the PLA Navy Marine and the PLA Airforce conducted their training which was not coordinated but amphibious exercises at the divisional level by the PLA ground forces were unprecedented.²⁵

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There have been conflicting reports about a further 500,000 troop reduction in the ground forces, by Hong Kong based papers and the *Washington Post*. We must view this reduction differently, like the last time it would probably be done over a number of years and more to transfer troops to the newly created PAP as well as finding more money for modernisation.

The reports of the abolition of MRs by the same Hong Kong paper, "in the style of US Joint Combat Commands...(which are) completely different from the existing regions which defend their territory and will be sub-regional Joint Command Commands", needs watching .

Chinese Proposed Unified Command System

As mentioned above the reform package reported by the Hong Kong media has several interesting features as follows²⁶:-

(a) The number of above discussed US style joint commands would replace the current MR system . The number of forces would be decided by the Central Military Commission (CMC) in accordance with the need.

(b) The much talked about reduction of 500,000 personnel would bring the total size to about two million and the money released for procuring new equipment and armament of a high tech nature so that the Chinese Armed Forces could fight a " local war under high tech conditions".

(c) The PLA ground forces could bear the brunt of this proposed reduction bringing the number of GAs from 21 to

13. As it is there has been one successful reduction of the GAs from 24 to 21 in the nineties. This could also be to replace the army division by combined brigade, to transform provincial military districts into conscription station'andto slash infantry units on a large scale.

(d) Some GA it is reported could be further mechanised and equipped with new tanks, missiles and artillery. These include 1st, 13th, 21st, 27th, 38th, 39th and 54th and all these GAs are proposed to be designated as rapid response units.

(e) Some garrison commands, such as those of Shanghai, Beijing and Hong Kong are reported to have been streamlined to make them more capable.

(f) New paratroop unit could be raised to strengthen the rapid response capability in addition to current 15 Airborne Command. A 16th Airborne Command could be organized merging some field army units from Jinan and Nanjing MRs with the new airborne command temporarily headquartered in Jinahu, Zhejiang province.

Special mission units as detailed above have been created and new weapon systems are reportedly being introduced in service in large numbers. About 350 CSS short range ballistic missiles are also being deployed across the country, mostly opposite Taiwan. And China is replacing its land-based nuclear arsenal of about 20 DF-5 intercontinental ballistic missiles with an estimated 60 longer-range, multiple warhead versions of the DF-5.²⁷

PLA Navy (PLAN)

Chinese Navy totals about 230,000 yet the events of last couple of years have given the PLAN an increasingly important role as perhaps the primary military instrument for securing China's vital national interests. Though everyone has been talking of the Chinese military modernisation as the fourth out of the four planned modernisations by China, yet it is worth noting that the PLAN has been on an "acquisition splurge" since the 1980s. Current weapon acquisitions have followed the Chinese three-path system i.e. design and build indigenously, outright purchase from foreign countries and the reverse engineering course. The last path is becoming a little difficult as the weapon systems are becoming more complex.²⁸

China appears to be pursuing its dream of possessing a blue water navy by buying four 6000 tonne Sovremenny class ships from Russia. Five indigenous Lu Hu and Lu Hai class destroyers are also under construction. China is also acquiring eight of Russia's eerily silent Kilo-class submarines and replacing its five rusty nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) with the new model 094 ones. The acquisition or construction of two nuclear powered aircraft carriers is also being considered. The changes will make the PLA Navy (PLAN) substantially larger and more potent than the Indian navy.²⁹

The PLAN includes a small marine corps, of about 12,000 and an air arm of more than 450 shore based fixed wing fighter-bomber and patrol aircraft and about 30 helicopters capable of shipboard operations. Recently the naval elite forces - the Marine Corps - has been tasked to :-

- (a) Seize and secure beach-heads independently or in cooperation with the

Army units, and protect follow-on landing forces.

- (b) Capture and defend maritime forward positions.
- (c) Perform the land fighting phase of naval operations.
- (d) Defend the seashore.³⁰

China appears to be continuing a two decade long period of modernising its Navy in terms of equipment and personnel. PLAN missions seem to include:-

- (a) Defence of the homeland, then move to supporting the reunification of Taiwan.
- (b) Defence of other sovereignty claims such as those in the East and South China Seas.
- (c) Defence of littoral sea lanes of communication, territorial waters, and economic interests out to the limit (350 nm from China's coastline) of the continental shelf.
- (d) Showing the flag as naval "presence" and diplomatic support.

The PLAN's missions are driving its modernisation, not always the case in modern militaries. Beijing seems determined to deploy enough naval force, even in the face of the US intervention, to secure vital national objectives, focusing on defence of sovereignty claims and reunification of Taiwan.³¹

PLA Air Force (PLAAF)

The PLAAF has adopted a formal campaign theory to guide it towards the future and is working on strategic guidelines. The PLAAF is starting to acquire the modern

weapon systems, 30s, aerial refuelling and control aircraft to conduct an offensive. It may be too reliant on weapon systems,

According to a recent report of Defense report some of the PLAAF reportedly conducted training involving PLAAF and Navy during 2001 repositioning, air de amphibious assault exercises were seen. The scenarios likely benefit PLA pilots in the exercises.

By 2010, the ageing fleet of 4 about 600 Sukhoi capable fighter of the indigenous China is also said to be replaced. The PLAAF is also acquiring such as aerial tankers and control aircraft platforms. This is 10 per cent, but in contrast, India then.³³

In 1998, the PLAAF was tasked to intervene of the PRC and airborne elite forces.

- (a) Seize and secure beach-heads independently or in cooperation with the
- (b) Cut and intercept

weapon systems, including the Su-27s, Su-30s, aerial refuelling, airborne early warning and control aircraft, and S-300 SAMs to conduct an offensive campaign, but may also be too reliant on foreign technology and weapon systems, as it did in the 1950s.³²

According to the 2002 US Department of Defense report on the PLA, during 2001, some of the PLAAF's more advanced aircraft reportedly conducted advanced tactical training involving fighters of dissimilar types. PLAAF and Naval Aviation exercise activity during 2001 reportedly concentrated on mobility, air defence, and support to amphibious assault forces. Air defence exercises were said to be highly scripted and the scenarios lacked realism, limiting the benefit PLA pilots could have gained from the exercises.

By 2010, the PLAAF will replace its ageing fleet of 4500, 1950s-era, planes with about 600 Sukhoi Su-27 and Su-30 nuclear capable fighter bombers and 300 units each of the indigenous J-10 and Super-7 fighters. China is also said to be developing a stealth fighter currently called the JX . Significantly, the PLAAF is also acquiring force multipliers such as aerial tankers, airborne early warning and control aircraft and electronic intelligence platforms. This will shrink the PLAAF by 75 per cent, but will make it more lethal. In contrast, India will have about 700 fighters then.³³

In 1998, the 15th Airborne Army was tasked to intervene in internal security duties of the PRC and in border skirmishes.³⁴ The airborne elite force battalions are tasked to:

- (a) Seize and hold important areas or landing zones behind the enemy lines.
- (b) Cut the enemy's retreat routes and intercept its reinforcement.

(c) Cooperate with the main forces in destroying the enemy units.

(d) Secure the landing of follow on forces.

(e) Destroy enemy missiles, nuclear weapons, command and control centres and support units.

(f) Assist guerilla units and people, militias operating in the enemy rear.³⁵

In the final analysis, however, the PLAAF may lack the most sophisticated weapon systems but today, it is modernising. China's neighbours are definitely concerned about what the PLAAF will look like in 20 years specially if China's economy remains strong and the PLA's modernisation efforts continue at the current pace. As the PLAAF has shown in the past, it could move hundreds of aircraft, SAMs and AAA, as well as thousands of support troops to unsophisticated airfields near the front in a short duration, if necessary. It would attempt to carry out its orders if required to do so.³⁶

Modernisation of Equipment

The philosophy behind the weapons development programme changed from "high cost, low efficiency, and backward system suited to total war" to that of "low cost, high efficiency system suited to high-tech local war."³⁷

During the past fifty years, the PRC has produced a number of weapons and weapon systems for all its Armed Forces. Most of this was produced for the Army. The older light and main battle tanks, armoured personnel carriers (APCs), both tracked and wheeled, long range artillery systems, multiple rocket launchers and light weapons were either withdrawn from active duty or were to be

modernised. Modernisation of these equipments was undertaken in protection (armour), firepower and mobility. Also attention was to be paid to the targeting systems, crosswind sensors, third generation night sights, computerised fire control systems and provision of the Global Positioning Systems (GPS) to make them fit for the new role of the PLA in the "local war under high tech conditions".³⁸

Training

The actual training methods in China also underwent considerable change from following Soviet manuals to learning from the western countries. Reorganised from 1990, the main aspects of training for the "local war under high tech conditions" concept included air borne emergency mobilisation, and joint all weather day and night operations. In this context the Chief of General Staff, Fu Quanyou, called for "creating four new aspects" in training of the armed forces as given below :-

- (a) A new theory on high tech military training with Chinese characteristics.
- (b) New contents and design of a 21st century-oriented composite system of high tech military training.
- (c) New ways to develop a concentrated and highly effective high tech military training form and method for furthering on base, simulated and network training.
- (d) New systems to form a perfect and smooth high tech military training management mechanism.³⁹

There is, however, another side as reported by the *India Today* of 08 December

2003. It reports that in August 2003, when China invited foreign diplomats to Inner Mongolia to witness PLA military manoeuvres for the first time, the observers returned struck by the beauty of the Steppes but stunned by the PLA's obsolescence. "These guys do not have a clue about what they are doing." Karniol, the Asia editor of the *Jane's Defence Weekly* says bluntly, "...buying a Su 30 is the easy part but operationalising it and developing fighting skills takes years." A senior China watcher says the PLA is inefficient because it has become a political force more than a fighting one. Being the final authority in an authoritarian state allows the PLA to function as a government within the government.

The Darker Side

The above statement encourages us to examine the darker side of the system where party controls everything. It is reported that China's military has acquired a faded look. "Only poor students and idiots join the army," says Peter Li, a 21 year old student in Beijing. For him the best options would be to do business or join the government.⁴⁰

The PLA has been unable to replicate the commercial sector's innovativeness and manufacturing expertise in defence. Programmes to produce Russian products under licence and indigenous weapons are said to be failing. The awkwardly engineered Super-7 fighter is so dubious that the PLAAF is resisting its induction. A senior Asian military official says, "the real secret behind the obsessively secretive PLA is how backward and incompetent it is." China's entire military apparatus is housed within the Central Military Commission (CMC), which is only loosely connected to the civilian administration. Though formally under the

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secretive PLA is how
impetent it is." China's
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mission (CMC), which is
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ugh formally under the

President, de facto control of the CMC lies with its chairman, Jiang Zemin, who held on to the post even after handing over the Presidency to Hu. Analysts say the PLA has significant political and business interests which it is guarding from the reformist Hu.⁴¹

When banqueting at Beijing's plush hotels, diners often joke that they are contributing to China's defence because many of the hotels are owned by senior PLA members and their families. An analyst says the PLA's business activities have corrupted its ranks and excessive politicisation has made it unwieldy. Every unit of the PLA, from a company of 100 men to the armies divided across China's seven military zones, is jointly headed by two officers – one military and the other political. This two headed leadership, with each making different calculations, has sapped PLA's decision making ability. The greatest casualty has been joint operations between forces.⁴²

Impact on the Region

Return of the Indian warships towards the end of 2003, after first ever exercises with the PLA Navy gave the most clear signals that both China and India have decided to step back from the "eyeball-eyeball confrontation" which has defined their relations for the last four decades. Indian media reporting the statements from Beijing and Delhi described that China and India have increasingly stared each other through the prism of "trade rather than geopolitics".

However, the question is, will China be a threat to India after its extensive modernisation, both in equipment and thinking undertaken in the past two years? The argument given is simple, that "for a nation that claims no military ambition, the scale of the modernisation is stupefying." The estimate

by analysts claimed that by 2010, "the People's Liberation Army (PLA) will be the world's second-most powerful conventional force". Song Do Xing, a military scholar at the People's University in Beijing, says, the world has nothing to fear; "China's main focus is to protect its territory. The strategic objective is to be able to fight a small-scale hi-tech war. There is no specific nation China has in mind (as it modernises)."⁴³

However, that is not how the experts feel in the field. The RUSI in the UK and the *Jane's Defence Weekly* opine that the 1991 Gulf War awakened China. People's War ideas of subduing the opponent with an endless stream of infantry by simply swarming took a severe beating. According to the RUSI, the PLA now has increasingly started focusing on "full spectrum dominance". China is determined to achieve deterrence against the US, both to defend itself and to protect itself as a global power. "The Chinese think they are the greatest race in the world. Arming themselves is part of that self-worship", says a Beijing based diplomat. "But no country should see that as a direct threat to itself". A casual observer in India will find that hard to digest. China's new military might will allow it to strike deep into the country.⁴⁴ Some experts in India question the present flow of events between China and India as the treaties since 1993 has put the Indian Military to great disadvantage.⁴⁵

In the military exercises conducted by China several of the above training methods were implemented. Of more than 120 military exercises conducted by China in the last five decades, the following broad trends were discernable :-

- (a) Geographical shift from the north and northeast towards south, southeast

and southwest regions of China after the Soviet threat was reduced.

(b) Single service training to combined GA, joint fleet exercises (within a single service arm, training on multiple weapon systems).

(c) Technical training to tactical training.

(d) Defensive to offensive operations of attacks on multiple targets in formation, first strikes, amphibious landings, battle space domination and rapid responses.

(e) Manual operation to automation.⁴⁶

The Chinese ambitions in the Spratly Islands for exploitation of the vast natural resources have been contested by other South East Asian countries, as also the continued Taiwan imbroglio dictated that the naval forces graduated from the coastal to the blue water navy. All this required emphasis on the anti-submarine warfare; large tonnage vessels, amphibious operations capacity and long range second strike capacity. Without these changes, it was argued, the safety of the all-important Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC), which are so important for the increasing maritime trade to sustain the requirements of the burgeoning economy, would not be met.

On the strategic weapons front, adoption of the local war concept and responses to the changing strategic environment necessitated a redefining and enhancing of the country's nuclear and strategic missile prowess. Evolving mechanisms to adjust to the multilateral regimes like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),

development of advanced miniature weapons, tactical nuclear weapons, enhancing the guidance systems of the missiles, Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV), testing anti ballistic missiles to counter the proposed NMD/TMD in the region, were recognised as the current challenges in this field.

Conclusion

Chinese have been concerned about eruption of various types of conflicts, in the post cold war world that were earlier suppressed. The nature of these conflicts required a paradigm shift since the deep routed causes of many of these conflicts were essentially economic. Accordingly, the Chinese have changed their approach to dealing with the situation and, instead of exporting revolution and increasing instability, they have adopted the policy of economic investment. They have also modernised their Armed Forces. This twin approach became the basis of their formulations to deal with the emerging strategic situation.

The success of China's economic reforms has earned respect from the international community. It is felt that instead of absorbing this progress and inwardly consolidating the gains, this newfound confidence has been channelled into nationalism, consequently allowing pursuance of assertive policies. The example of the occupation of "Mischief Reef" and other islands, in the South China Sea, are quoted to support this view. These incidents have been considered by the ASEAN and the international community as watershed, since the strategic importance of these reefs itself may be of questionable importance. These actions have been perceived as the most concrete examples of China's irredentist

claims as far as Vietnam and Ind

These incic become public (the prevalence o force", "peacef restraint". Muddy and counter claim civilian structure common use, to naval vessels a affected the c citizens in the r at least as a "p

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claims as far as countries like Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia are concerned.

These incidents have been allowed to become public despite the official claim of the prevalence of the policies of "non use of force", "peaceful resolution" and "self restraint". Muddying the water through claims and counter claims, of the erection of so called civilian structures in the South China Sea for common use, to military emplacements with naval vessels at hand, has over a period affected the consciousness of ordinary citizens in the region, in considering China, at least as a "potential threat".

Because of China's size and relative power, its own apparent dissatisfaction with the security environment in the region, particularly vis-a-vis Taiwan and the US military prepondence and because of past links with forces hostile to governments in the region, countries in the neighbourhood (periphery for China) will expect that the burden of responsibility for demonstrating that it is not a threat, rests with China.⁴⁷

Notes

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3. Article 29 of China's 1978 Constitution reads. "The Army is the mainstay of the dictatorship of the Communist Party".
4. Article 19 of the National Defence Law (adapted at the Fifth Plenary Session

of the Eighth National People's congress on March 14, 1997), stipulates that "China's Armed Forces", a term defined to include the PLA, PAP and the militia, "are under the control of the Chinese Communist Party".

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6. The Royal United Services Institution (*RUSI*) for Defence and Strategic Studies: Chinese Military Update, ISSN 1470-9772 July 2003 Vol 1 No 2.
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- (Hereafter SWB FE) SWB FE/3518 G/9 April 26, 1999. For the reorganisation of the PLA in the Ninth Five Year Plan, see also Huang Caihong and Guo Jia "Today's Great War Stands in a More Majestic Manner- Reviewing in Retrospect the PLA's Achievements During Ninth Five Year Plan Period", *Xinhua*, 7 October 2000 in FBIS-CHI - 2000-2007, 12 October 2000.
16. Chinese Military Digest, 1999 at <http://www.gsprint.com/cmd.cmd.htm>
 17. These GAs will be converted from a division-based structure to a brigade-based structure. See Robert Sae-Liu, "PLA reorganises group armies", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 15 September 1993, p. 33.
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 19. See for Fu Quanyou on Officer Corps, *Xinhua*, 4 September 1999 in SWB FE/3633 G/9 7 September 1999. For Jiang Zemin's decree of 30 June on recruiting civilians and pay rise, *Xinhua*, 11 July 1999 in SWB FE/3585 G/8 13 July 1999. The Navy announced in August of recruiting about 1,000 officers from non-military institutes every year, accounting for nearly 40 percent of all naval officers by 2010. *Xinhua*, 17 August 1999 in SWB FE/3617 G/5 19 August 1999.
 20. Zhou Rongting was appointed as the first President of the Information Engineering University in November 1999. See CHINA aktuell (December 1999), p. 1300/12. See also *Xinhua*, 2 July 1999 in SWB FE/3578 G/4, 5 July 1999; CHINA aktuell July 1999, p. 728/12. The University of Science and Engineering is meant for training technical personnel for information warfare. See Tai Yang Pao, 25 September 1999 in SWB FE/3642 G/8 17 September 1999.
 21. n. 10.
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26. Arthur S [Build up a in The Ro (RUSI) f Studies - 1470-977
27. Jehangir Teeth", No. 49; (
28. Benara Internati College Libratio Developi The Ro (RUSI) Studies. 1470-97
29. n. 27.
30. "How D Conflict H Yang
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CHAIRMAN'S REMARKS

Though it did not come out in the presentation, but because I had the opportunity to go through his paper, the one thing that requires to be mentioned here of import is the change in the Chinese concept - from winning a local war under ordinary

conditions to winning a local war under hi-tech conditions. Now we have the joint presentation by Vice Admiral Kataru Hasegawa and Lieutenant General Tomohiro Okamoto.

SECOND SESSION : SECOND PAPER

CHINA'S NAVAL STRATEGY AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN JAPAN'S VICINITY

VICE ADMIRAL KATARU HASEGAWA AND
LIEUTENANT GENERAL TOMOHIRO OKAMOTO (RETD)

Recently, there has been a perceptible change in China's approach to beef up its military capability. The defence budget of China has been at an upswing to the tune of two digits in the last, successive, 14 years. According to the American Defence Report 2002, China's actual defence expenditure is more than three times that released by the government. If this American assertion is to be believed, then China's real annual defence budget as compared to the official figure of 2002 (166.2 billion Yuan or Y 2 trillion - 323.5 billion) would have surpassed that of Japan's by a big margin. With such a huge military budget allegedly directed towards Asia in the background, China's efforts to modernise her military strength is concentrated towards (a) building nuclear deterrence against the US; (b) repletion of naval and air force aimed at hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, especially by blocking the independence movement of Taiwan; and (c) leveraging IT in the military for gaining supremacy in the future.

Coming in the wake of China beefing up its military capability, North Korea's nuclear programme is another cause of worry for the security of the North-East Asian region. While

putting its people to great misery, North Korea is engaged in building up its military capability, including developing nuclear weapons, by pursuing a "policy of brinkmanship" and by forward mobilisation of more than 60 per cent of her total military force near the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ), besides all kinds of destructive activities by its special troops and factory (repair) ships, development and disposition of weapons of mass destruction and guided missiles, and adoption of illegal means such as kidnapping, drug trafficking, weapon exports, and so on. By undertaking such activities, Pyongyang has sown or is engaged in sowing the seeds of disturbance in countries of East Asia, including South Korea and her own fellow countrymen. By these means, Pyongyang is projecting itself as one of the "pivots of evil". It is, therefore, desirable that the US in cooperation with Japan and South Korea develop strategies to arrest Pyongyang's design by engaging it in a process of dialogue and also by using coercive diplomacy. For such a strategy to be successful, the participation of Russia and China may be inescapable.

In addition to certain countries desiring independence, terrorism triggered by Islamic

terrorist activities head. The US massive assault beginning has been in Afghanistan. The exterminate terrorism in East Asia and help towards the example of this in the Philippines. Since the 9/11 attack, the Philippines has tightened its security in South East Asia. The US, Japan and various countries have helped towards the anti-terrorist and strengthening the region.

Regarding Pakistan, the unresolved problems are not eliminated. The present paper especially on the unresolved issues and attempts to

CHINA'S NAVAL STRATEGY

China's Naval Strategy in the South China Sea and the East China Sea.

The 16th Representative Conference saw a rejuvenation of the emergence of leaders led by diplomatic dialogue. The Conference held in June 2003 at the strategy in the

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terrorist activities has also raised its ugly head. The US on its part, has launched a massive assault to contain this trend and the beginning has been made in this regard in Afghanistan. The US seems determined to exterminate terrorism from the soil of South East Asia and has been extending all possible help towards this end to ASEAN. A typical example of this is the joint manoeuvre with the Philippines army for getting rid of Abu Sayaf. Since the blast in Bali Islands that resulted in over 180 deaths, Indonesia too has tightened its control against terrorists. The South East Asian region, in cooperation with the US, Japan and Australia has also taken up various measures against terrorism. Consequently, coordination and cooperation for anti-terrorist measures has been widened and strengthened in the entire Asia-Pacific region.

Regarding relations between India and Pakistan, the Kashmir issue remains an unresolved problem. The measures to eliminate the Al Qaida also remain unresolved. Keeping these points in mind, the present paper attempts to concentrate especially on the Chinese 'Naval Strategy' and attempts to present the motives behind it.

CHINA'S NEW MILITARY STRATEGY

China's National Strategy : Korean Peninsula.

The 16th Conference of the National Representatives of China's Communist Party saw a rejuvenation of the leadership with the emergence of the so-called fourth generation leaders led by Hu Jintao. Hu Jintao made his diplomatic debut at the 29th Heads of States Conference held in Evian in France in early June 2003 and with this China's diplomatic strategy in the 21st Century made a new

beginning. However, ahead of Hu Jintao government, there are several knotty issues such as problems pertaining to the communist ideology, problem of correcting distortions caused by the economic growth, income gap between the East and the West, unemployment and poverty, problem of frontier races and the national security issue, etc.

One of the problems is the relationship with North Korea. Recently, the number of illegal migrants from North Korea to China has reached an alarming proportion. This has resulted in the heightening of tensions between the two countries. Further, with regard to the nuclear problem of North Korea, China has repeatedly expressed its support for denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. Even in the Secretary level defence talks held in the US in December 2002, China confirmed her stand – not to tolerate the emergence of a nuclear power in the Korean peninsula. This seems to be a part of the medium and long-term national defence strategy of China, wherein the thinking is that a potential nuclear power in Japan's neighbourhood would propel Japan to go nuclear in the near future as also destabilise the military balance in the East Asian region. Since the current Chinese national strategic goal is to concentrate on sustained economic growth, China feels it desirable that any possibility of destabilising the region should be avoided. Consistency in China's strategy in this regard can also be observed from the strengthening of intelligence flights near the border with North Korea. However, China is unlikely to continue putting pressure on North Korea.

CHINA'S NEW "NATIONAL DEFENCE STRATEGY"

China seems to have formulated her new "National Defence Strategy" at the

beginning of the 21st Century. However, before discussing about it, it is worthwhile to have an overview of the change in China's defence strategy in the last 20 years.

Defence Strategy

In 1980, based on a decision of the Central Military Committee, China's People's Liberation Army adopted the so-called "People's War Strategy", i.e. 'resist stoutly and dissipate a powerful enemy based on a combination of medium-scale movement war and wide scale guerilla warfare as well as securing a decisive victory in a war based on total annihilation of the enemy.'

This was in tune with the traditional human sea tactics of Mao Tse Tung. This so-called military strategy had to be resorted to by technically inferior People's Liberation Army. Thereafter, according to the "Strategy Report" in which Chen Yun, the then Chairman of the Central Advisory Committee, Communist Party of China announced on 17 September 1990, that "For the time being the potential enemy of China is the US, and Japan shall attain war capability by the year 2005. During the remaining 15 years, China must prepare for a possible war with Japan." It went on to say that China must build her military capability aiming at "developing a carrier fleet ranking with that of the US by the year 2050 and grow into a nation which can exercise influence on the global scale." Under this policy, China's Military Committee formulated a new "National Military Strategy" in 1990. In other words, this was the "Wide and Far Maritime Defence Strategy" and it was to realise national defence by encompassing East and South China Seas within the First Archipelago line. In brief, it was to acquire quality armaments, besides shifting the strategy from full-scale war to local

war approach. Its focus was reinforcement of naval power, building of coastline-type navy having capability ranging from coastal type navy to near sea operation capability and thorough crushing of enemy before landing based on sea defence through combined reinforcement of navy and air war capabilities. For that, besides possessing multi-function medium type surface warships and submarines having anti-submarine, anti-aircraft and anti-electronic war capabilities, possess in-flight refueling planes, early warning planes as well as fighter bombers. Further, besides operating carrier loaded with carrier-based type fixed wing planes, acquire aggressive type nuclear submarine by 2050. The actual status of military power built in the last 10 years based on this plan is before US.

China's Strategy in the 21st Century

Based on the statement, namely "Science and Technology is the productive capacity" made by Deng Xiao Ping in 1979, China has pursued improving her education, production and military power by laying emphasis on science and technology as the national policy. Further, based on the "Decision of the Central Committee, Communist Party concerning Reformation of Science and Technology Setup" (Decision on Science and Technology) by the then Prime Minister, Zhao Ziyang, in 1985, it was decided to improve the private sector base for command and control, communication, information and computer function (C4I function) as per the "National Hi-tech Research Development Plan (Plan 863) and the 'Torch Plan', extolled in the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000).

According to a paper by Colonel Zhu Oozhi, Professor at Taiwan National Defence

College, amid! has formulate strategy at the outline of such

(a) First Acquisition capability

(b) Second Acquisition capable

(c) Third Acquisition impact US.

If these to be analysed medium-scale 2005 is first J by Chen Yun. Moreover, 'design' as simultaneous ranking with heightened acquiring comparable China's size several times be justifiable quality compared Japan cannot

CHINA'S MEP

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College, amidst such circumstances, China has formulated its new national military strategy at the start of the 21st century. The outline of such a strategy is as follows:-

- (a) First Stage (2000 -2005):
Acquisition of medium scale local war capability.
- (b) Second Stage (2006-2105):
Acquisition of Space defence system capable of double defence.
- (c) Third Stage (2016-2049):
Acquisition of military power that has impact on world peace along with the US.

If these national military strategies are to be analysed carefully, the target for medium-scale local war to be achieved by 2005 is first Japan, as per the statement made by Chen Yun, to be followed by Taiwan. Moreover, by 2050 China will have a "grand design" as a nation in place where, simultaneously with possessing a large navy ranking with that of the US, it would have heightened its impact on the world by acquiring aerospace capability, also comparable with that of the US. Considering China's size as a country, military power several times bigger than that of Japan may be justifiable. But if China's military attains quality commensurate with that of the US, Japan cannot afford to be a mute spectator.

CHINA'S MILITARY STRATEGY AND MEASURES TO COUNTER IT

China and Asia-Pacific Region

In this way, China has been trying to expand its national power based on national military strategy consistently since 1980. According to news reported in the *Yomiuri*

Shimbun dated 8 June 2003, in view of the overwhelming victory of the US in the Iraq war, China's People's Liberation Army is said to have embarked on a full-scale leveraging of IT in military focused on inception of digitalisation of forces. While inducting IT in the Army, China has been simultaneously linking various systems like command, communication, surveillance, information and reconnaissance with the IT network to establish the base for speedy execution of a strategy that aims at developing satellite guided missiles and electronic war. Also, anti-electronic war capability is being inducted in important areas such as the Taiwan Strait.

Furthermore, China is acquiring fourth generation fighter planes such as SU-27, SU-30, kilo class submarine, Sovremenny destroyer, S-300 air defence system, etc. from Russia in large quantities. In addition, it has developed a long-distance ballistic missile called "Tofu 31" with a shooting range of 8000 km and it has already positioned 400 medium and short-range ballistic missiles in her mainland close to Taiwan. Among them, solid fuel and mobile type missile called "Tofu 2 5" with a range of 2,500 km has Tokyo in its shooting range and the solid fuel, vehicle-mounted type short-range missile "Tofu 1 5" with a range of 600 km can reach Okinawa.

In other words, these ballistic missiles, starting with Japan, have also become a threat for Philippines and the East Asian countries. Further, it has been learnt recently that China instituted in 1997 the "Army Missile Brigade No. 1" in the Nanking Military District, which will play the central role in the event of China militarily intervening in Taiwan. So far, missiles were positioned in the second artillery. But the aim this time behind the inception of the new army brigade can be interpreted as better mobility and response

from operational point of view. In this way, efforts of China to build up its military strength and the overall trend are extremely challenging. The modernisation of military forces by China and the perceived threat emanating from its power projection capability is extremely worrisome to the nations in the Asia-Pacific region.

Maritime Strategy

The characteristic of naval strength lies in its manoeuvrability and flexibility. Unlike land forces, it can have impact on various fronts ranging from friendship and amity (gun-boat diplomacy) to attack and destruction (power projection) against distant nations across the seas. Indeed, it can facilitate extension of politics and pursuit of valuable national policies.

Japan is strategically located in the South Pacific Island chain comprising mainland Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan and the Philippines. Being a maritime power and dependent on maritime trade for its national prosperity, the safety of sea-lanes for trade is essential for Japan's economic survival. Especially if China's aspiration to become a major maritime power in the 21st century and have a free entry into the open sea of the Pacific and the Indian Ocean is to be fulfilled, the status of Okinawa and Taiwan would be crucial.

Contrary to the above premise, few people subscribe to the image of China as a potential Ocean State. They base their argument on 5,000-year-old history. For China it was the land battle that determined the fate of many dynasties and even if the main battle was on water, it was river and not ocean. However, as is evident from the expression "South is ship and North is horse", southern tribes have oceanic character and around the

fourth century, they developed the compass called "Shinanshin" and before the Arabians appeared on the scene, they advanced from South China Sea to Andaman Sea till the seventh century and built a China town in each place. And, in 1405, during the Min period, the fleet headed by Zheng Ho reached from Java to Calcutta in India. Zheng Ho continued his expedition even further and spread over seven times till 1433. He carried out great sea expeditions to the west coast of Africa and the Persian Gulf and brought tributes from over 30 countries. This was half a century before the so-called Great Navigation Age and even a century before the discovery of the American continent. It was China which had a powerful sea force during the Min period and advanced from the Indian Ocean to the Arabian Sea. Moreover, in modern times, domestic situation fell into disorder and national prosperity declined. And, when the European powers descended in the East, the great old nation became a "sleeping lion". There were many wars after the Opium War in 1840 till the birth of unified navy as People's Revolution Army in 1928 but there was no naval battle in the real sense and it was not worth being addressed as the Chinese Navy.

After the end of the Sino-Japanese war and World War II, National Navy was built based on compensation received from Japan, and grant and support from the US and England. In September 1950, the People's Liberation Army-Navy Division came into being by incorporating various local navies. Thus was born the unified People's Liberation Army-Navy.

After mid-1980s, under the perception that the 21st century will be the century of the ocean and that the growth of People's Republic of China cannot be separated from the ocean, the task of building up of a

powerful navy through related interests task. Thus was coastal operation is apt to be regarded but we need to Chinese venture had a powerful

On the other of China, as thought, is the Chinese did not boundary and for the first time Nerchinsk was surprised with boundary when Republic of China became an issue China. At that time lost after the Opium of reconsideration This view of nation can be seen in China, a middle mentioned the Okinawa, Taiwan Peninsula, Vietnam Mongolia, etc. were snatched during the period (1919). Furthermore note China's boundary, not (strategic not determining the nation and race addition to the ocean continue outer sphere also included.

If the above world's perception

developed the compass and before the Arabians came, they advanced from the Andaman Sea till the Gulf of China built a China town in 1405, during the Ming Dynasty. Zheng Ho reached India. Zheng Ho's mission even further and continued till 1433. He carried missions to the west coast of the Arabian Gulf and brought back countries. This was half the so-called Great Silk Road even a century before the American continent. It was a powerful sea force and advanced from the Arabian Sea. Moreover, the domestic situation fell into prosperity declined. And, powers descended in the region became a "sleeping giant" wars after the Opium War. Birth of unified navy as army in 1928 but there is the real sense and it is addressed as the

the Sino-Japanese war. The National Navy was built and received from Japan, support from the US and after 1950, the People's Liberation Division came into various local navies. ended People's Liberation

under the perception. I believe the century of the growth of People's will not be separated from the building up of a

powerful navy that can safeguard her ocean-related interests was viewed as a strategic task. Thus was developed a navy having coastal operation capability. In this way, China is apt to be regarded as a continental country but we need to remember that in the past Chinese ventured out overseas and that they had a powerful maritime force.

On the other hand, yet another aspect of China, as conceived in the Chinese thought, is that until modern times, the Chinese did not have the concept of national boundary and it recognised national border for the first time in 1689 when the treaty of Nerchinsk was concluded. The world was surprised with the Chinese view of national boundary when after the creation of People's Republic of China in 1949; national boundary became an issue for the approval of new China. At that time, China made the territories lost after the Opium War as the starting point of reconsideration of its national boundaries. This view of national boundary of the Chinese can be seen in the *Brief History of Modern China*, a middle school textbook wherein it is mentioned that the Korean Peninsula, Okinawa, Taiwan, Singapore, Malay Peninsula, Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, Nepal, Mongolia, etc. were Chinese territories that were snatched away by imperialist forces during the period of old democracy (1840-1919). Further, it is also important to note China's peculiar concept of national boundary, namely, "strategic frontier" (strategic national boundary) where determining the space for the survival of nation and race is an important element. In addition to exclusive economic zone and ocean continental shelf, cosmic space in the outer sphere and deep sea of the ocean are also included.

If the above argument is summed up, world's perception of China is that it is a

member of the continental nation/heartland from the geopolitical point of view and confronts ocean nations/rim land formed by the island countries of the Pacific region led by the US. In this respect, the world will be faced with an important choice, i.e. whether to make Taiwan, which is located geographically in a very crucial position where land powers and sea powers rival with one another, a land power attaching importance to order rather than freedom or a sea power attaching importance to freedom and democracy.

Former Navy Commander, Seki Un Sei, talked about the basic concept of the Ocean Strategy, thus, in a meeting: "People who have not experienced war may have forgotten about the sea war but regarding the new century of the Ocean, following revelations, can be obtained from the memories of the history of sea wars in the last few thousand years."

(a) The struggle among people over ocean has not ended and continues even today. It is an immutable truth. What has changed is that the struggle has become more complicated and intense and the sea wars have become more severe.

(b) We not only possess land territory of 960 sq km but also have jurisdiction over sea area of several million sq km. Safeguarding both is very important and we will be attaching more and more importance to the Chinese perception of the Ocean.

(c) In the 5,000-year-long history of China, many a dynasties have risen and fallen. During the age when a strong dynasty prospered, ocean activity also progressed and Chinese people

ventured out. If ocean activities prosper, the country as well as the people become powerful and the growth of the Chinese people is inseparable from the Ocean. The 21st century is the century of the Ocean. With the advent of this century, it is mandatory for us to build an even more powerful navy.

Under such revelations, how to build a powerful People's Navy is the need of the hour. Based on the policy, namely *Strategic Thought and Strategic Mission of the Chinese Navy*, whose cornerstones are not to carry out world-wide strategy, not to advocate permanent hegemony, and carry out operations in the near sea as well as based on a series of instructions by Deng Xiao Ping concerning 'Our Maritime Strategy Defence Range' (Author's note: Details are not known but usually it is believed to imply Yellow Sea, East China Sea, South China Sea), we have built our naval strategy of 'Near Sea Defence' and clarified our naval strategic mission in the new age. This implies restraining and defending against aggression by a foreign enemy from the sea, maintaining the sovereignty of our country and maintaining unification and ocean interests of our country.

Navy : Near Sea Defence Strategy

Now, let us look at "Some viewpoints on changes in the form of war and the naval development of China" (History of Military, 1988) and "the Chinese Naval Growth Strategy" (Knowledge on warships, Q4 1989) by Zhang Xu, the key leader who researched on the "Naval Development History" for building the Chinese Navy in the year 2000 and served as the Director, Naval Academy and Vice-Commander of the Navy for long and who has been responsible for its modernisation programme currently underway.

Further, with regard to matters concerning operation of troops, there are basically no publicly disclosed materials. Therefore, here let us attempt a few observations based on the aforesaid materials.

(a) "Mission of the Navy" is the main means to safeguard the sovereignty and maritime interests of the country.

(b) Near Sea is the strategic concept (usually, it is considered to imply the sea areas outside the coastal waters) and its range includes not only all the sea areas under Chinese control confirmed by the law of the sea but also various islands like Tohsha, Seisha, Chusha and Nansha that are Chinese territories in these sea waters. Here, we ought to pay attention to explicit mention of defence of South China Sea and four archipelagos in these sea areas.

(c) The objectives of "Defence of Near Seas" are unification of the nation, preservation of national land and safeguarding the maritime interests of the country, dealing with local war against China, preventing and defending against possible aggression from sea, promoting modernisation of socialism in the peaceful and stable environment of China and ensuring protection of the Asia-Pacific region and world peace.

(d) "Navy building" is to be carried out based on the theory of local war. Chinese military, based on the understanding that there will be no world war and future wars will be limited wars; will build its normal war potentials so that it is able to deal with the Western style minimum nuclear deterrent potential and strategic surprise attack.

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And, aiming at building troops based on the limited war theory, China must develop the navy that can cope with modern local wars, maximise its efficacy with limited investment and exhibit its effective and latent potentials through reorganisation and reformation of the current set up.

(e) In response to strategic threat potential, actual war potential and effective land defence potential demanded of the Chinese Army, the overall structure of navy shall be readjusted and now the "Operation Forces Categorisation" shall comprise the following three in the light of different duties and capabilities :-

(i) Intimidating-type Strategic Missile Submarine Fleet, whose growth is to be determined based on the need of the national strategy and the growth of nuclear war capability.

(ii) Actual war type mobile operation force whose main duties are to carry out mobile operations in the near sea, tackle various clashes or unforeseen incidents, safeguard national maritime interests and dominate the sea safety. And, whenever needed, also carry out deep-sea responsibilities. At some point in the future, this force will be very crucial and without it, navy will be unable to play an important role for the nation.

(iii) Defence-type regional guarding force which will be stationed in a certain area of maritime defence and will execute

daily combat as well as other duties.

(f) "Operational Sea area" changes with time but there is the Sea Area Theory called "the First Archipelago Line and the Second Archipelago Line". First Archipelago Line implies the arc shaped chain of islands formed by the Aleutian Islands in West Pacific, the Kurile Islands, the Japanese archipelago, Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, and Philippines as well as arc-shaped chain-like islands formed by the Greater Sunda Islands. The Second Archipelago Line implies the arc-shaped islands lying vertically to the outer east side of the First Archipelago Line (The Present Chinese Navy 1987, Chinese Scientific Publications). There is no Chinese document which clearly defines the Second Archipelago Line, but the Archipelago Line to the south of the Kurile Islands, Japanese Ogasawara Islands, Iwo Jima and Mariana Islands (Shigeo Hiramatsu, "China's Strategic Advance in the Sea", 1 October 2002) is considered to be appropriate.

(g) It is the authors' purely personal opinion but as for the "sea area-wise operational objectives", the First Archipelago Line is being used as the inland sea. In other words, almost complete sea control by positioning all kinds of forces is being maintained and underwater resources are being exploited freely at all times. Also, the use by other countries can be blocked depending on the requirement. Further, China has the capability to control the sea area between the First and the Second Archipelago Lines, if required, and it is perhaps considering having the

capability to carry out maritime scientific research, fisheries, exploitation of underwater resources, deployment of SSBN etc. during peace time and execution of patrolling based on SSBN, destruction of enemy's SLOC, crushing of enemy forces etc. during war time.

(h) With regard to the "Operation Concept", it is believed to have been developed in line with the present times, based on the "Maritime Multiple Defence Strategy" (Importance and Balance of Naval Building" by Director, Dairen Warship Academy, Major General Rin Chigyo "Knowledge about Warships", November 1989) stated below.

"Maritime Multiple Defence Strategy" is the concept of defence based on horizontal and vertical positioning of various weapon system like submarines, airplanes, surface warships, coastal missiles, etc. in two or three layers and, militaristically, it is something universal.

The following capabilities are needed since the defence of the first layer i.e., from the coastal line to 150 nautical miles is based on high-speed patrol boats equipped with anti-ship missiles or torpedos and land missiles. That of the second layer from 30 to 300 nautical miles from the coastline based on missile destroyer or convoy ships and that of the outermost third layer i.e., inside of Tsushima Channel, Okinawa to Nansho Islands based on submarines or air planes loaded with missiles.

(a) Capability to carry out wide ranged operations in South and East China Sea in the First Archipelago Line.

(b) Independent capability to command seas and air.

(c) Powerful and prompt counterattack capability.

(d) Powerful dual war capability.

(e) Certain level of nuclear threat capability.

However, based on the current economic and technical power, since China cannot increase its military expenditure vastly, the first phase should be divided from 1989 to 2000, and the second phase from 2000 to 2050. During the first phase, medium range fighter bombers, early warning planes, scout planes, electronic sabotaging planes and mid-air refuelling planes, etc. should be developed in a balanced manner. Further, as for the naval force, striking submarine surface warship carrying helicopters should be the command support war capability. During the second phase, aircraft carrier should be the nucleus and mobile troops possessing surface warships and submarines having anti-aircraft, anti-surface and anti-submarine operation capability should be acquired in a phased manner from South to North depending on the level of economic growth.

This, in short, suggests that there is a move to extend strategic boundary described below in the "Near Sea Defence" to the open sea and establish China's sovereignty to the maximum possible extent as the "Sea of China". If such a sea zone is established in the open sea, sea lanes will get split and the free sea will get restricted considerably. It may be quite an arbitrary interpretation but as it is established based on a positive law, namely the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, it is quite annoying. Moreover, it links sovereign rights in the National Sovereign Waters with the naval power. To put it precisely, it declares exercising one's naval force to protect one's rights recognised under the United Nations Convention.

"Strategic Bound

The growth of last 10 to 15 years the outer sea, space on the typical Chinese boundary. The problem the boundary varies equation. It is identical of minimum standard justification of merit that "a nation is a perish if the requirements available. It is the job to keep the requirements under its control." similar to the core Haushofer. Historically dogmatically expansion in the vicinity for the sea and its obsessive continental nation with regard to ocean is not so distinct, "strategic boundary; be building and power force in accordance

In February "Territorial Water for the People's it has declared the islands, Taiwan including fishery Tohsha, Seisha that belong to proclaimed government possession of the vessels (It re and Nansha Archipelago the eighth National in May 1996). In Li Peng, during Congress, add target of defence

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"Strategic Boundary" Concept

The growth of the Chinese Navy in the last 10 to 15 years and China's setting out in the outer sea, space and deep sea are based on the typical Chinese concept of national boundary. The problem of this concept is that the boundary varies depending on the power equation. It is identical with Hitler's concept of minimum standard of living. The basis for justification of merger of Poland by Hitler was that "a nation is an animate entity and it will perish if the required energy is not made available. It is the just right of a growing nation to keep the required resources for its survival under its control." In other words, it is also similar to the concept of survival sphere of Haushofer. Historically speaking, China is dogmatically expanding its boundary in the vicinity for the safety of the Chinese world and its obsession with territory being a continental nation is extremely strong. Even with regard to ocean where national boundary is not so distinct, it has evolved the theory of "strategic boundary" and China is believed to be building and putting into operation its naval force in accordance with it.

In February 1992, it formulated "Territorial Waters and Contiguous Zone Law for the People's Republic of China" wherein it has declared the continent of China, coastal islands, Taiwan and affiliated islands, including fishing islands, Hohko Islands, Tohsha, Seisha and Nansha group of islands that belong to Taiwan and unilaterally proclaimed guidelines for the right of possession of territorial waters and passage of vessels (It removed the Senkaku Islands and Nansha Archipelago from this list during the eighth National People's Congress held in May 1996). In March 1993, Prime Minister Li Peng, during the National People's Congress, added maritime interest as the target of defence when he said, "We must

strengthen patrolling of our national boundaries and coasts and safeguard interests of our land, sovereignty and oceans". One needs to be wary about this Concept of Survival Sphere (Defence Outlook) which has China's strong attachment towards territory, desire to acquire sea resources accompanied by excessive nationalism, strong feelings of being a victim denoted by the building of the Great Wall of China in the background.

Military Modernisation

As for modernisation of navy, verification of all hardware, software and human fronts, such as documentation of legislation and strategic essentials concerning military power, armaments, operation of armed forces, education and training, exercises, personnel management, reinforcements etc. are necessary. But here, we would like to confine ourselves to giving an outline of modernisation of naval vessels and aircraft forces.

The Chinese Navy today possesses 770 ships and warships (capacity about 905,000 tons) and 550 military or naval operation planes. The majority of them are old and small and most of the leading naval vessels are not equipped with anti-aircraft missile. Therefore, besides building and deploying new type of destroyers with capability to carry helicopters and submarines, China is pushing forward modernisation programme of its navy by procuring and inducting silent kilo-class submarines, and Sovremenny-class destroyer that can carry supersonic anti-ship missiles from Russia. Further, besides deploying J-811 fighter planes having mid-air refuelling capability and H-6 improved mid-air refuelling planes in 1997, it has inducted Su-27 fighter planes and manufacturing them locally under licence from Russia. In addition, it has also already inducted Su-30 MKK fighter strike

planes having anti-ground attack capability and is carrying out modernisation of air fighting capability as well as expanding its air cover capability.

Domestic Production.

(a) There are two types of new destroyers. They were launched at Shanghai Kunan Shipyard in May 2002 and April 2003. They are the same as Luhai class or even above that and are the highest class produced domestically. One is equipped with air defence system made up of Russian radars and missiles, where cannons and anti-ship missiles have been developed and manufactured indigenously using western technology. And the other is called air defence type destroyer equipped with four face fixed type phased array radar and long range SAM.

(b) As for submarines, besides continuous building of SONG class SS, building of new 093 type SSN has been reported., It is equipped with new weapons like underwater firing anti-ship missile, wire guided, torpedo, self-propelled sea mines, etc. By 2005, it is likely to be in active stage.

(c) As for Ballistic Missile Atomic Power Submarine, SSBN, development of successor vessel 094 type of the Xia class is being pursued, and by 2010 it is likely to be in active stage. Loaded SLBM is the improved version of vehicle-loaded DF-31 ICBM (Kyoro II: JL-2) with a range of over 8000 km. Therefore, the US can be directly attacked from the Chinese coast. Further, the range of JL-1 loaded with XIA class is about 2150 km and can cover the whole of Japan in its range.

(d) With regard to aircraft carrier, at present there are no signs of developing and building it and no decision has been made as yet regarding building one. Private companies of China, with tacit approval of the Army, have purchased three aircraft carriers, which were either incomplete or retired from service, from the erstwhile Soviet Union. These are being used as a facility at the Theme Park. Army is behind its purchase and the Chinese government has even participated in its repair and revival. It is believed that technical investigation for future building of aircraft carriers is being carried out.

Import of Weapons from Russia

(a) The most noticeable characteristic of modernisation of the Chinese Navy is the purchase of armaments from Russia and this phenomenon has assumed prominence of late. China has purchased six naval vessels from Russia since 1995 and has deployed them. The conclusion of China-Russia Treaty of Friendship in 2001 became the base for China-Russia military cooperation. Following this, both countries have signed major contracts for the purchase of naval vessels and aircrafts. The Navy alone has signed agreement worth \$3.6 billion. Further, General Soh Goh Sen, who has recently assumed office as the Director (minister) of the Defence Ministry, is the former in-charge of overall armaments and has the experience of studying in erstwhile Soviet Union on two occasions. Since he has established rapport with Russia, it is believed that this association will give a spur to induction of weapons and technology from Russia.

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(b) As for naval vessels, a contract for the acquisition of Sovremenny class destroyer was signed last year. China has already acquired two naval vessels of the same class in 2001 but in the latest contract, two upgradable type 956 EM will be bought at a cost of \$1 billion. Upgradable type is said to have improved type auto-fighting system, and can be equipped with new anti-ship missile SS-NX-26. These two vessels are likely to be handed over to China by the end of 2005.

(c) As for submarines, negotiations for the additional purchase of K class SS are said to be underway and it is reported that an agreement for the purchase of eight submarines at a cost of \$1.6 billion, has already been reached. It is said that China intends to buy not the export-type but high capacity 636 type submarine.

(d) As for aircraft, it is believed that China has reached an agreement to buy 24 Su-30 MKK aircrafts as the multi-purpose fighter planes for the navy. Su-30 can be loaded with medium range air-to-air missile AA-12 or supersonic anti-ship missile AS-77 and is a fighter plane with high capability belonging to the fourth generation. In the Chinese Army, these have so far only been deployed in the air force and induction of Su-30 in the navy is for the first time.

(e) The Chinese Navy is in the process of acquiring a wide variety of armaments to enhance its war potential. These include attacking type atomic power submarine SSN (one), regular type submarine SSK class (eight), Song class (two), large-sized destroyer DDG

Sovre class (two), new type destroyer (four), multi-purpose fighter planes Su-30 (24) etc, by 2005, through both domestic production and imports from Russia, and, therefore, rapidly modernising its navy – both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Operational Capability : Overseas Dispatch of Naval vessels

Besides enhancing its presence in South China Sea by dispatching naval vessels regularly in recent years, the Chinese Navy has been carrying out large-scale manoeuvre such as joint exercises or land exercises by army, navy and air force and is enhancing its operational potential. Here, I would like to discuss China's potential in this regard from actual overseas dispatch of naval vessels. This can also be viewed as the history of enhancement of open sea capability of the Chinese Navy.

In recent years, the Chinese Navy has been implementing ocean navigation in a positive manner centred on overseas dispatch of naval vessels. It was first undertaken in 1985 and since then in the last 18 years; it has been carried out 22 times and especially in the last few years, two or three times a year. They have always been accompanied by refuelling ships. First, it was visit to three countries, including Pakistan by two vessels. Initially, such dispatch was focused on neighbouring countries but in 1997, it crossed the Pacific Ocean and visited North America and South America. And in 1998, it was Oceania and in 2000, Africa. Thus, such dispatches have become farther and larger and in 2002, navigation around the globe was implemented by China for the first time ever. Two vessels, namely Lufu class destroyer and Fuqing class refuelling vessel carrying

carrier-based planes with commander-in-chief of North Sea Fleet as its commander and with 506 people on board, including music and medical corps as well as four lady corps, left Shanghai port in May and visited 10 ports in 10 countries, navigating 30,000 nautical miles in 132 days.

There are some interesting facts about it, such as non-use of the Great Circle Navigation Law, holding of party related events on board, implementation of "Ocean territory" ceremony, cordial welcome to commander on return (selected as candidate for the Central Committee), etc. Thus, careful preparation and great enthusiasm can be seen for navigation plan, mid-ocean refuelling, port of call ceremony, vessel maintenance status, zeal of corps, dignity of troops and the navigation is considered to have been undertaken as a big challenge for national glory. All these are to be seen as big turning points in the history of the Chinese Navy.

The Chinese Navy has been dispatching latest vessels to overseas from olden days and they are viewed as a step towards becoming a maritime power. Activities like ocean navigation have diplomatic targets such as display of naval strength, building of trust and so on but they contribute towards enhancement of operational capability of people, armaments, etc. in the open sea, use of knowledge and experience obtained over a long period in ocean navigation, uplifting of status of navy within the country and its modernisation.

One needs to pay attention to this trend for the future. Here, one needs to make special mention of the development of indigenous Chinese Navigation Satellite System "Hokuto Navigation System" (equivalent to GPS of the US). Already, China

has launched two satellites in 2000; in 2003 and in 2005 it has plans to launch over 30 satellites. Besides these being indigenous, they are believed to immensely enhance the fleet operation and strategic capability of this system and ought to be viewed carefully.

Chinese Military Activities in the Vicinity of Japan

The advance of the Chinese Navy in the open sea is said to have begun when Liu Huaqing was chosen as the third generation commanding officer of the navy by Deng Xiao Ping. Soon after assumption of office, he paid attention to the importance of sea resources and urgency of ocean development. He also emphasised on the necessity of building a strong and modern navy in order to protect mineral and fishery resources in the sea in the vicinity of the Chinese continent. He also talked about the importance of rapidly grooming human resource that could operate such modernised navy and promote their training in the open sea. As a result, the Chinese Navy developed rapidly into ocean navy. According to an announcement of the Chinese Navy in 1988, Chinese Navy mostly trained until 1979 along the coast and hardly ever did so in the open sea. This changed altogether one year after Deng's government came into power and in eight years between 1979 and 1987, training sessions in the open sea by the Chinese navy increased 31 times compared to that in 29 years prior to 1979.

Their traces are not only to be found in all the Chinese waters, but extend from the Indian Ocean to the South Pole. In the process, key personnel were also groomed and the navigation rate of first class naval vessels rose from six per cent in 1979 to 56 per cent and senior personnel who experienced deep sea navigation reached 80

per cent. There implement large-scale training was developed sea training sessions the West Pacific, South Pole and etc. and four have landing operation! tactical operations to South China Sea which was first used and then naval vessels at securing possession

South China Sea

Before having the vicinity of Japan South China Sea become the pre-terms of China's Further, with regard are claims by six possession of Na Taiwan and China of this entire are:

China's advance can be traced back establishment of when it staked its Seisha islands. 1 strong protest from this problem was later generations on the surface to behind the scene to establish its area

In the 1980s implemented and the middle of 1980s repeatedly carried carrying land war

tellites in 2000; in 2003 plans to launch over 30 more being indigenous, immensely enhance the strategic capability of this to be viewed carefully.

Activities in the Vicinity

of the Chinese Navy in 1983 have begun when Liu Xiang as the third generation commander of the navy by Deng Xiaoping took office, he paid attention to the development of sea resources. He also recognized the necessity of building a navy in order to protect China's interests in the sea in the Pacific continent. He also recognized the importance of rapidly increasing the navy's operational capability and promote their sea power. As a result, the navy developed rapidly into ocean navy. The announcement of the 1982, Chinese Navy mostly along the coast and hardly into the open sea. This changed after Deng's government in eight years between 1982 and 1990 sessions in the open sea. The navy increased 31 times in 9 years prior to 1979.

not only to be found in the South China Sea, but extend from the South Pole. In the 1980s, the navy was also groomed to be of first class naval power. The number of first class naval vessels increased from 56 in 1979 to 156 in 1990, or personnel who engaged in navigation reached 80

per cent. Thereby, the human base to implement large-scale deep sea navigational training was developed. Further, in this deep sea training sessions are included three in the West Pacific, one as a part of support to South Pole and friendship call to Pakistan, etc. and four have been navigation training, landing operations training, sea fighting and tactical operations. China turned its attention to South China Sea from around this time, which was first used for open sea advance and then naval vessels were deployed aiming at securing possession rights.

South China Sea

Before having a look at the status in the vicinity of Japan, let us see the status of South China Sea, which is believed to have become the precedent for East China Sea in terms of China's ocean advance strategy. Further, with regard to South China Sea, there are claims by six countries concerning the possession of Nansha etc., including that by Taiwan and Chinese claims of the possession of this entire area.

China's advance in South China Sea can be traced back to 1951 soon after the establishment of People's Republic of China when it staked its claim over Nansha and Seisha islands. Thereafter, as there was a strong protest from the concerned countries, this problem was put on the shelf (left for later generations to settle). While suggesting on the surface to develop these islands jointly, behind the scene China was moving ahead to establish its actual control over them.

In the 1980s, Ocean Research was implemented and as they progressed around the middle of 1980s, Chinese naval vessels repeatedly carried out military exercises by carrying land warfare troops and enhanced

their presence by carrying out land operations exercises. Thus, China, which until then simply staked its claims over these islands, began to indicate its actual domination both in words and action. In 1987, escorted by naval vessels, civilians (fishermen) were planted in six coral reefs near Vietnam and sign board claiming sovereignty of the People's Republic of China were put up. As a result, there was a military clash with Vietnam in March 1988, which was immediately repulsed and thereafter, naval troops were stationed there. This way, China established its effective control over these islands. Thereafter, within the next few years, China built permanent facilities and since then has gradually made it its military base.

After establishing its effective control over Nansha Islands on 20 April 1992, the Chinese Navy commemorated Navy Day by formulating the "Territorial Waters Law" and declared that it will maintain its national ocean interests and stated its right over Nansha, Seisha and Chusha islands in South China Sea. Further, it allotted oil exploration rights in the territory claimed by Vietnam to an American company.

At the beginning of the 1990s, after having completed its effective control over Vietnam, China began surveys in the water west of Palawan Island of the Philippines and erected monuments claiming its sovereignty in several uninhabited coral reefs and by the end of 1994, built structures assumed to be military facilities in four places of Mischief Atoll claimed by the Philippines. When the Philippines government protested against the Chinese action, China rebuffed by saying that they were shelters for fishermen and between 1998 and 1999, China further constructed four permanent structures. Close to Mischief Atoll, there is an oil mine that many Philippines call

Lead Bank. But here too, China advanced aiming at oil resources and established its possession rights. China today has effective control on the whole of Nansha Islands and several reefs like Eisho Rock and Mischief Rock etc. in the Nansha archipelago.

In the "Action Criteria Talks" with the ASEAN countries, which are still going on, China's stand is quite stubborn and asserts that "all territorial disputes must be resolved through bilateral talks". Further, China emphasises on peaceful resolution to and joint development of resources in the Nansha Islands but it is based on the premise that the South China Sea is "China's Sea". While on the one hand it calls for "peaceful and joint resolution" to the problem, on the other it has cemented its effective control over a period of time supported by military power. Thus, one can see the typical "Chinese stance" here. The accident between American and Chinese Army planes over Hainan Islands in April 2001 gives a glimpse of offence and defence of America and China concerning underwater surveillance in South China Sea. In the Chinese claim about its rights over the air space above the Chinese exclusive economic zone, one can see the design to make the air space also exclusive to itself (Concept of Strategic National Boundary).

Viewed in retrospect, the American withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973 and from the Philippines in 1993, followed by the retreat by the Soviet Union (from Camranh in Vietnam in 1987 and the subsequent Russian refusal to extend the pact to use it beyond 2004) encouraged China to occupy Nansha Islands. China also knew that both the US and USSR would not interfere if it extends its sphere of influence in the Nansha Islands. Since then, China has speeded up its

advance all over the South China Sea. It is but natural that Japan cannot overlook these developments.

If one tries to grasp the overview of the above-mentioned developments, one would notice a sequential action pattern, namely claim for possession, ocean investigation, naval vessel deployment, stationing of troops and establishment of effective control. Furthermore, the Chinese move to fill up the vacuum created by the withdrawal by the US and the USSR should be seen in the context of power play in the Asia Pacific region.

East China Sea

In East China Sea, China stakes different claims than Japan with regard to boundary of the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone as well as possession of Senkaku Islands. As a continental nation, China had very little interest in the sea area but the presence of under water resources in East China Sea based on the report of ESCAPE of 1968 propelled China to stake its claims about ownership of Senkaku in 1971.

With regard to the boundary of the continental shelf, China claims Okinawa trough, extending from the coastline to over 200 nautical miles, as the end of the continental shelf and is trying to secure its rights and interests up to this point. Japan takes the position that Ryukyu Ocean depth which is the end of the Eurasia Plate as the continental shelf and since both China and Japan exist in the continental shelf, it claims it as the intermediate line between Japan and China.

The problem is that China, instead of solving it through negotiations, may try to claim the final control right based on its past

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mode like step-by-step ocean advance, implementation of ocean survey or deployment of naval vessels.

Ocean Research

All Chinese ocean research is conducted by the government and is under the guideline of the party but it is broadly carried out by three organisations, namely, the State Council, State-owned enterprises and the Navy. In the State Council, which is same as the government, National Ocean Bureau is responsible for ocean research, Ministry of Education and China Science Council for surveys aimed at educational and scientific research; and the Ministry of Land Resources for resource exploitation.

Ocean Research by the Government Owned Enterprises

In the State-owned enterprises, China Ocean Oil Co. is carrying out underwater resource exploitation on a commercial scale. A wide variety of investigation ships in the range of 300 to 4000t belonging to state-owned enterprises are active in the vicinity of Japan.

If one sums up the status of ocean research, in East China Sea where China claims its ocean interests, preliminary investigations for resource exploitation and ocean research for ocean control are being carried out, and in the central part of East China Sea, already resource exploitation has reached a commercial base. Near Okinawa trough, it is believed that technical data is being collected for determining the continental shelf. Further, according to the Ocean Law Treaty, in case of setting the continental shelf beyond 200 NM, 10 years after the concerned country has ratified the Ocean Law Treaty, i.e. by 2008 in case of China, it must submit

the supporting data to the related committee of the United Nations. Further, during the year 2003 also on the Pacific side, several investigation ships were seen in action and it is felt that China's interest in the open sea is deepening.

With regard to Ocean Research, there is the problem of the so-called prior information system. Since China's research activities in East China Sea have been carried out actively disregarding the intermediate line claimed by Japan almost completely, it developed into a diplomatic problem and through a diplomatic discussion an agreement was reached on prior information system concerning ocean research in February 2001. Upto now, based on this framework of agreement, intimation has been issued. But it is a fact that many survey ships have been seen carrying out survey-like activities in the waters without any prior intimation. Further, based on the United Nations Ocean Law, if any country wants to undertake any survey in the waters of the Pacific, the country needs to apply for a survey prior to six months of any such survey mission in the exclusive economic zone of Japan. However, it was confirmed that "Kagaku 1" was carrying out ocean survey like activities in the Japanese waters without any prior intimation. This problem of survey ships is being witnessed due to the ambiguity in the written statements under the so-called prior information system, differences in views of China and Japan, inadequacies in Japan's domestic laws, etc. In short, it is due to weak-kneed diplomacy of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Even if intimation is being made, this framework of prior intimation has become merely perfunctory. In particular, the following three issues are a matter of concern.

(a) With regard to "Scientific Survey

of the Ocean", the difference between "Resource Exploitation" and "Scientific Survey" is not described specifically in the "Written Statement".

(b) Under the situation where boundary lines of the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone of East China Sea have not been determined, mistake of having recognised "scientific surveys" by China in the waters that fall under Japanese sovereignty as legal, based on the premise of prior intimation.

(c) Absence of a law specifying ways to deal with illegal act of resource exploitation in Japan's exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. (There is a document titled "On Handling of Scientific Surveys", but it does not have any binding force.)

Moreover, even if a fool-proof prior intimation system is established, the purpose of surveys cannot be known. Therefore, it is necessary to carry out continuous supervision and analysis regarding such activities, probe objectives of the Chinese side and deal with it suitably keeping in view the national interest. For example, there is a photograph of the survey ship "Binhai 511" owned by the Chinese Oil Co. engaged in survey activities in waters close to China-Japan intermediate line in 1999 taken from air and behind the buoys towing from ship's stern. Bubbles considered to have been caused by air gun can be seen. This is the method where artificial earthquake based on compressed air explosion is caused and based on the echo waves received, sea bed layer structure is surveyed. This method is used for sea-bed resource exploration.

At present, collection of technical data for deciding the boundary of the continental

shelf and exclusive economic zone to China's advantage and surveys of sea-bed resource development that are to Japan's disadvantage are being carried out. In all these activities, military overtones cannot be overlooked. As a result, Japan needs to gear up as a nation commensurate with its exclusive economic zone.

Ocean Research by Naval Vessels

Ocean research activities by Chinese Navy's surveying vessel (AGS), ocean observation vessel (AGOR), buoy tender (AGL), information collection vessel (AGI), etc. have been carried out in waters in the vicinity of Japan.

In 2001, ocean research over a wide area in the vicinity of Japan ranging from East China Sea to the Pacific, such as that by "Kaihyo 723 all over the Pacific extending up to Ogasawara Islands has been carried out. In 2002, activities by survey vessel "Tosoku 226 in the northern part of East China Sea were confirmed. This ocean research by naval vessels is ocean observation mainly for ocean data collection. There appears to be a military objective while collecting information, and can be used for future military power expansion.

During the last 10 years, there have been the following three areas of ocean research by China in the vicinity of Japan and in each of these areas, there are essential differences in the research activities carried out :-

(a) The area just about the middle of Japan-China Intermediate Line in East China Sea on the Japanese side and to the west of Sea of Enbi Oshima. It is believed that mainly sea-bed survey based on seismic sea-bed investigation

and continental shelf as well as surveys are being carried out.

(b) The area around the Pacific main island of observation. It is believed that information on naval vessels based on temperature and submarine operations is being collected.

(c) The area around the Ryukyu Islands. In exploration of the best in continental shelf investigation carried out. data collection operations, of Okinawa waters are being carried out.

Moreover, vessels have been carrying out simultaneous activities. Japan several times has water zones have been visited and winter as well. These suggest aiming at grasping waters where it is rich in resources.

Activities other than Ocean Research

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(b) The area from East China Sea to the Pacific via the south of Okinawa main island. Since lowering and lifting of observation equipment etc. is seen, it is believed that collection of information necessary for navigation of naval vessels, especially submarines based on measurement of sea water temperature and salinity, and anti-submarine operations is being carried out.

(c) The area around the Senkaku Islands. In this group of islands, oil exploration prospects are believed to be the best in the entire East China Sea continental shelf and seismic investigation for oil exploration is being carried out. Further, it is believed that data collection for future submarine operations, like in the sea channel south of Okinawa main island, is also being carried out.

Moreover, in these surveys, several vessels have been seen to be carrying out activities simultaneously in the vicinity of Japan several times and the surrounding water zones have been surveyed in summer and winter as well as in all the four seasons. These suggest that the Chinese military is aiming at grasping the environment of the waters where it is operating.

Activities other than Ocean Research

Full-scale activities by Chinese naval vessels in East China Sea were seen in 1999 when over 10 vessels including destroyer and Free Gate carried out activities successfully in the North-west waters of the Senkaku

Islands. Thereafter, several fighter vessels have been confirmed to be engaged in activities in East China Sea near the intermediate line between China and Japan every year. In 2002, two Haiqing class patrol vessels carried out activities in the central part of East China Sea. In addition, one Luh class destroyer was confirmed to be navigating from west of Okinawa towards South China Sea.

In addition to icebreaker-cum-information collection vessel "Kaihyo 723" carrying out activities around Japan for the first time in 2000, "Tocho 232" that carried out information collection on the southern coast of Japan in the same year was the latest scientific observation vessel. Further, in 2002, activities to collect information targeting Okinawa were carried out and one can see that the Chinese Navy is keen to know about Japanese defence power and American Army stationed in Japan.

In recent years, Chinese naval vessels in the vicinity of Japan have been Jianghu class frigate, Luh class and Luda class destroyers, Haiqing class patrolling vessel, Yuting class tank carrier vessel, "Tocho 232" missile support vessel, "Kaihyo 723" information collection vessel, etc. In these activities, ocean research and observations have also been carried out.

There is no definite information regarding activities of aircraft and submarines of the Chinese Navy. It is possible to believe that there have been no aircraft so far that have crossed the Japan-China intermediate line. With regard to submarines, based on the "Annual Report on Chinese Military Power" by the American Defence Ministry (30 July 2003) i.e., "Chinese Navy is aiming at enhancing its wide-ranged monitoring

capability based on submarines", as also on the war potential of kilo-class submarines, the current status of ocean research, etc. one can conclude that even if China has not reached a stage to carry out full-scale activities, they are definitely at a stage where crossing the Okinawa Archipelago line or the Bashi Channel, they are carrying out evolution activities in the West Pacific.

As regards the background to such activities by naval vessels in the Japanese vicinity, in addition to specific objectives like manoeuvring, training, information collection etc., there is a possibility of having the design to ensure a positive presence of navy in the open sea advance being carried out by China. In the pattern confirmed in the advance in South China Sea, what could be the stage of East China Sea (Senkaku Islands)? One needs to wait and see whether China stations its troops and proceeds towards establishing its effective control.

Evaluation of Activities

The objectives of ocean advance by China are estimated as under:

(a) The reason for China to rush with its ocean advance is for economic growth and exploitation of fisheries resources, sea-bed resources like oil, minerals, etc. and then "strategic national boundary". Further, delay on Japan's part is a matter of concern but it is believed to be also related to the collection of support data that China needs to submit to the concerned committees of the United Nations by 2008.

(b) Enlargement and securing of protection cover for the defence of national territory. China, in recent

history, had been invaded by the world powers and there is a perception in China that due to lack of awareness about its sea rights, it lost its sovereignty and national territory. It especially regards the defeat of the Chinese Navy in the Sino-Japanese war as a development that led to splitting of the national territory. In the background to this is the "Strategic Concept of National Boundary" described earlier. Further, due to rapid growth of the economy in coastal cities based on reformation and Open Door policies, need for defence of the coastal cities could also be one of the reasons.

(c) Rise in China's international status is the third reason. Even today ocean related specialised magazines of China debate that a country that controls the sea gets the right for survival and growth. All Ocean Management Organisations position 21st Century as that of the oceans and call for reinforcement of overall ocean power and building China as an "Ocean Power".

CONCLUSION

In 1988, a year before the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union ended, following the Malta Talks, the world entered the new age of multi-polar competitive co-existence, China's Deng Xiao Ping proposed a "New International Order". The details are not available but it aims at the world centred on China, i.e. "Revival of the Chinese World". It is believed that the Chinese Army will play a catalyst role for its realisation. Above all, what is worth noting is that "reduction in the number of soldiers to the tune of one million was carried out three years prior to this, i.e.

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been invaded by the world there is a perception in the world to lack of awareness of rights, it lost its sovereignty over territory. It especially the defeat of the Chinese Navy in the Japanese war as a factor that led to splitting of the world. In the background to the Strategic Concept of National Security described earlier. Further, the growth of the economy in China based on reformation and market policies, need for defence and cities could also be one of the factors.

China's international status is a major reason. Even today oceanic magazines of China are published in a country that controls the right for survival and Ocean Management in the 21st Century as oceans and call for the growth of overall ocean power and China as an "Ocean Power".

CONCLUSION

Before the Cold War and the Soviet Union ended, the world entered the Cold War Talks, the world entered a multi-polar competitive co-existence. Deng Xiao Ping proposed the "New World Order". The details are not clear. The aim is at the world centred development of the Chinese World. The Chinese Army will play a major role in its realisation. Above all, the key is that "reduction in the number of troops to the tune of one million in the next three years prior to this, i.e.

since 1985 there was a conscious shift in the military from "quantity to quality". In 1987 reduction in the number of soldiers was achieved smoothly. At the beginning of 1988, when modern military power was beginning to take shape, China implemented its programme to augment its naval power and has begun to establish its effective control over Nansha Islands. Fifteen years have elapsed since then and now China is marching ahead with establishing its effective control over South China Sea. Not only that, China's advance in East China Sea is also progressing at the same pace and at this rate, East China Sea too will sooner or later become "Sea of China". Japan's inaction is to be blamed for this. At this rate, if the Japanese Government turns a blind eye to ocean research like seismic survey, boring, etc., it is feared that the air space above the exclusive economic zone will become China's air space and the deep sea bed of the West Pacific may also become China's backyard.

In the background to this are China's peculiar history, perception towards seas and strategic national boundary concept. Chinese leaders are quick to assume a strategic viewpoint, think of growth, defence and naval growth of their country and are surging ahead towards their realisation based on an unparalleled long-term national strategy and Party military system. Hereafter too, the presence of the Chinese Navy in the region, based on various open sea activities, is expected to increase. If that happens, a confident China is likely to accelerate its ocean advance all the more with regard to unjust resource exploitation or establishing facts regarding national interests by China through such activities of naval vessels. In addition to dealing with it firmly as a nation having a counter presence in a proactive manner, it is necessary for Japan to

strengthen the legal system, without letting creation of a vacuum.

The military situation in Asia in the recent years is volatile as compared to Europe, which is on the course of integration. Especially, the US condemned Iraq for possessing weapons of mass destruction in large quantities and carried out preemptive strike to eliminate the regime of Saddam Hussein. This course was undertaken when the US learnt that the Security Council was unlikely to endorse such an action. China seems to be emboldened by such US action in Iraq for taking a similar punitive action against Taiwan. In view of such concerns with regard to the element of threat that is emerging in the Asia Pacific region, it is necessary for Japan to direct its attention to the emerging reality in the region and mobilise world opinion to restrain China. At the same time, Japan ought to use all the available opportunities at its command to have close cooperation with countries in the region in order to adopt specific measures to deal with these emerging issues.

Fortunately, according to recent reports, China besides joining "South Asia Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation", the basic treaty of ASEAN in October 2003, is proposing the institution of "Security Policy Talks" by senior ministry officials within the framework of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and is trying to establish a forum for security dialogue with the ASEAN countries. Institution of such talks is extremely important for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region. It is necessary that all the concerned countries explain their fear perception and evolve policy measures so that such mutual suspicions are eliminated.

International security in the 21st century is no longer a simple proposition that can be

established or dealt with by a single country. It must be stressed here that building of trust through frank exchange of opinions at international fora and at multilateral levels alone can ensure the establishment of peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region. Such preventive diplomacy seems to be sine qua non for peace in the region.

Finally, the time has come when Japan too should clarify in explicit terms her stance that contributes towards international security in a positive manner within this framework. Several questions cross our mind: what will

be the shape and size of the Chinese Navy in 2050? Will it be a great force in the region and challenge the US? Or, for reasons of economic development, will it be a regional force? What will be the status of Taiwan, Japan, East China Sea, Senkaku Islands, and so on?

In any case, as members of Rim land/Ocean Nations that form the West Pacific Island chain, for their growth, survival and national interests, both Japan and Taiwan are destined to collectively contain China, which is an emerging power and a "latent military superpower".

Vice Admiral Prer

The approach based on invasion and exercise of objectives of maritime the two papers the Admiral Hasegawa approach by China the China Sea issue.

Lieutenant Gene

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DISCUSSION

**Vice Admiral Premvir Saran Das, PVSM,
UYSM, VSM (Retd)**

The approach to South China Sea is based on invasion, deployment, occupation and exercise of control. There are three objectives of maritime power enunciated in the two papers that were presented. Vice Admiral Hasegawa has focused on integrated approach by China in handling the South China Sea issue.

**Lieutenant General Tomohiro Okamoto
(Retd)**

A mention was made of the geo-political characteristics of relations. In China, the Communist Party controls the PLA. A civilian control is possible only in a democracy. Hence, do we take it that this Communist Party control is being referred to as civilian control?

**Lieutenant General Bhupal Singh Malik,
PVSM, AVSM (Retd)**

Chinese military is not the typical military arm of the state but it has been conceived, evolved and maintained as the military arm of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Being a single party system, this had been the "Chinese equivalent" of ensuring the "civilian control" over the military under the basic principle of "the party commands the guns". It is a close loop where the military backs the communist party rule with its power and the party takes care of the military. Thus, curiously, the most important post in China is that of the Chairman Central Military Commission (CMC), which allows Jiang Jamin to be the Commander-in-Chief of the PLA. Jiang Jamin did not give up this post even when he handed over the presidency to Mr Hu Jintao, who of course is the Vice Chairman of the powerful CMC.

**Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, AVSM, VrC,
VM (Retd)**

China is a unique case. The PLA is the military of the Communist Party, not of the state. The loyalty of the military, according to the Chinese Manifesto, is to the Communist Party and not to China.

**Lieutenant General Vijay Kumar Kapoor,
PVSM (Retd)**

There seems to be a soft balance of power between the US, China and Taiwan. In the perception of China, India is closer to the US. They desire a feedback on why this is so. The Chinese, in fact, feel that India and China can create a balance in the future if they come closer.

**Lieutenant General Tomohiro Okamoto
(Retd)**

Air Commodore Jasjit Singh has mentioned that China is having a growth rate of nine per cent in its economy. As long as the growth is in the economic field, matters are okay. What becomes a matter of concern is when the growth is more towards military strategy.

**Lieutenant General Bhupal Singh Malik,
PVSM, AVSM (Retd)**

China is a worried nation regarding the leverage between India and the US. China otherwise would have had more leverage than India, especially when it comes to the question of who listens to whom, if India were not close to the US, China, in fact, is able to exert soft power in Asia. As long as India is close to US, all this is at their cost. China is thinking of 'self' – their philosophy rests on 'Wei', the force covered by the soft pulp of

'De' - meaning virtue. The economic power gives them a great amount of 'De'. This is their leverage against the US. And that is what they would do against India too.

Vice Admiral Premvir Saran Das, PVSM, UYSM, VSM (Retd)

Both, for India and Japan, management of relations with China is the crux.

Lieutenant General Tomohiro Okamoto (Retd)

My first question pertains to what sort of relations exist between India and Taiwan in the economic and military fields? My second question is, what are the details of the McMahon Line? Since 1962, has this line moved or is it the same?

Lieutenant General Bhupal Singh Malik, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

The border in the North Eastern region is along the McMahon Line and there has not been any dispute on it as it is by and large accepted by the Chinese; this has been so stated by them at different times, including during the flag meeting in August 1987. The Chinese have even hinted that they could accept the whole line if the border along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) is accepted by India in the West. The confusion arises due to different Chinese "claim lines"; they lay claim to much larger areas. The most ambitious claim by China, in the North East, is the whole of Arunachal Pradesh. India has never accepted this. It is for this reason that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi deliberately visited Arunachal Pradesh, to test the water, before going to China in 1988. The Chinese raised expected objections but did not press the same.

Commander Vijay Sakhuja

My question is for Vice Admiral Hasegawa. What are the measures taken by Japan against piracy and what are her views on maritime security?

Vice Admiral Kataru Hasegawa (Retd)

Multilateral measures are required against piracy. In this case, the responsibility lies mainly with the Coast Guard. Maritime responsibility comes later. The Japanese forces are involved in such aspects. Multilateral exercises are being undertaken in minesweeping and submarine areas.

Regarding our carrier strength, Japan has six helicopters but no vehicles for launch of missiles. They do not have striking capability. Japan has no intention of acquiring aircraft carriers either. The deployment of maritime power in the Arabian Sea was for minesweeping purposes. Post Afghan war, Japan was supplying oil. This was only a support activity.

Lieutenant General Chandra Shekhar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

There is actually a misunderstanding regarding what is Line of Actual Control (LAC) and 'claim line'. Lieutenant General BS Malik referred to LAC, which is where the McMahon Line is. The Chinese have agreed to some sort of LAC in certain areas. Some areas of agreement have been identified. It is actually not very clear on the quarter inch map. We gave it to them but they have not reciprocated. The 'claim line' refers to entire Arunachal Pradesh, Aksai Chin and Sikkim, which are not recognised as part of India. This LAC versus 'claim line' debate is consequent to the Sino-Indian War of 1962. This is the point where settlement is required.

Lieutenant Genr

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Vice Admiral P

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Major General

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I Chandra Shekhar, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

ally a misunderstanding e of Actual Control (LAC) tenant General BS Malik ch is where the McMahon e have agreed to some n areas. Some areas of an identified. It is actually e quarter inch map. We ey have not reciprocated. ers to entire Arunachal 1 and Sikkim, which are part of India. This LAC lebate is consequent to of 1962. This is the point required.

Lieutenant General Bhupal Singh Malik, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

There is no problem about relations between India and Taiwan. The problem has been with India's reaction to the Taiwan-China equation and the concept of one China and Taiwan being treated separately in some dealings. Recently, China has accepted India's position on Sikkim being part of India; similarly, India's official position is quite clear on 'One China'.

Vice Admiral Premvir Saran Das, PVSM, UYSM, VSM (Retd)

India believes in one China. However, the Indian office in Teipei, which was non-official a year ago, is official now. It is headed by a serving Indian Foreign Service officer.

Major General Youdishter Kumar Gera (Retd)

China's maritime interests, as presented, are vast. China is asserting itself in the South China Sea. Its rivals are Taiwan and Japan. For operating in this area, the Chinese have to control the Pacific Ocean, where the US is. China is interested in the Indian Ocean too. My doubt is whether this is a wish list. Are there any indicators that this is serious? As far as my knowledge goes, having gone through the Janes, China has 63

combat ships; the Japanese have 54 modern ships and Taiwan has 32.

Vice Admiral Kataru Hasegawa (Retd)

Regarding South and East China Seas, China is already advancing as if it is their own area, for the ocean resources. Regarding Indian Ocean, it is not clear. What I have stated in my presentation are hard facts.

Vice Admiral Premvir Saran Das, PVSM, UYSM, VSM (Retd)

This brings us to the end of this session. I would just like to add here that a hundred years ago, Alfred Thayer Mahan stated that no nation could become a great power until it became a power at sea. The Chinese have learnt this lesson and are progressing accordingly.

It must be noted that no two nations have as much commonality of interests as India and Japan. In the Indian Ocean, there is a commonality in our positions vis-a-vis China, and other related matters. Despite this, our interaction has been negligible. Even India's trade with South Korea far exceeds that with Japan. The legislation that allowed the Maritime Self Defence Force of Japan to operate well outside the thousand-mile zone is now history. I can sense that the interaction between the two countries in the defence sector is going to increase.

THE NUCLEAR DIMENSION, NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENCE (NMD)/ THEATRE MISSILE DEFENCE (TMD) SYSTEMS AND IMPLICATIONS

THIRD SESSION

Chairman : **Lieutenant General Tomohiro Okamoto (Retd)**

First Paper : **Rear Admiral Raja Menon (Retd)**

Second Paper : **Lieutenant General Shigetaka Hasegawa (Retd)**

THIRD SESSION : FIRST PAPER

INDIA'S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE AND POSTURE

REAR ADMIRAL RAJA MENON (RETD)

In deference to our host, who would be interested in the above subject, I have taken it a little beyond this subject to how this doctrine and posture affects India's stature in the international fora where the Japanese are present. The Japanese have a stand of their own, formed by their tragic experience unparalleled to that of any country's experiences. As a result of the different perceptions of the two countries, the stand taken by the two in the international fora are

divergent in many cases. These did lead to some misunderstandings and it would be good if we could look at the way in which these views could be made to coincide a little more.

India's nuclear posture is very unique; here is a country, which began very much against nuclear weapons and went on to test them. There are certain points that would highlight the journey between great pacifism and India being a nuclear power (Table 1).

Table 1 : India's Nuclear Doctrine and Posture and Indo-Japanese Differences : A Summary of Events leading upto the Indian Tests

1964	Chinese tests in LopNor Desert. India's Nuclear programme is ahead of China's, but India refuses to make a bomb.
1971	India threatened by China and USA in war with Pakistan.
1972	India decides to demonstrate basic nuclear capability.
1974	India's first test. Device is 1500 kgs, non weaponised – 15 kilo ton (KT) yield
1976	Pakistan bomb making programme commences.
1983	China transfers bomb design to Pakistan.
1983-87	Massive Chinese transfer of bomb technology and material. USA ignores transfer as Pakistan is ally in war against USSR in Afghanistan.
1987	Pakistan develops aircraft dropable nuclear bomb.
1988-96	Chinese transfer of missiles, missile technology and missile factory to build M-9s. There is an extraordinary period of ten years of Chinese duplicity in this period. In 1995 and 1996 two events that angered India occurred. In 1995 the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was indefinitely extended without any guarantee of disarmament. In 1996, India was asked to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). After this if India did not opt for a nuclear capability, it would have become permanently disadvantaged. Normally economics overwhelms any other issue in India, but if any government would have signed the CTBT they would have lost political power.
1990	India decides to weaponise nuclear capability.
1995	NPT extended indefinitely without any commitment to disarm.
1996	CTBT came up for signature. India placed outside to NPT. India refuses to sign NPT and CTBT. Public pressure builds against government.
Feb 1998	One political party decided to go for nuclear test. That Government thus got elected.
May 1998	Indian Nuclear Tests.

Although India tested only in May 1998, by 1999 it was ready to talk about nuclear CBMs and reduction of arsenals. This is an extraordinary political achievement. Most countries have taken over 25 to 50 years to become nuclear weapon powers and start thinking of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), arms control and disarmament. I want to explain the greatness of the attempts made at Lahore and the tragic blunder made by Pakistan when it destroyed the Lahore initiative by going in for the Kargil War. In the February 1999 Lahore Agreement, eight nuclear CBMs were agreed upon, including exchange of doctrines. In August 1999, India had produced its doctrine. The main features were that there would be :-

- (a) Triad.
- (b) Minimum Credible Deterrence.
- (c) Only Second Strike.
- (d) Massive Retaliation.
- (e) Civilian Control.
- (f) Additional clause stipulating nuclear retaliation in case of a biological or chemical attack added in 2002.

In 2000-2002, India operationalised its strategic nuclear forces. The National Command Authority (NCA) was set up. Strategic forces commander was named. And the Integrated Defence Staff was authorised to manage the strategic forces. The Agni series of missiles was commissioned. In 2002, security dialogue with Beijing commenced. This dialogue is designed to include nuclear issues in the future. The current perceptions are :-

- (a) Chinese nuclear arsenal being rapidly modernised. By 2010, there will be a completely new nuclear arsenal. It will be centred around BF 31 and JL2.
- (b) There will be missile defence which will have a cascading effect on the Chinese arsenal. India has been invited by the US to talk on missile defence. This may set off a reaction in Pakistan.

A dialogue may be to Pakistan's advantage.

(c) Chinese missile assistance to Pak has not stopped. The last transfer of guidance systems took place in 2002. Like all transfer cases, it becomes evident one year later. Hence, despite all Chinese promises, India is not sure whether this transfer has effectively stopped.

(d) Pak has received two missile factories. One received from North Korea to produce No-Dong and one missile factory to produce the M9. Today, there is actually only one set of missiles which targets New Delhi. Delhi is targeted by the Shaheen missiles, which are Chinese M-9s built in Pakistan. It was operationalised and accepted in the Pakistan Army four months ago.

With these perceptions, India takes a stand in the international forum where India faces difficulties as a result of her perception of over 50 years and Japan's perception of over 50 years (Table 2). Japan is a strong supporter of NPT, originally intended to circumscribe Japan and Germany. In a statement of 15 April 2002 at NPT Review conference, Ambassador Yumo Takasu stated that India and Pakistan should accede to NPT.

India is not a signatory to the NPT. It is outside the NPT. India always stood for total disarmament until 1995-96 when P5 extended the NPT indefinitely without commitment to disarm and brought up CTBT for signing. To preserve national security, India had to carry out the May 1998 tests. Present view is that India is prepared to go on outside the NPT, without responsibilities, but if there is to be a change in the NPT, it must come from the P5 so that India is not seen as seeking a backdoor entry into the status of nuclear weapon state (NWS).

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Table 2 : A Recent Update on India's and Japan's Position on Disarmament and Nonproliferation

	Japan	India
	Strong supporter of NPT, although NPT originally intended to circumscribe Japan and Germany.	Outside the NPT. Stood for total disarmament until 1995-96 when P5 extended the NPT indefinitely without commitment to disarm and brought up CTBT for signing. Tested in 1998 to preserve national security.
www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/html	<p>Lately (22 Nov 2002) Japan's draft on A path to total elimination of nuclear weapons' accepted overwhelmingly in UN General Assembly.</p> <p>Statement dated 15 April 2002 at NPT Review conference of Ambassador Yumo Takasu that India and Pakistan should accede to NPT.</p>	<p>Present view is that India is prepared to go on outside the NPT, without responsibilities, but if there is to be a change in the NPT, it must come from the P5 so that India is not seen as seeking a backdoor entry into the status of NWS.</p> <p>India and Pakistan have gone very far down the road of operationalising nuclear weapons. This can be moved backwards only if the P5 begins to adhere to article VI.</p>

There is a 15 nation group called the New Agenda Coalition or the NAC. These are countries with nuclear capabilities, who would object very strongly if India was admitted to the NPT. The question put to India by the US is on what should a new NPT look like? After all the draft of the NPT was written by India. It was then taken and issued as joint draft by the US and the Soviet Union.

In an interesting discussion with the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, two months ago, a Japanese representative stated that India was suggesting that the Japanese abandon the ship without a rescue boat in the vicinity. Hence why not abandon the ship when the rescue boat comes. Meanwhile the holes in the ship could be repaired. That was a brilliant analogy, but this

ship is an unusual one. The Captain and the officers were making the holes. So, as quickly as you rectify the old holes, the Captain and the officers make new ones. Hence it is better to now search for life jackets.

India and Pakistan have gone very far down the road of operationalising nuclear weapons. This can be moved backwards only if the P5 begins to adhere to article VI. India retains its position that the core of the NPT is article VI, which addresses the issue of nuclear disarmament. The nuclear weapon powers believe that the core of the treaty is article II and III, which state that the non nuclear weapon states will not make nuclear weapons. However, this was not the core of the treaty; the core is article VI and India will not compromise on this.

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Differences are probably the most in CTBT (Table 3). Even among the nuclear weapon powers, there is no unanimity that they will adhere to the CTBT. Japan is the one country that is strongly supportive of the CTBT. It has signed and ratified the CTBT and has bilateral negotiations to pressure the US, China, Vietnam and Iran to ratify. It has issued multilateral announcements with Australia and Netherlands asking all nations to ratify the CTBT. Japan has its own good reasons, no doubt. But India is outside the CTBT. Political statements have been made

that there will be no testing. India has been the single most active state for test bans, but wants CTBT tied to disarmament and not tied to separating the privileged from the non-privileged.

India's refusal to even sign the CTBT was a traumatic experience as India tried and failed to get the P5 to agree on any concessions on disarmament. The hard stand of the P5 at the CTBT followed the 'indefinite' extension of the NPT without any timetable for disarmament.

Table 3 : Relative Positions on CTBT

	Japan	India
	<p>Signed and ratified the CTBT</p> <p>Has bilateral negotiations to pressure the US , China, Vietnam and Iran to ratify.</p> <p>Has issued multilateral announcements with Australia and Netherlands asking all nations to ratify.</p>	<p>Did not sign the CTBT</p> <p>Political statements have been made that there will be no testing.</p> <p>Has been the single most active state for test bans, but wants CTBT tied to disarmament and not tied to separating the privileged from the non-privileged.</p>
		<p>India's refusal to even sign the CTBT was a traumatic experience as India tried and failed to get the P5 to agree on any concessions to disarmament. The hard stand of the P5 at the CTBT followed the 'indefinite' extension of the NPT without any timetable for disarmament.</p>

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Both India and Japan have signed and ratified the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC). While Japan is a member of the Australia Group, India is not. However, it identifies with its objectives. At the fifth review conference (November 2002), Japan concurred with the work programme up to 2005 when the next Review will take place. The programme concerns the steps to strengthen national penal legislation against BT agents and laws to ensure the custody of pathogenic micro organisms. India concurs with Japanese view 'in principle'.

At the fifth Review Conference, Japan regretted that no consensus could be found on the verification regime but hoped that 'new proposals' could be examined. India, on its part protested strongly at the action of 'one key member' diluting the verification regime and not agreeing to the rolling text (Table 4).

Japan has also signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). 'She is a member of Australia Group. India too has signed and ratified the CWC. In fact it is ahead of the schedule to destroy CW stocks. However, India is not a member of the Australia group (Table 4).

Table 4 : Relative Positions on BTWC and CWC

	Japan	India
BTWC	Has signed and ratified the BTWC	Has signed and ratified the BTWC
	Is a member of the Australia group	Is not a member of the Australia group, but identifies with its objectives
	At the 5th review conference (Nov, 2002) Japan concurred with the work programme upto 2005 when the next review will take place. The programme concerns the steps to strengthen national panel legislation against BT agents and laws to ensure the custody of pathogenic micro organisms.	India concurs with Japanese view 'in principle'.
<u>Statements of India and Japan</u> www.opbw.org/rev_cons/5rc/5rc.htm .	<u>5th Review Conference</u> Japan regretted that no consensus could be found on the verification regime but hoped that 'new proposals' could be examined.	5th Review Conference Protested strongly at the action of 'one key member' diluting the verification regime and not agreeing to the rolling text.
CWC	Signed and ratified CWC Is member of Australia group	Signed and ratified CWC. Is ahead of the schedule to destroy CW stocks. Is not a member of Australia group.

As far as Fissile Material Control Treaty (FMCT) is concerned, Japan and India are all for a discussion on the treaty (Table 5). Japan would like FMCT guided by the principles of universality, non discrimination and cost effectiveness. In fact Japan has suggested a global inventory of fissile materials. She is agreeable to an ad-hoc committee working on the FMCT without a matching ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. Japan recommends that there be a panel of technological experts before FMCT negotiations commence. India wants FMCT to be linked to nuclear disarmament by the P5. The US opposes this. India wanted a simultaneous ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament but has since resiled from this stand.

On 22 November 2002, Japan's draft on a path to total elimination of nuclear weapons was accepted overwhelmingly in the UN General Assembly. In brief, the draft features the following points:-

(a) Recognises the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reduction between the US and Russia as a step towards disarmament.

(b) Stresses the importance of signatures and ratifications of the CTBT and establishing an ad-hoc committee to work towards a moratorium on fissile materials production in five years.

(c) Make nuclear disarmament irreversible.

Table 5 : Relative Positions on FMCT

Japan	India
Wants discussion on FMCT.	Wants discussion on FMCT.
Wants a panel of technical experts before FMCT negotiations commence.	
Would like a global inventory of fissile materials.	Wants FMCT to be linked to nuclear disarmament by P5. This is opposed by the US.
Japan would like FMCT guided by the five principles of universality, non discrimination, cost effectiveness. Is agreeable to an ad-hoc committee to work on the FMCT without a matching ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament.	India wanted a simultaneous ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament but has since resiled from this stand.

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(d) An undertaking by the NWS to eliminate all nuclear weapons as stated in the NPT review conference 2000.

(e) Steps by NWS to reduce arsenals unilaterally, reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons, reduce the importance of nuclear weapons in international relations.

(f) Strengthen the verification mechanism of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

An interesting treaty is the Outer Space Treaty. It seems to us in India that Japan is at the crossroads when it comes to supporting or not supporting the Treaty (Table 6). This is because the country that would benefit most from missile defence is Japan. But the second phase of missile defence cannot work without what will be the militarisation of space. Japan already has missile defence against lower speed ballistic missiles. Eventually it will need defence against higher speed ballistic missiles. The Yoshida Doctrine has stood Japan well for 50 years. But times are changing whereby Japan's defence will depend on breaching the Outer Space Treaty, signed in 1967. Unless that is done, Japan will not get the kind of missile defence that is needed as a defence against ballistic missiles. This will probably be the first instance when Japan comes up against the decision to support or go against an established international treaty. That may be the beginning of an understanding that instead of looking at minor issues between India and Japan, and debating who supported or did not support what, Japan and India could sit together and look at what this new world is going to be

like. Is it possible to sit together and draft a new NPT, a new Outer Space Treaty that would satisfy the new technologies and the new relationships?

Neither India nor Japan has come out with any white paper on its interpretation of what constitutes the military use of space or the weaponisation of space. Japan presented some interesting papers for the 41st International Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space regarding third party liabilities, commercial utilisation and notification of satellite accidents, but neither country has a published statement on their interpretation of military activities. In 1968, when the treaty was signed both earth observations satellites and geo-stationary communications satellites for military purposes were in existence. Hence the interpretation that these activities must have been permitted in outer space. Presumably missile launch detection satellites are also accepted in the treaty. Certain activities need a new interpretation. These include the following:-

(a) Anti satellite satellites.

(b) Strike weapons from outer space. The UN assembly could ask for an advisory opinion on this from the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Militarising space entails both positive and negative features. The space support to missile defence will be seen as offensive. Such space support also directly increases nuclear superiority. It can increase the possibility of first strike. It will generate anti-satellite (ASAT) devices and an ASAT will generate an arms race in space.

Table 6 : India and Japan on Space

Outer Space Treaty - India and Japan

- Neither country has come out with any white paper on its interpretation of what constitutes the military use of space or the weaponisation of space. In 1968, when the treaty was signed both earth observation satellites and geo-stationary communication satellites for military purposes were in existence. Hence the interpretation that these activities must have been permitted in outer space. Presumably missile launch detection satellites are also accepted in the treaty. The following activities need a new interpretation.

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Militarising Space

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- Such space support directly increases nuclear superiority.
- It can increase the possibility of first strike.
- It will generate ASAT devices.
- ASAT will generate an arms race in space.

Lieutenant General

Rear Admiral comprehensive for we realise that threat from No Pakistan. We dic As Rear Admiral we must consider and not just re anticipate the future.

Lieutenant General

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Rear Admiral

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DISCUSSION

**Lieutenant General Tomohiro Okamoto
(Retd)**

Rear Admiral Menon's paper is very comprehensive for the Japanese people. Now we realise that just as Japan apprehends threat from North Korea, for India it is Pakistan. We did not perceive the problems. As Rear Admiral Raja Menon has advised we must consider a strategic way of thinking and not just react to situations but try to anticipate the likely developments in the future.

Lieutenant General Yasuo Ohkushi (Retd)

My question is on Pakistan's nuclear capability and technology transfer to Iran, Libya, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and North Korea. Is China acknowledging this? I believe that C130 aircraft was used for exporting this technology to North Korea. Further, regarding technology transfer to North Korea, is it confined to uranium technology or does it include equipment? Does it extend to supply of nuclear bomb too?

Rear Admiral Raja Menon (Retd)

Pakistan is an unusual country. It has two production lines. One is the uranium line and the other the plutonium line. But the uranium line is tied to North Korea and the other to China. This also means the North Korean line has the 'No Dong' or the 'Ghauri'. Hence this missile most probably has the uranium bomb. The Chinese line has the M9, which is the 'Shaheen'; most likely, it has the plutonium bomb. It is unusual for a small country to have two production lines. In 1998, when Pakistan decided to test, two scientists met Musharraf and each of them requested permission to test. Musharraf chose the

plutonium man Samar Mubarakmand, and did not allow A Q Khan to be in charge of the test. There are also two sets of fissile materials. The Pakistan plutonium reprocessing facility was commissioned only in 1998. This means that stockpiles of plutonium had started accumulating in Pakistan only in 1998. It is roughly in the range of 25 kg a year. But uranium has been stopped by them. Between 2000 and 2001, it was estimated that Pakistan could make 40 to 50 bombs. But whether it was only uranium, we do not know. The only people outside Pakistan who knew what bombs were tested were the US who had apparently collected air samples after the tests but they have refrained from telling what it was. With time, more and more plutonium will come into the fissile material stocks. Hence the number of bombs will theoretically increase as time passes.

Regarding export of nuclear technology, the stand taken by the Pakistan Government is that it is not the Government that exports technology but the individuals. But then there is the question of Pakistan Army. Is the Army the government, less than the government or more than the government? Because most of the transfer took place in 1990, when General Aslam Beg was the Army Chief. Today, it is General Aslam Beg whom the Americans would like to question. There is no question of whether the scientists in their individual capacity transferred nuclear material to Iran and Libya. Nothing happens in Pakistan without the Army's knowledge. But then in 1990, the Army was not in power. It still was doing what it wanted. Hence, when the Pakistanis say the government was not involved it is correct. But the Army was aware of everything that was happening.

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Regarding technological transfer, the only factor we are aware of is that missile guidance technology has gone from Pakistan to North Korea. This means that the No Dong that they got from North Korea was not accurate. Now it is. This is a factor of concern for the Japanese. The Chinese missile guidance system has been upgraded with direct purchase from western countries also, including from Israel. Hence Chinese missile guidance technology is probably of a very high standard.

A story on one of the web sites is about the time when in the 1980s A Q Khan was travelling to the United States and the CIA burgled his briefcase, which had the plans for the Chinese bomb. They photocopied that and gave it to Los Alamos who produced the bomb to check its workability. When Benazir Bhutto visited the US in 1995, she showed complete ignorance of existence of the bomb when she was shown the Pakistani bomb and the actual working drawings. So, the entire thing was functioning without being in the knowledge of the Pakistani Prime Minister.

Colonel Hachiroe Tokuda (Retd)

My question is regarding the Outer Space Treaty and militarisation of space. In the US, the general opinion is that they would like to use it for self-defence. When we visited the NATO Headquarters, we asked for the opinion of Europe regarding this. They too support militarisation of outer space but its weaponisation is not acceptable to them, because there is a duplication in technology.

Rear Admiral Raja Menon (Retd)

When the Outer Space Treaty was signed, communication satellites already existed. Hence the Outer Space Treaty was concluded knowing that space would be used

for military communications. Militarisation of outer space, to have missiles, is regarded as self-defence, which is permitted under Article 51 of the UN Charter. But then missile defence has implications. The belief is that a country possessing missile defence will use the missile defence to defend itself against a first strike. What missile defence gives you is the ability to launch such a strike and defend yourself against a second strike. Hence what you do is create a virtual nuclear arsenal, which increases your arsenal to twice the effective number. Hence without building, say, a thousand nuclear weapons, one is actually converting these thousand odd nuclear weapons to twice that number. Thus the deterrence between two countries gets upset. Activating missile defence and not guaranteeing that the same country will not launch a missile defence as a first strike destroys the deterrence calculation. Under those conditions, the country that perceives itself to be the victim will attack the satellite. By attacking the satellite, it is restoring the deterrence equation. That is how transition from militarisation of space to weaponisation takes place.

Professor Tsuneo Yoshihara

I would like to know about the accuracy of the North Korean and Pakistan's missiles. In the Republic Day parade, Agni I was exhibited. We have the information that Agni I has been deployed and Agni II is in the R and D stage. Is it because Agni missile is going to be upgraded or is there any other particular reason for showing it as in the R and D stage?

Rear Admiral Raja Menon (Retd)

Formerly, the circular error probable (CEP) used to depend on Inertial Navigation System and the duration of flight. As time of

flight increased, the became more inaccurate to coordinate the with global position that technology is Pakistan - perhaps accuracy of the available accuracy km or 800 km range of around 200 raises is whether will convert Pakistani counter value because Pakistani

As far as for rocket technology does not necessarily capability because small islands of I have been told 200 Ph.Ds in F science and so them from pre Regarding A studied them

Air Commodore

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nications. Militarisation of the missiles, is regarded as is permitted under Article 101. But then missile operations. The belief is that missile defence will use to defend itself against a missile defence gives you is such a strike and defend second strike. Hence what virtual nuclear arsenal, our arsenal to twice the size without building, say, weapons, one is actually thousand odd nuclear that number. Thus the two countries gets upset. The defence and not the same country will not? Hence as a first strike defence calculation. Under a country that perceives it will attack the satellite. The elite, it is restoring the. That is how transition space to weaponisation

Yoshihara

Now about the accuracy and Pakistan's missiles. In the parade, Agni I was the information that Agni I and Agni II is in the R because Agni missile is 1000 km or is there any other showing it as in the R

Lenon (Retd)

Circular error probable on Inertial Navigation system of flight. As time of

flight increased, the inertial navigation system became more inaccurate. Today it is possible to coordinate the inertial navigation system with global positioning system (GPS). And that technology is thought to be available with Pakistan – perhaps not the highest levels of accuracy of the GPS. But even with the available accuracy, it is possible for a 700 km or 800 km range missile to have a CEP of around 200 metres. One issue that this raises is whether in the years to come this will convert Pakistan's nuclear strategy from counter value to counter force, especially because Pakistan relies on first strike.

As far as Agni is concerned, the base for rocket technology is higher in India. This does not necessarily convert to better missile capability because it is possible to create small islands of competence and excellence. I have been told that there are not more than 200 Ph.Ds in Pakistan in aerospace, nuclear science and so on. But that has not stopped them from producing outstanding weapons. Regarding Agni missiles, I have not yet studied them in much detail.

Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, AVSM, VrC, VM (Retd)

In my opinion, it is very important for the Japanese to understand why India requires nuclear weapons. The central and only reason is for India to defend itself against a nuclear threat. Prestige, power or defence against conventional forces is not the reason. The problem since 1964 has been that nuclear weapons impinge on India's security. Both the ruling and opposition parties made the first demand for nuclear weapons in 1964. The first attempt at one level was to propose the NPT and at another level to go to London, Moscow and Washington for nuclear guarantees. The American documents regarding this issue that are declassified are

worth reading. The US refused to give those guarantees for many reasons that are listed. Our problem could be solved if the world got rid of nuclear weapons or else if there was to be no disarmament, the only option was to acquire nuclear weapons. But nobody considered it an urgent requirement. Even now there is no urgency expressed regarding the number of bombs that we must have.

As a matter of policy, India will continue to look for a global, universal, nuclear disarmament and as a step towards that, it will look for nuclear restraint, nuclear freeze and other measures.

Built on this principle is the doctrine and the strategy – that India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. This is not a political statement but the official doctrine and the official strategy. Hence the term second strike could lead to misunderstanding. Because second strike means there is a first strike. So in the official document, doctrine the term second strike is not used. What is used is that India will retaliate to a first strike, once it is hit. In doing so other things start to arise. Retaliation need not be massive. It can be assured retaliation. In the western literature there is utter confusion that India wants to respond with massive retaliation. This is just assured retaliation leading to unacceptable level of punishment. How massive is a matter of judgement as to which country is being referred to – be it China or Pakistan.

The year 1995 to 1996 became a major turning point. The central factor, and Japan was party to that, is the Test Ban Treaty, of 1996. Article 14 requires that 44 countries ratify the treaty for it to enter into force (EIF). This was to force India to sign the treaty and use it as a means to keep it non-nuclear. But there was one more injunction to the treaty – if the treaty does not enter into force in three

years, a meeting is to be called to discuss the measures to be taken. That language, the diplomats would say, is Chapter VII H. So for India, beginning September 1996, there were three years in which to make a decision as to what it wants to do with the option. In my opinion, it hardly mattered which government was in power, India would have gone nuclear before September 1999 to avoid the situation into which they were being forced.

Another aspect to note is that the world, the West, and Pakistan's leadership have been reiterating that Pakistani nuclear weapons are completely controlled by the Army. Now they state that private people were responsible for the sale of nuclear technology for financial gains. This is unbelievable. The people questioned in this regard included six to seven army officers who were dealing with the nuclear programme. This needs a careful looking into. As Rear Admiral Menon stated in his presentation, General Aslam Beg headed the Army and the nuclear programme. Pakistan initially made the offer to Iraq; the material

technology given to Libya was offered to Iraq. There has been a statement from General Aslam Beg recently that this was for the Muslim countries.

General Shigeto Nagano (Retd)

The NPT and CTBT now belong to yesteryears. Now we face the problem of proliferation in the vicinity of Japan, especially in countries like North Korea. There have to be ways and means by which this situation has to be controlled, besides what the US is doing.

Lieutenant General Tomohiro Okamoto
(Retd)

Rear Admiral Menon presented a very precise paper. From the political-military point of view it is mandatory to absorb the attack from outside. India has to see this situation. On the other hand, Pakistan has no such capability to absorb an attack. In that sense, India now has some other political means which we may have to respect. Now the Japanese side will have Lieutenant General Shigetaka Hasegawa introduce some of our defence policies.

If we come to India and Japan, the ends of the spectrum that India won in War II while Japan, a defeated nation, turned towards nuclear

The shadow of the defence strategy of War II. Japan, the Century, fought the first Asian war against a 'wh' Japan first fought then the Pacific war. If we depict the 'wh' admiring that 'wh' go that far. Had the war due to bombs on Hiroshima which had not defeated for the massive casualties the misery of the country that the bomb. Horror: on to subsequent

Majority fed up with war as well as exhausted in tremendous defeat. Perhaps was considered Japan ran out of war or why

THIRD SESSION : SECOND PAPER**JAPAN'S DEFENCE STRATEGY AND MISSILE DEFENCE****LIEUTENANT GENERAL SHIGETAKA HASEGAWA (RETD)**

If we compare the defence strategy of India and Japan, they are at the opposite ends of the spectrum in two respects. One is that India won her independence after World War II while Japan made a beginning as a defeated nation, and the other is the approach towards nuclear weapons.

The shape of present day Japan's defence strategy was formed soon after World War II. Japan, at the beginning of the 20th Century, fought a war with Russia and was the first Asian nation to register a victory against a 'white' world power. Thereafter, Japan first fought the Sino-Japanese war and then the Pacific War, wherein it fought an all-out war. If we see the world map of the time depicting the war situation, one cannot help admiring that such a tiny island country could go that far. However, ultimately Japan lost the war due to dropping of the two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan, which had never lost a war till then, was defeated for the first time in her history with massive casualties. It especially underwent the misery of being the world's first and only country that became the victim of an atomic bomb. Horrors of radioactivity have continued on to subsequent generations.

Majority of the Japanese people were fed up with war. Since the energy of the nation as well as of the people was thoroughly exhausted in the war, the reaction was also tremendous. In a way, it was a shock of defeat. Perhaps it was unavoidable but there was considerable self-reflection as to why Japan ran on to the path of a thoughtless war or why Japan could not give it up half

way through and so on. Especially, criticism got centred on the army, as it was felt that the army, based on its direct linkage with the Emperor's system, took the nation on the road to destruction. An extremely war-weary feeling was visible among the people. In hindsight, there was also self-reflection towards losing the majority support in the international arena through acts such as avoiding democracy during the Great War, selection of absolutism and withdrawal from the League of Nations and so on. There was also self-introspection regarding causing trouble to the neighbouring countries especially in the continent. Hence, while there were countries like India, which may observe that the war provided an opportunity for independence, for Japan, there were several self-reflections.

The American policy of occupation was aimed at neutralising Japan and, although there was the frustration of being ruled by the victorious nation, majority of the Japanese people those days accepted the occupation positively, as they welcomed freedom and democracy.

At the Far Eastern International Tribunal (Tokyo Tribunal), Japan was adjudged to be guilty. Japan at that time did not have the power to criticise or resist such unilateral military trial and acted in concert with America's policy of neutralising Japan; the "masochistic historical view" that Japan was to be blamed for everything continued for long. It was only Justice Radha Binod Pal, one of the 11 judges of the victorious nations who said that "This trial is illegal and in violation of the international law as it is unilateral trial

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of a defeated nation by the victorious nations", and pronounced everyone to be not-guilty. But it was only after several decades that the Japanese understood the true spirit of this statement. Common Japanese were demanding revival of the exhausted economy for their survival. The basic part of Japan's defence policy was shaped under such circumstances.

Japan's Defence Policy after World War II

Japanese Constitution. Japan's defence strategy is derived from and is based on the Japanese Constitution. The Japanese Constitution was based on the draft prepared by the General Headquarters (GHQ) and although a mere formality, it was passed by the Diet in 1946. The Constitution extols that the sovereignty rests with the people, and basic human rights must be respected, Emperor is the symbol of the state and pacifism etc. After the war, Japan was increasingly democratised and economy also progressed, but undoubtedly its base was formed by the Constitution. However, it was put into practice with several deficiencies concerning the identity and security of the nation. There was no mention of the National Flag and the National Anthem in the Constitution. They were legalised only in 1999, a good 40 years after the war. The age of Constitutional spell continued for long wherein Article 9, which renounces war, was like a taboo and could not even be debated. The main contention of this Article under Chapter 2 of the Constitution pertaining to Renunciation of War read thus: "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people renounce war as sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding

paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized."

Considerable debate has been generated due to the second paragraph. Japan has responded to this problem not based on the revision of the Constitution but based on interpretation of the Constitution by the government. This interpretation by the government has been made based on the need for policy change primarily to cope with the change in the international environment. Since a new policy is born out of negative and restrictive wording, there is bound to be some ambiguity in its interpretation. The main contentions of this article are :-

- (a) *No use of right of collective self-defence.* Of course, Japan possesses the right from the International Law and the Constitution points of view, but since Japan cannot exercise it beyond the "barest minimum limit", it stipulates that it will not exercise this right based on a parliamentary decision. As a result, besides Japan's alliance with America getting distorted, her entry into regional alliance is also practically difficult to realise. (Right of collective self defence: Right to prevent an armed attack against a foreign nation with which one has close ties, even if one's own country is not directly attacked).
- (b) *Banning of possession of "weapons of offence".* Weapons of offence (weapons mainly used for destroying enemy's territory) shall not be possessed as they exceed the scope of self-defence.
- (c) *Overseas Dispatch of Self Defence Forces (SDF).* Self Defence

Forces cannot be used for the purpose of other than self-defence. The use of force can be dispensed with for "use of force" cannot be justified by necessity. The interpretation used for this result, if activities, a Furthermole on the cor that partic that has cannot be use of for

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debate has been in the second paragraph. As to this problem not of the Constitution but of the Constitution by interpretation by the government made based on the interpretation primarily to cope with the international environment. It is born out of negative interpretation. The main conclusion are :-

Right of collective self-defence. Japan possesses the right of collective self-defence under International Law and from different points of view, but since it cannot exercise it beyond the limit", it stipulates that this right based on a decision. As a result, the alliance with America after her entry into regional war is practically difficult to collective self defence: in armed attack against which one has one's own country is involved).

Right of possession of territory. Weapons of war (mainly used for the defence of one's territory) shall not exceed the scope

Dispatch of Self Defence Forces (SDF). Self Defence

Forces cannot be dispatched overseas for use of force. Further, if it is for a purpose other than use of force, they can be dispatched but only the authority for "use of weapons" is given. Yet they cannot inflict damage except for justifiable defence and an act of necessity. In other words, the interpretation is that weapons cannot be used for discharging one's duties. As a result, if forces dispatched, their activities, area and timing are restricted. Furthermore, the interpretation, based on the concept of collective security is that participation in multinational army that has international endorsement cannot be done, if it is accompanied by use of force.

(d) *Possession of nuclear weapons.* Constitutionally, it is possible (however, it is not being done policy-wise).

The Yoshida Doctrine. It was Prime Minister Yoshida who determined the future course of politics in post-war Japan. His stature is same as that of Nehru in India. "Yoshida Doctrine" is the national strategy for making a choice about the national objective of "economy or military". PM Yoshida chose the path of "top-most priority to economic revival and with regard to security, security alliance with America and minimum of Self Defence Forces", which forms the basis of post-war politics. For several decades in the latter half of the 20th Century, Japan devoted herself to the economic growth, though within the framework of post-war economic revival. As a result, Japanese economy progressed suitably and the popular sentiment also stabilised. Moreover, economic, scientific and technological power accumulated during this time, besides forming an essential part of overall national power; it formed the quantitative and qualitative prop for defence and armaments.

This basic path has been inherited by the present ruling party of Liberal Democratic Party even after 60 years, but the problem is that due to excessive dependence on America for security, the tendency to regard this as one's own problem is lacking and the legal basis of defence has been quite ambiguous. At present, this line of thinking is under review.

With the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1951 (took effect in 1952) Japan's occupation ended and she won back her independence. With that Japan became a member of the western camp, just as the line of demarcation between East and West camps was by and large getting fixed. With the outbreak of the Korean War, American Army, stationed in Japan then, participated in the war. The SDF were formed in 1950 as the 'National Police Reserve', to fill the vacuum created by the absence of the American Army to maintain internal law and order in Japan. Thereafter, following some changes, SDF in its current form was developed and inception in 1954. The Prime Minister became the Supreme Commander of the SDF and its duties (protection from direct and indirect aggression or maintenance of public order, whenever required) and authorities were prescribed.

Even at the time of inception of SDF, core part of the Constitutional debate was not carried out and "use of force" from the international law point of view got mixed up with "use of weapons" from the domestic laws point of view, a legacy of the age of National Police Reserve. This led to restrictive interpretation or operation of SDF. Moreover, it made a hurried start without clarifying its role in case of national exigencies or laws pertaining to government agencies excluding the Defence Agency. At the time of inception of SDF, "international cooperation" was not

taken into account at all. On the contrary, a resolution was passed "banning overseas dispatch of SDF".

Japan joined the United Nations (UN) in 1956 and returned to an international organisation after a gap of 23 years. It was in 1933 that Japan had withdrawn from the League of Nations.

The UN was considered a distorted international organisation, which has the enemy clause concerning Japan and others. But since 1956, for the Japanese people, the UN has been a kind of ideal forum where they can be free from all anxieties. This has been another prop for Japanese diplomacy along with the US-Japan Security Treaty. With regard to the stipulations in the UN Charter namely, "Obligations of member countries (Charter Article 2 (Principle) Related)", the Japanese government declared that "From this day of Japan becoming a member of the UN, Japan accepts all the obligations laid down in the UN Charter and promises to observe them by all means at its disposal". In other words, it indirectly indicated that there might be certain Constitutional limitations, which prevent it from executing those obligations.

Other Important Defence Policies

Three non-nuclear principles. Japan, based on the experience of being the only victim of atomic bombing, has been maintaining three principles concerning nuclear weapons i.e., not to possess them, not to manufacture them and not let their entry into the country, as the policy of the nation. Further, based on the NPT, Japan has the obligation not to manufacture or possess nuclear weapons, as a non-nuclear nation.

Civilian Control (Priority to politics). Based on the introspection of the Second World War, Japan has adopted the policy of political control i.e., political priority over military or in other words, politics shall have control over military. The principles behind this policy are:

- (a) Diet to decide in the form of law, budget etc and approve the mobilisation of the SDF.
- (b) Defence administration falls fully under the administrative power of the Diet as General Administrative work. The prime minister and other cabinet ministers have to be civilians and the prime minister as the representative of the Diet shall be the Supreme Commander of the SDF.
- (c) The Director General of the Defence Agency who manages the job of the SDF should be a civilian minister.
- (d) Diet shall have a Security Committee to deliberate on important matters concerning national defence.

Role and the Basic Concept of Defence Capacity

Next, among various defence policies of Japan, let me describe the strategy from the viewpoint of development of defence capacity.

Japan shall not directly deal with a specific country or threat and shall possess a balanced defence capacity during peacetime so that it can perform the following roles in respect of defence capacity and shall deal with it on the basis of the "Basic Concept of Defence Capacity", which can be expanded depending on the situation.

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Concept of Defence

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directly deal with a great and shall possess the capacity during I perform the following capacity and shall of the "Basic Concept which can be expanded ation.

As for the roles of defence capacity, naturally "Defence of Japan" is included and based on it; Japan shall contribute towards maintenance of balance of power without creating a vacuum in its vicinity. However, in case US-Japan Security Alliance collapses, Japan also has the basic role to rebuild indigenous defence capability. In addition, activities for contributing towards peace and stability of the world that have increased after the end of the Cold War, and dealing with internal and external large scale disasters etc, are also included in the role.

Awareness About International Environment

International order dominated by America. America is currently struggling with Iraq and anti-terrorist operations. However, there is no doubt that America is a superpower that has far-reaching influence on the world. A senior official of the SDF (His wife is the eldest daughter of Iwaichi Fujiwara of the Fujiwara (F) Institute of the old Japan Army; who is said to be involved in the independence movement of Subhash Chandra Bose) illustrates the structural outline of the present world. According to him, world is like a company with America as the president, Security Council as the board of directors, UN General Assembly as the general body meeting of the shareholders – with democracy and liberalism as the guiding precepts.

The President believes in righteousness, namely democracy and liberalism, and recommends the same to other employees. He attaches importance to the Board of Directors but at times ignores it. Further, majority opinion about this President is that he is bossy but there are some good points too. Many believe that it is better that no one

else is the President. Majority of the employees regard these company precepts to be good but there are some who have absolutely different value systems, and historical and religious views. There are some who do not listen to the President. If the President forces things, they resist. The President is very strong in fighting those who are vocal but is weak against those who are tenacious and are not visible. Of course, I do not mean to say that this explains everything, but broadly speaking, it gives the structural outline.

International and regional terrorism cannot be exterminated and it is even showing signs of spreading globally. Regionally, it has spread to Middle and Near East, South Asia and South East Asia. It has not yet surfaced in East Asia but needs to be carefully watched. International terrorism using Iraq as the breeding ground is trying to secure a foothold, and using Iraq as a pretext, is threatening the world. Furthermore, in East Asia, North Korea, which has reached a dead end on its nuclear policy, cannot be ruled out from becoming a terrorist nation.

Role of the UN. This has been put to trial in the Iraq War. Its limitations are quite evident but its role as a forum that has international endorsement or as a forum that can be used when other countries confront America is still functional. The role of peace keeping operations will also not change. Further, the NPT system does not seem to be functioning sufficiently.

Concept of equality of sovereign nations is crumbling. The principle of non intervention in domestic politics of a country that the international society has valued in the past, is crumbling. After the Cold War, as seen in countries like Rwanda, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, the international society has the

tendency of intervening in despotic or extremely poor countries transcending that country's sovereignty.

East Asia and the Pacific region are still dragging on with the cold war structure and there are major causes that can lead to a conflict in the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, in this region, it is indispensable to maintain the "balance of power" between two countries or in each region. It is necessary to watch with caution North Korea's nuclear development and missile threat; the as yet latent, but hegemonic, developments in China - their nuclear warhead loaded medium distance missiles or their attempts to make South China Sea and East China Sea as the inland sea of China. Further, there is the territorial issue between Japan and China.

Development of Defence Capacity

It is in this background that Japan is developing her defence capacity based on the concept of basic defence capacity so that the SDF can perform its role. The objective of each division of the SDF, within the broad framework of the defence plan, is as given in Table 1. The system for changeover is being developed.

Japan's Defence and U.S-Japan Security System

The significance of US-Japan Security Treaty that was signed in 1951 and revised in 1960, has continued till date. This treaty as the name 'Treaty for mutual cooperation and security between Japan and America' suggests, governs cooperative relationship in a wide variety of fields such as politics, economy, security etc. Establishment of democracy and the economic growth of Japan in the post-war years owes a great deal to this treaty.

(a) *Securing Japan's Safety (Article 5)*. This treaty stipulates that in the event of an attack on either of the signatories on the Japanese territory, both Japan and America shall jointly deal with it under their respective Constitutional procedures. This provision with the backing of America is a big deterrent and forms the backbone of Japan's defence.

(b) *Securing Peace and Safety of the Neighbouring Regions (Article 6)*. In the same treaty, there is a provision that "In order to maintain international peace and safety in the Far East and Japan's safety, the American army is permitted to make use of Japanese facilities and territories." Hence America has stationed her troops in its bases in Japan. This clause, along with America's treaties with South Korea and the Philippines, plays an important role in peace and stability of East Asia and the Pacific region.

Confirmation and Realisation of US-Japan Security System in the post Cold War Era. During the US-Japan Summit talks held at Tokyo in 1996, a 'Joint Declaration on US-Japan Security' was made concerning US-Japan security system in the post cold war era. In this declaration, based on the understanding of the situation that in the Asia-Pacific region there still exists an element of instability and uncertainty, the relations on the security front between the two countries, based on the US-Japan Security Treaty, was reaffirmed as the foundation of stability and prosperity in the region.

In view of this declaration, and in order to further raise the reliability and efficacy of the US-Japan security system; new

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Table 1

Ground Self Defence Force

Classification		New Defence Programme Outline	Earlier Programme
Constituting Number		160,000 Regular 145,000 Ready Reserve 15,000	180,000
Major Units	Peacetime Regionally Deployed Unit	8 Divisions 6 Brigades	12 Divisions 2 Combined Brigades
	Mobile Operation Unit	1 Armoured Division 1 Airborne Brigade 1 Helicopter Brigade	Same as left
	Surface-to-Air Missile	8 Anti-aircraft Artillery groups	Same as left
Main Equipment	Battle Tanks	Approx. 900	Approx. 1,200
	Artillery	Approx. 900	Approx. 1,000

Maritime Self Defence Force

Classification		New Defence Programme Outline	Earlier Programme
Major Units	Destroyer Units (Mobile Operation)	4 Flotillas	Same as left
	Destroyer Units (Regional District Units)	7 Divisions	10 Divisions
	Submarine Units	6 Units	Same as left
	Minesweeping Units	1 Flotilla	Same as left
	Land-Based Patrol Aircraft Units	13 Units	16 Units
Main Equipment	Destroyers	Approx. 50	Approx. 60
	Submarine	16	Same as left
	Combat Aircraft	Approx. 170	Approx. 220

Air Self Defence Force

Classification		New Defence Programme Outline	Earlier Programme
Major Units	Aircraft Control and Warning Units	8 aircraft Warning and Control G 20 Warning Squadrons 1 Flying Squadron	28 ni G 1 Flying Squadron
	Interceptor Units	9 Squadrons	10 Flying Squadrons
	Support Fighter Units	3 Squadrons	Same as left
	Air Reconnaissance Units	1 Squadron	Same as left
	Air Transport Units	3 Squadrons	Same as left
	Surface-to-Air Missile Units	6 Groups	Same as left
Main Equipment	Combat Aircraft (Fighter Planes)	Approx. 400 (Approx. 300)	Approx. 430 (Approx. 350)

"Guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation" were framed. Matters of cooperation identified in the guidelines were :-

- (a) Have cooperation during all times.
 - (i) Exchange of information, policy deliberations.

(ii) Cooperation on the security front.

(iii) US-Japan joint initiatives.

- (b) Action to deal with armed attack against Japan.

Japan's Safety (Article 10) stipulates that in the event of an armed attack on its territory, both Japan and the United States shall jointly deal with it. This provision with the United States is a big deterrent to the backbone of Japan's

Peace and Safety of the regions (Article 6). In the United States there is a provision that to maintain international peace and security, the Far East and Japan's military forces are permitted to use Japanese facilities and defence America has troops in its bases in Japan, along with America's troops in South Korea and the United States plays an important role in the stability of East Asia and the

and Realisation of US-Japan Summit talks in the post Cold War. In the US-Japan Summit talks in 1996, a 'Joint Declaration' was made concerning the security system in the post cold war situation, based on the understanding that in the Asia-Pacific region there still exists an element of uncertainty, the relations between the two countries, the Security Treaty, was the foundation of stability and

declaration, and in order to ensure the reliability and efficacy of the security system; new

Concept of operation in the event of armed attack against Japan is given in Table 2.

Table 2 : Concept of Operation

Operations etc. Operation for coping with an air attack against Japan.		Action by SDF Independent implementation of operation for air defence.	Activities by the American Army Support the operation by SDF ● Implement operation for supplementing the capability of SDF, including operation accompanied by use of striking power.
Operation for the defence of sea in the vicinity of Japan and protection of maritime traffic.		Independent implementation of operation for the defence of important ports and channels in Japan, protection of vessels in the vicinity of Japan and other operations.	Support the operation by SDF. ● Implement operation for supplementing the capability of SDF, including operation accompanied by use of mobile striking power.
Operation for dealing with landing attack against Japan.		Independent implementation of operation for obstructing and eliminating landing attack against Japan.	Implement operation for mainly supplementing the capability of SDF. (At that time, depending on the scale, mode and other elements of attack, get support of forces as early as possible and support the operation by SDF).
Dealing with other threats	Attacks of irregular type such as guerilla and commando attacks carried out by infiltrating military force in the Japanese territory.	Carry out independent operation for obstructing and eliminating the enemy as early as possible. At such time, carry out coordination with related organisations through close cooperation.	Suitably support SDF depending on the situation.
	Ballistic Missile Attack.	Coordinate based on close cooperation to deal with the attack. ● Provide necessary information to Japan. If required, consider use of troops having striking power.	

(c) Cooperation in the event of a crisis in the vicinity of Japan. Governments of both the countries to pay due attention from the diplomatic point of view so that no crisis occurs near Japan (crisis which

if neglected can develop into direct armed attack on Japan and can have serious impact on Japan's peace and security in the vicinity of Japan). Functions, areas and items of

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(i) Cooperation by the governments of both the countries regarding independent activities to be carried out by either side.

(aa) Measures to cope with relief activities and refugees.

(ab) Search and rescue.

(ac) Activities to evacuate non-military personnel.

(ad) Activities for securing economic sanctions aimed at maintenance of international peace and security.

(ii) Japan's support to activities by the American Army.

(aa) Offering of facilities and areas and securing use of SDF facilities.

(ab) Rear area support (supplies, transportation, maintenance, hygiene, security, communication etc).

(iii) US-Japan cooperation on operation front.

(aa) Guarding, supervision (Exchange of information).

(ab) Removal of mines.

(ac) Adjustment of sea and air space.

(d) US Army Stationed in Japan. Under the US Army Headquarter (Yokota Base) in Japan, land forces

number 21,000 (army personnel and mariners), Navy has the Seventh Fleet (40 vessels, 610,000 tons, 70 ship borne airplanes), and Air Force has the 5th arm (130 operational planes) and so on. As for American military bases in Japan, there are over 100 facilities that are being used by the American Army (including temporary ones) and Okinawa has the highest among them. Moreover, Japan bears Y246 billion (2003) towards the expenditure of American troops stationed in Japan (manpower and facilities maintenance expense etc.).

Operational Actions in Japan

Regular surveillance activities by SDF could be detailed as given below :-

(a) *Warning monitoring in sea around Japan.* Monitoring in Japan's neighbourhood, Japan Sea and East China Sea etc. is being carried out based on patrolling aircraft P-3C of the maritime SDF. Further, monitoring troops of the maritime SDF carry out round the clock monitoring activities.

(b) *Vigilance and scramble against air space violation.* Air SDF carries out round the clock monitoring with the help of radar sites across the country, the Early Warning Plane (E-2C), the Early Warning Control Plane (E-767) etc. In case there is a fear of violation of airspace, fighter planes scramble and depending on requirement, advice for withdrawal is made.

(c) *Collection of military information.* Signal information is collected and analysed at communication centres spread across the country. As for visual information, information from

commercial global observation satellite is improved and made more sophisticated (Resolution: 1m class) from the security point of view and information about military bases of other countries is captured.

Moreover, in order to ensure peace and security of Japan, the Japanese government launched two information satellites for the first time in March 2003. They have limited capability but with this Japan can be said to have indigenously developed the system for collection of information.

Operations by Ground, Sea and Air SDF

SDF has the following plans for Japan's defence. The broad outline is that the Self Defence Forces will carry out fighting and seek help from the American army wherever needed.

(a) Operation for air defence. Air SDF, which primarily carries out this operation, has a system in place wherein commander of the Air Defence Command can carry out unified command of the four Air Defence Forces instituted across the country to exhibit the fighting ability speedily and comprehensively. In order to destroy the enemy airplane as far as possible from one's own territory, it is "sighted as early as possible with radar or early warning control plane and "distinction" between enemy or ally is made based on systems such as the automatic warning control system (BADGE System). In case it is adjudged to be an enemy plane, it is destroyed with fighter interceptor or land-to-air missile. Land and maritime SDF also carry out necessary operations and support. The American Army, under these guidelines,

provides support for SDF operation and carries out operation to supplement the capability of SDF including the operation accompanied by the use of striking power.

(b) Operation for the defence of the neighbouring sea. Maritime SDF, which primarily carries out this operation, like air SDF, too has a system in place wherein the commander of the Japan Maritime Self Defence Fleet can carry out unified command of Escort Vessel Fleet (four number), air group (seven flying corps), submarine fleet (two) etc. In the leading sea channels in the offshore, coastal sea area and territorial waters, it carries out operation combining various operations like anti-surface ship battle, anti-submarine battle, air defence battle, anti-mine battle etc. Air SDF and land SDF also carry out necessary operations and support. The American Army, simultaneously with supporting the operation of SDF, carries out operation to supplement the capability of SDF including the operation accompanied by the use of mobile striking power.

(c) Operation for the defence of the Japanese territory (to cope with landing attack). Ground SDF, which essentially carries out this operation is made up of five armies and the system is that the concerned army mainly supervises the operation when the enemy lands and depending on requirement fighting power is reinforced based on support from other armies. Weak points of the enemy around the time of landing are captured and an attempt is made to deal with the enemy in the offshore or coastal area to the maximum possible extent.

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Only when it is unavoidable, enemy is dealt with in the inland area. Maritime SDF and air SDF also carry out necessary operations and support. The American Army carries out operation to supplement the capability of SDF. At the time, America employs its forces at the earliest possible opportunity depending on the scale and mode of attack and other elements and supports the operation being carried out by the SDF.

(d) *Operation for ensuring safety of maritime traffic.* This operation, which ensures the foundation of Japan's survival, is mainly carried out by the maritime SDF. In the sea area of several 100 (nm) around Japan and in case of instituting a sea route belt (comparatively safe sea area instituted for the passage of ships), in the sea area of about 1000 nm, various operations like anti-surface ship battle, anti-submarine battle, air defence battle, anti-mine battle etc. are carried out in a combined manner and patrol, protection of vessels and defence of channels and ports are carried out. Air defence is carried out by the escort ships of maritime SDF and depending on circumstances provides support to air SDF as far as possible. The American Army, along with providing support for the operation carried out by SDF, shall carry out operation for complimenting the capability of SDF, including the operation accompanied by use of mobile striking power.

(e) *Measures against other situations* like mystery ships, armed secret agents, nuclear, biological, chemical weapons, cyber attack etc. are also being carried out.

Activities for International Contribution

(a) *Cooperation for international peace.* Japan dispatched Sea Clearing Fleet of the maritime SDF to the Persian Gulf in 1991, soon after the Gulf War. It was aimed at ensuring the safety of Japanese ships but it was also the first dispatch of SDF for international cooperation. Thereafter, participation in the UN peacekeeping operations became a national issue and in 1992, International Peace Cooperation Law was enacted. Role of SDF expanded from "self defence" to "international contribution".

(b) The International peace cooperation carried out by SDF is given at Table 3. About a decade later, in May 2003, over 4500 personnel have been dispatched overseas in eight cases. Steady and sound activities by SDF have been appreciated by the UN and concerned countries.

(b) *Response to international terrorism in Afghanistan.* In view of coordinated terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, Japan perceived international fight against terrorism as her own problem from quite early on and enacted the "Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law" in October 2001, in order to positively and independently contribute towards prevention and extermination of terrorism within the framework of the Constitution. This was one step ahead of the contributions through peace keeping operations of the UN. This law is based on various resolutions of the UN Security Council and is aimed at contributing towards ensuring peace and security of the international society including Japan. Although one may call it an extension of the U.S-Japan

alliance, it is definitely UN guided international cooperation. Based on this law, maritime SDF, receiving support from India, is carrying out cooperation and support activities such as refuelling of American naval vessels on the Indian Ocean with the help of refuelling vessels and convoy vessels as well as relief activities for victims. Countries that

received support were only America and England to begin with. It was later extended to Germany, France and many other countries. Since the end of 2002, Aegis class cruiser has also been pressed into service. Further, air SDF is also transporting relief supplies of the UN and the American Army in Japan and overseas.

Table 3 : International Peace Cooperation carried out by SDF
(As on May 2003)

Destination	Duration	Details of Activities	Number dispatched
Cambodia	September 1992 to September 1993	Monitoring of ceasefire, repair of roads, bridges etc.	Approx. 1200
Mozambique	May 1993 to January 2001	Headquarter personnel, allotment of means of transport etc.	Approx.150
Rwanda	September 1994 to December 1994	Headquarter personnel, medical, prevention of epidemics, water supply, air lifting of units and relief supplies etc.	Approx. 380
Golan Heights	February 1996 onwards	Headquarter personnel, transportation etc.	Approx.660
East Timor (Refugee Aid)	November 1999 to February 2000	Airlifting of relief supplies	Approx.110
Afghanistan (Refugee Aid)	October 2001 onwards	Airlifting of relief supplies	Approx.140
East Timor	February 2002 onwards	Headquarter personnel, repair, maintenance of roads and bridges, water supply and other livelihood support	Approx.1880
Iraq (Refugee Aid)	March 2003 to April 2004	Airlifting of relief supplies	Approx.60

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(c) *Response to the Iraq problem.* PM Koizumi, at the time of war on Iraq in March 2003, stated that Japan understands and supports this attack. The air SDF, on receiving a request from UNHCR in March 2003, transported the supplies for the refugees free of cost and in July, based on a request from World Food Programme (WFP) transported humanitarian relief supplies. Moreover, Japanese government, in order to support the rehabilitation of Iraq, offered gratuitous funds to the tune of \$1.5 billion immediately and has decided to extend yen credit to the tune of \$3.5 billion. Furthermore, in order to support humanitarian rehabilitation and security related activities, the 'Iraq Humanitarian Rehabilitation Support Special Measures Law' was enacted in July 2003 and through the rehabilitation work in Iraq, Japan aimed at contributing towards securing peace and security of the international society including Japan. Moreover, the present government (at the end of November 2003) is investigating the details of activities, timing and place of dispatch of ground SDF to Iraq.

Actions and Authority of SDF

In Japan, as mentioned earlier, while describing the Constitution, authority concerning actions of the SDF has been restrained. The main debate in Japan pertains to the following:-

(a) With regard to the defence situation, the paradox of the exercise of right of defence as per the constitution is that the right of collective defence cannot be exercised. There are many who suggest that if a situation were to arise

that would endanger the life of American Army personnel; a situation which is directly linked with the national interest of Japan, the alliance will not be functional.

(b) In any international cooperation like peace keeping operations etc., the authority to "use weapons" is provided but its use is limited to protection of "one's own life or body" and the conditions for inflicting injury on others are also restricted to "justifiable defence and emergency evacuation".

(c) As a result, activities of the Japanese SDF personnel not only exclude direct involvement in a battle but the area and timing of dispatch also have to be "when the actual battle is not taking place", something unimaginable usually. Hence, not only is it difficult for Japan to carry out joint action with other countries, it also causes inconvenience to others on this account.

(d) In Afghanistan and Iraq also, the authority is basically restricted to "use of weapons", like in the aforesaid cases of peace keeping operations etc. In Afghanistan, since action was either on sea or air, there was no problem. But in Iraq, the focus is on land action, as the law and order situation is worsening and commanders and troops dispatched to the front will undoubtedly hesitate from using weapons due to common sense and domestic laws in Iraq.

(e) Japan becomes overcautious about this issue compared to other countries mainly because of the Constitution.

Anti-Nuclear and Missile Defence Strategy

Frankly speaking, Japan is lagging behind with regard to missile defence. It

began a study on this in 1995 but did not have any countermeasures or sense of urgency. Japan was woken up from her slumber in 1998 when ballistic missile of North Korea (based on Taepo Dong) flew over Japanese skies. Present status of missile and nuclear programme of North Korea is as under.

Ballistic Missiles

No Dong: North Korea began development of long-range ballistic missiles in 1990s. Their range is about 1300 km and entire Japan is within their range. Their movement on vehicle is possible and obtaining pre launch warnings is difficult. It is presumed that more than 100 such missiles have been deployed.

Taepo Dong 1: It is a ballistic missile of two-stage-type with liquid fuel propellant using No Dong in the first stage and Scud in the second stage. It has a range of over 1500 km.

Taepo Dong 2: It is a two-step missile using new type booster in the first stage and No Dong in the second stage. Its range is 3500 km to 6000 km. It is currently under development.

With regard to launching of a ballistic missile, in the joint declaration by Japan and Korea in September 2002, North Korea indicated that it intends to freeze launching of missiles after September 2003 but since then it has hinted from time to time at calling off this freeze. Development of ballistic missile is rapidly progressing without carrying out launching experiment. This is considered to be so because of inflow of materials and technology from overseas.

Furthermore, North Korea has itself admitted using export of ballistic missiles as a source of foreign exchange earning.

Nuclear Weapons

North Korea's nuclear problem is quite complicated as besides military, it has strong tinge of politics and diplomacy. Their nuclear substance was believed to be conventional plutonium type but North Korea itself has indicated in October 2002 that it has planned to develop uranium type. Hence that possibility cannot be ruled out. There are several steps to the possession of actual war capability, ranging from the possession of nuclear substance to the development of the final product - the nuclear weapon. But it is not clear what stage North Korea currently is in.

America's Striking Power

Originally, based on the US-Japan Security Treaty, Japan has left the striking and retaliation response to America. Even with regard to anti-nuclear and anti-missile strategy of Japan, new guidelines for US-Japan Defence Cooperation of 1997 lay down that "the SDF and the American Army shall cooperate and coordinate closely for dealing with ballistic missile attack. American Army, simultaneously with providing necessary information, should consider use of fleets that have striking power, depending on requirement". There are Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles ((SLBMs), bombers, missiles and other means for attacking the command centre or the missile base of an enemy and cumulative attacking power including attacking power from the space. In other words, the "Spear" portion will be the lead player in this strategy.

Missile Defence Concept of America

The present Bush administration is pursuing building of missile defence system.

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Power

Based on the US-Japan alliance, it has left the striking force to America. Even nuclear and anti-missile guidelines for US-Japan relations of 1997 lay down that the American Army shall cooperate closely for dealing with such a threat. American Army, Navy, and Air Force are providing necessary support. The use of fleets that are being decided, depending on the situation. Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine Ballistic Missiles ((SLBMs), and other means for defence are being considered. The centre of the missile defence is cumulative attacking power from the "Spear" portion of this strategy.

Efforts of America

The administration is developing a missile defence system.

This concept has been unified as missile defence (MD). Research and development currently being carried out by America is the 'Multi-layer Defence System' whereby countermeasures are taken along with the flight of the ballistic missile.

(a) *Boost (soon after launching) stage:* There are aircraft based laser and high mobility interception missiles.

(b) *Mid-course (basically outside intermediate flight in the atmosphere) stage:* There are Ground-based Mid-course Defence System (GMD) and Sea-based Mid-course Defence (SMD). Especially in SMD, development of interception missile and improvement of laser centred on Aegis ship-based type BMD (Ballistic Missile Defence) is being carried out.

(c) *Terminal (from entry into atmosphere to impact) stage:* There are Patriot PAC 3, and Theatre High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD). In addition to the launching of new satellite (STSS: Space Tracking and Surveillance System) for improvement in supervision range, accuracy and information transmission capability, ground and sea-based radar are being readied. Further, research and development concerning battle control for the system as a whole is also being carried out.

Further, America has decided to carry out initial deployment of MD system between 2004 and 2005 and has plans to deploy GMD in Alaska and California and SMD in the Pacific. It also intends to deploy PAC-3.

Efforts by Japan

There has been some debate in Japan that in spite of the threat of this missile being

a pressing issue, can Japan afford not to have any defence measure? Hence, Japan began work in this regard in 1995 and since then has investigated the technical possibilities and the costs versus effects ratio of the ballistic missile defence (BMD). Since 1999 it has been carrying out joint research concerning a part of SMD. In this joint research, design and trial manufacture of four main components of missile that are scheduled to be used in this system are being carried out. Moreover, induction of PAC-3 is also being considered. Thus, in order to promote BMD measures, a budget to the tune of ¥142.3 billion has been asked for in 2004. In Japan, BMD has been said to be a set of simultaneous equations of possibility of technical realisation, cost versus effect, clearing of legal problems, relationship with America and so on. It can be said to be at the threshold of resolution.

Direction of Future Measures

First of all, the possibility of Japan making and possessing nuclear weapons is very low, due to the special sentiment against nuclear weapons. After all, Japan cannot forget that it was the one country to have experienced atomic bombing. However, this is true as long as American nuclear umbrella is there. What will happen if US-Japan alliance fails, is anybody's guess. At present, there are some, though few in number, who support possession of nuclear weapons by Japan.

In addition, based on the technical capability of Japan's defence and other industries, one can say that ballistic missile development, missile range extension, and use of IT etc. though not adopted as a policy at present, should be technically possible, although it may take some time to develop. Further, there is also a proposal to buy cruise missiles.

How to Interact With America?

Throughout the post war era, Japanese people have elected only that party to power that has supported the US-Japan security alliance. At the time of first revision of this security alliance (in 1960) when there was anti-American sentiment and a strong movement against this alliance, it was the change of government between factions within a ruling party. Common Japanese people are of the view that Japan has been able to maintain peace and progress economically to this extent only because of America. In their opinion, it was good that America won the Cold War. Moreover, there is a feeling that in this American victory in the Cold War, Japanese economy and Japan's alliance with America (SDF or offering of military bases in Japan etc.) have successfully played their role. Majority of the Japanese believes that this alliance is important for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region in the post-cold war era. Especially, a response to highly tense situation in the Korean peninsula or ensuring safe operation of sea-lanes as a whole, including the Taiwan Strait will not be possible without America. There is also the issue of potential threat from China.

With regard to Japanese government's response to American action after 11 September 2001 attacks on America, although majority of the Japanese have a general agreement on it, there is some confusion too. Majority of the Japanese could see the enormity of the shape that terror took. They detest such happenings and desire its complete extermination. Moreover, Japan, as a country heavily dependent for oil on the Middle East, wants the stability of this region. In addition, Japan wants to contribute its bit to world peace through extermination of international terrorism and rebuilding of Iraq.

In the war efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and their rebuilding programmes, the Japanese government besides making declarations, expressing support and financial contribution, has dispatched (until September 2003, it had only been legalised) SDF "in order to contribute to ensuring peace and stability of the international society including Japan". Japan has indicated that she will try to positively contribute to international cooperation if there is a UN resolution, which has international endorsement. On the other hand, Japan also wants to cooperate with America through such international cooperations and make the US-Japan alliance even stronger. Especially with regard to dispatch of SDF to Iraq, it is being considered under conditions that are literally like doing a "tightrope walk" from the Constitution point of view. There are many who are wary about America's arbitrary actions. It is because everything that America is doing is not right and there is a certain lack of clarity about the direction in which America is moving. Therefore, Japan expects many countries to perform the role of a check at the UN and Japan is impressing upon America to obtain international endorsement. In Japan, there is a strong opinion that Japan must express her "independent" opinion towards America and check and restrain it. However, this issue too ultimately gets linked with the problem of the Constitution.

Further, there are some people in Japan who have doubts whether it will be really possible to exterminate international terrorism or restore law and order situation in Iraq with the present American approach or will international terrorism not spread further and reach even the Japanese shores. We have high hopes on the excellent flexibility and automatic restoration force that America as a nation and its people possess.

How to Deal with

If we see in the post-war security points that the impact the Sino-Japan very long time termed as "W" "Apologetic Di gradually chan Sino-Japanese of equality fr hesitancy. Witl understanding the two countri so, retired offic China once a discussions wit and security ir minutes of the the stance of the debate at e not reflect the entirety but si introduce the :

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How to Deal with China?

If we see the Sino-Japanese relations in the post-war era from the diplomacy and security points of view, it would be noticed that the impact of World War II, especially the Sino-Japanese War, has persisted for a very long time. Unfortunately, it has been termed as "Weak-kneed Diplomacy" or "Apologetic Diplomacy". However, this is gradually changing and one may say that Sino-Japanese relations have entered an age of equality from the age of dispirit and hesitancy. With a view to deepen mutual understanding on the security front between the two countries, for the last two decades or so, retired officials of SDF have been visiting China once a year and hold meetings and discussions with those in-charge of diplomacy and security in that country. If we read the minutes of the past meetings, we get to know the stance of both the countries as well as the debate at each stage. Of course, they do not reflect the Sino-Japanese relations in its entirety but since they tell about trends, I introduce the same here.

In the beginning, China's unilateral stance was quite noticeable. Most of the time allotted for discussion in these meetings was used by the Chinese side and most of the debate centred on the so-called historical problems, opposition to US-Japan security treaty or concerns towards Japan becoming a military superpower and so on. In other words, these meetings were all about unilateral claims by the Chinese side about central government's policies. However, of late, both the countries have started indulging in equal debate and content-wise also it is not about the past but on current issues wherein true feelings are revealed. If the perception of China and Japan concerning security, taking into account other forums of

Sino-Japanese dialogue, is summed up, it will highlight certain traits:-

- (a) Both the countries perceive the relationship with America as extremely important for the time being.
- (b) Chinese side also recognises the US-Japan Security Treaty. Rather, the Chinese side is of the view that as long as Japan is within the framework of the US-Japan Security Treaty, there is a restraining effect against arbitrary action by Japan and at the same time, it wants Japan to restrain domination by America using the US-Japan relationship.
- (c) Both Japan and China may have the "capability" to pose mutual threat but they recognise that there is no such "will" on either side. China is watching closely the rapid pace at which the defence policy of Japan has been changing in recent years and the technical capability of the private sector as potential defence power. Japan, on the other hand, is concerned about military expansion of China like missile development and making neighbouring seas the inland sea of China and is demanding transparency in policies in this regard.
- (d) If America and China were to go to war over Taiwan problem, the Chinese warn that in the event Japan joins hands with America and Taiwan, Japan could also become the battlefield. On the other hand, the Japanese side has conveyed to the Chinese side about the "enormity of American power" based on not only the recent capability of American Army but also based on fighting America during World War II. The Chinese side also understands it fully well.

forts in Afghanistan and building programmes, the element besides making financial support and financial patched (until September 2001 been legalised) SDF "in order to ensuring peace and international society including indicated that she will try to contribute to international peace as a UN resolution, which is a reinforcement. On the other hand, it wants to cooperate with such international relations. The US-Japan alliance especially with regard to security, it is being considered as literally like doing a violation of the Constitution point of view who are wary about military actions. It is because America is doing is not right lack of clarity about the situation America is moving. affects many countries to check at the UN and upon America to obtain consent. In Japan, there is a view that Japan must express its opinion towards America. However, this issue is connected with the problem of

some people in Japan whether it will be really international terrorism or situation in Iraq with a new approach or will not spread further and these shores. We have excellent flexibility and realise that America as a possess.

(e) Economic mutual dependence will function as a restraining factor against tension, but the Japanese side has conveyed her strong concerns about the use of funds from Japan in the form of economic assistance for building military strength by China.

Moreover, there is a perceptible change in the Japanese view of China. According to a "public opinion poll concerning diplomacy" carried out by the Japanese government in 1980, in response to the question whether they feel affinity towards China, 79 per cent replied in the affirmative. In 2002, this percentage has dwindled sharply to 46 per cent. On the contrary, people who replied in negation rose sharply from 15 per cent to 49 per cent; and in the last few years, the latter category is on the rise. Concepts like 'friendship and distrust' or 'cooperation and confrontation' are believed to be the destiny of neighbouring nations.

Conclusion

Like individuals, nations too learn things.

Japan built the present system based on the lessons of the Second World War. If we regard this as the "first phase of learning", the present, when 60 years have elapsed since then, can be regarded as the "second phase of learning" where Japan can learn from the merits and demerits of post-war politics. It is necessary for Japan to retain good things of the first phase and correct their shortcomings, so as to equip for the future.

In Japan, defence issue is a Constitutional problem. In the year 2000, a nonpartisan 'Cabinet's Commission on the Constitution' was instituted in the Japanese Diet and it is scheduled to submit its report on the problems of the present Constitution in 2005. Almost parallel with it, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party plans to prepare a draft plan for the revision of the Constitution as a political party. Both these attempts are a pursuit of the "ideal way of the nation" from the overall viewpoint, targeting Constitution as a whole. There is no doubt that at that time, various themes concerning security and defence will become the main focus of debate.

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DISCUSSION

**Lieutenant General Tomohiro Okamoto
(Retd)**

Our basic doctrine is to accord priority to the UN. In case of Iran, we can enjoy the assistance from Holland troops, but we cannot assist them in case of any contingency. Another point to note is that the Dong Feng 6 had liquid fuel propellant. The Dong Feng 21 has solid fuel, loaded on vehicle, moveable and might also be MIRVed (Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle). Hence Japan is concentrating on threat from China and therefore our focus on relations with India.

**Lieutenant General Yoginder Mohan
Bammi (Retd)**

What is the Japanese reaction to the American policy of preemption? Would you adopt a similar policy for North Korea? In your security calculations, you have not taken South Korea or Australia into consideration. Is this accidental or deliberate?

**Lieutenant General Shigetaka Hasegawa
(Retd)**

There is no possibility for Japan to preempt as the capability to attack North Korea is not there. Regarding South Korea and Australia, with the former there are discussions at different levels and joint exercises are held. With Australia, naval exercises are there.

**Vice Admiral Mihir Roy, PVSM, AVSM
(Retd)**

India on gaining independence did not seek reparation from Japan for the occupation of Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Further, when China conducted nuclear tests, there

was only a muted reaction from Japan. When India conducted the tests in 1998, the whole world rose against it with Japan in the lead. Another aspect I would like to know about is the visit of the Japanese Premier to the shrine of the War dead. Why is it mired in controversies in Japan? Also, would Japan support India for the UN Security Council seat?

Professor Tadamasu Fukiura

The reaction to Indian tests was stronger because when the Chinese announced their tests, the NPT was not in place. It was post NPT that India had conducted the tests and hence such a sharp reaction. Regarding the shrine that the Premier visited, it is created in memory of all those who died in war – domestic or international. This has nothing to do with the Second World War. China and South Korea have been criticising very strongly the Premier's visit to the shrine. And this spread to Japan also where some Japanese reacted. On India's candidature for the UN Security Council, personally I would support it. Both our communities can contribute a lot to the international community through the Security Council.

**Major General Youdhishter Kumar Gera
(Retd)**

It has been mentioned that People's Republic of China (PRC) also feels threatened from nuclear North Korea. That is not so because they got their nuclear technology from Pakistan who in turn got it from China. So I personally feel that if this technology has been transferred by Pakistan to North Korea, it must have been with the knowledge, concurrence and connivance of the PRC. There is something more than meets the eye.

Second point that I wish to raise is about the excessive reliance of Japan on the USA. America is a global power. Their interests are global. Their interests are dynamic. As and when their overall perception changes, they are prepared to break away from a relation when required. For instance, Taiwan was a member of the UN. When it suited the USA they dumped Taiwan and favoured the PRC. Has Japan given a thought to a similar contingency arising?

**Lieutenant General Shigetaka Hasegawa
(Retd)**

Economic hardships compel a nation to compromise and consequently face threats as China does. Regarding the second query, there is a distinct possibility of the US changing her alliances. In their war in Afghanistan and Iraq, they have been very selective about their alliances. There have been talks of leaving out even France. So equations for their alliances keep changing. In view of that, Japan does not rule out the possibility of being left out in certain scenarios.

Diplomatically, Japan has to think of amending its Constitution. Japan should have that kind of freedom.

**Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, AVSM, VrC,
VM (Retd)**

Just a comment on why Japan kept quiet when China conducted its nuclear tests earlier and also when China was testing when the CTBT was being signed. To say that there was no NPT and hence no reaction requires more discussion. If the argument is that there was no legal commitment for China not to test then there was no legal commitment for India also not to test. India had not signed the NPT and had not violated any international treaty or commitment. We need to understand this.

Regarding the Japanese reaction to India's nuclear tests, it is my opinion that the Japanese Foreign Office miscalculated the international and the American response to the tests. And also, as some people feel, the competition for the UN Security Council seat was very much under discussion. It has been generally indicated to me that the negative attitude was not negative as perceived.

Professor Tadamasa Fukiura

I agree with Air Commodore Jasjit Singh on the aspect of absence of legal binding regarding the tests. When China tested in 1964, the Tokyo Olympics were on. This was a very important event for Japan, because 19 years after end of the War, this was celebrated as a national event. Japan did criticise China perhaps less strongly. The apprehension might have been that strong criticism might result in something similar to pouring cold water on the entire event of the national Olympics. Further, China at that time was not a member of the UN and there were no diplomatic relations between mainland China and Japan. Any nuclear tests that have been carried out in subsequent years, Japan has always criticised them. Personally, I do not think that the nuclear tests conducted by India pose a direct threat to Japan. The basic stand of Japan was that if India decided to go nuclear because of nuclear threat it perceived from China and Pakistan, Iran will go nuclear because it perceives a threat from Pakistan. Iraq will go nuclear because it perceives a threat from Iran and the proliferation would continue. Similarly, Japan has a very valid reason then to go nuclear because it perceives a threat from Russia and China. So we can understand India's position, but if one sees the international debate on this issue per se, our stand is also justifiable.

Professor Tsu

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Professor Tsuneo Yoshihara

There are strong pro-Russia and pro-China lobbies in Japan, because of which there was not so much of a reaction to the nuclear tests by those countries. But no such lobby exists for India there and hence the reaction was so strong. The experts in Japan may not have felt at that time that the Chinese tests were a threat to Japan and hence the reactions were less. My personal reaction to India's nuclear tests is that the tests were done by a country with more than one billion population. Hence it works as a deterrent against China. This is to Japan's advantage.

Lieutenant General Tomohiro Okamoto (Retd)

Every country has a right to go nuclear. From the political or military perspective, as a bigger country, India has another meaning for other countries. Some of us see in India's nuclear test meaning in terms of international balance of power. Now Ambassador Gupta shall comment on the actual relations between India and Taiwan.

Ambassador Ranjit Gupta, IFS (Retd)

Yesterday a question was asked on India's relationship with Taiwan. The politics of the cold war had cast a very dark shadow on India's relations with South East Asia and East Asia. With the end of the cold war and stark financial crisis in 1990, we had a re-look and consciously launched the 'Look East' policy. The primary attention was of course on South East Asia and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). But it included other countries too, not excluding Taiwan.

The relations with the ASEAN improved. Things moved quickly with Japan also, except for the clouding on the nuclear question. With Taiwan, we had to be very careful because of the extremely complex relationship with China. And, therefore, our unofficial office was opened in 1995. It was the 45th such office opened by countries that were having diplomatic relations with China. Out of these 45, and four more that have been added since then, the office of the United States is official. It is not diplomatic but is established under the US law. So it is official. Others are non-official. All have been established with the prior knowledge and consultation with China. Yet in the last two years a great deal of progress has taken place. There are direct flights between Teipei and New Delhi. We have an investment protection and promotion agreement. That office, apart from giving visas, also gives passports and passport services to Indian nationals. Last year 16,000 visas were issued which is more than twice the number of visas issued by the India office in Mainland China. The trade last year was \$ 1.4 billion. If you take the energy sector of India's exports and imports, it will be among India's top 50 trading partners.

I was in Taiwan as a retired Ambassador. My successor is a serving Indian Foreign Service officer. Out of the 49 offices, retired officers head four. The others are headed by serving people. This does suggest an improving relationship. For the last two years, Track II diplomacy has begun. The USI has received and sent delegations to Taiwan. The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses has also received and sent delegations to Taiwan. China is aware of all this and I am happy to state that there is progress in relations. But there remain some political restraints on the Indian side.

CHAIRMAN'S REMARKS

We have two eminent speakers for this session. One, a distinguished soldier, Lieutenant General Takashi Arai, and the other a distinguished diplomat, Shri C R Gharekhan. They are going to speak on the important subject of the future of the United Nations and the international system. Discussing what happened in the past is difficult enough. There are many versions of the same event. But talking about the future is infinitely more difficult. The future we predict may not be the future we want. This may be the case when we discuss the future of the UN. Hence, we may have to examine what is to be done to change that future. We now

have not only a predictive task but also a prescriptive task. But our distinguished speakers are more than equal to the job.

One outstanding contemporary feature, a signpost that perhaps marks a fork in the road ahead for the UN, is the Bush Administration's unilateral use of force, which has been put into practice and demonstrated to the world with the attack on Iraq. This is something like what happened when Italy attacked Ethiopia and the League of Nations occupied the position of the UN. The attack on Iraq could mark a turning point in the fortunes of the UN unless something is done to recover its declining prestige.

FOURTH SESSION : FIRST PAPER**JAPAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY IN THE 21ST CENTURY AND THE UNITED NATIONS****LIEUTENANT GENERAL TAKASHI ARAI (RETD)****Problems for the United Nations brought forth by the Iraq War**

The *raison d'être* of the United Nations (UN) is being questioned since the Iraq war. It is because the Security Council, the nerve centre of the UN did not function during the Iraq war. America tried to persuade the member countries of the Security Council for getting a fresh UN resolution passed prior to launching military operations. When France and other countries showed an inclination to exercise their veto in the Security Council; America gave up hope on getting a fresh resolution on use of force and launched an attack on Iraq.

The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, considered the "preemptive attack strategy" of the Bush administration to be a serious

challenge to the various principles that formed the basis of functioning of the U N Security Council and hinted at a serious crisis in its functioning. He expressed concern at the factors that compelled America to resort to exercise of force against Iraq without getting a clear approval of the U N Security Council. He admitted to the inadequacies in the system when he proposed setting up of a criterion for the approval of mandatory measures against threats from terrorist groups armed with weapons of mass destruction.

The Japanese Prime Minister, Koizumi expressed support for America as, soon as the Iraq war broke out and emphasised the close ties between Japan and America. However, there is no denying the fact that there was an element of timidity when it came to dispatch of Self Defence Forces (SDF) for

the rehabilitation of Iraq. There is no clear-cut explanation given by the Japanese government regarding the latter choice when the UN centred diplomacy and the US-Japan alliance became incompatible. There are many Japanese who have their doubts about the Iraq war. The Democratic Party, the largest opposition party in Japan, is opposed to dispatch of SDF to Iraq as it holds the view that there is no just cause for the Iraq war. The dispatch of SDF to Iraq is also an international pledge and will have to be implemented sooner or later but the debate for or against a dispatch, which has the official stamp of the UN, will continue for sometime.

From the American point of view, the UN was dysfunctional as no specific action could be unanimously taken against weapons of mass destruction of a rogue nation. In America, there is a strong opinion that in the UN the "objective of the Security Council is not to suppress a dictator but suppress America", because it could not even pass a resolution for military action against Iraq that has seriously violated 17 resolutions of the UN passed since the end of the 1991 Gulf War. This is a country that has literally scoffed at the UN. Perhaps America feels that it cannot leave important matters pertaining to the safety of the nation to the UN. But, on the other hand, it can expect backing of the UN resolutions to its actions, with a view to get the concurrence of the international society in a wider sense.

At present, when clash of interests between the permanent member nations of the Security Council has become more conspicuous and complicated compared to the cold war period, the opportunities for America to take action concerning international disputes, outside the framework of the Security Council, has increased. The

"six country deliberations" concerning the nuclear development issue of North Korea is also one such move. For Japan, which considers the US-Japan alliance as the pivot of her diplomacy, it is important to clarify the ideology regarding what action it is going to take.

Relations between Japan and the United Nations

The United Nations formally came into being in 1945. At that time, Japan was involved in a desperate war with the Allied forces - the countries that were responsible for the creation of the United Nations. Allied powers specified Japan as well as other Axis powers that had already surrendered as the enemy nations. They also compelled Japan to surrender, which was already in a critical condition, by carrying out mass indiscriminate killing through the use of the two atomic bombs.

In 1956, Japan joined the UN without this enemy nation clause being dropped and returned to the international society. For nearly half a century, withdrawal from the League of Nations haunted the Japanese. Being a member of the UN has been a source of relief for the Japanese people and, thus, there is a tendency to idealise and glorify its activities more than they actually are.

There is essentially no awareness among the Japanese people that the UN is an organisation, which was created by the victors of the Second World War to control the post-war international order. There is hardly any awareness that it is also a place for intense diplomatic tug-of-war to give priority to own national interests. The common Japanese people have a strong feeling that the UN is a place to discharge justice. However, in direct contrast to the misplaced

expectation of the UN, also called "I one looks back a Nations in the pa it has been e "maintenance o safety", which important objecti

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expectation of the Japanese people from the UN, also called "UN Faith" or "UN Illusion", if one looks back at the activities of the United Nations in the past 50 years, one finds that it has been extremely inadequate in "maintenance of international peace and safety", which happens to be the most important objective for its inception.

During the cold war, the UN through the exercise of veto right, lost its function of passing resolutions concerning important security matters. It was relegated to being a place for publicity and giving vent to one's frustrations against other countries by the member countries. It has at the most been able to perform the function of being the forum for clarifying mutual position even if not resolving international disputes and build trust to avert wars caused by misunderstanding. The only exception was forming the UN Army during the Korean War. It was more of a chance happening as the war broke out while Soviet Union had boycotted the Security Council in protest against denial of entry to Communist China into the UN.

During the Gulf War, a multinational army was formed under a resolution of the Security Council. Thereafter exhibition of its function by the Security Council was greatly expected but the loss of function of the Security Council during the Iraq War provided a big disappointment not only to America and England but also to the countries that were against use of force.

The debate on reform of the Security Council at the UN is more than a decade-old but prospects of reforms taking place are not bright. Japan has made big contributions to the UN over a period of time. Japan has made the UN the main prop of its diplomacy and has responded positively to sharing the

expenses of the UN. As a result, Japan's share of expenses of the UN is higher than the total share by the four permanent members of the Security Council, excluding America. Most of the results that the UN has achieved in the last 50 years except in the field of security owe a great deal to Japan's financial contribution. However, it has not been successful in having the 'enemy' clause deleted. Moreover, though Japan is aiming at being a permanent member of the Security Council, it cannot exercise the right of collective defence concerning the most important objective behind inception of the UN, namely, the "maintenance of international peace and safety". It will be difficult for Japan to perform an important role in the field of international security at the UN, as it cannot perform its responsibility sufficiently in terms of military action.

Awareness that exercising the right of collective defence is also important for effective functioning of the US-Japan security alliance is spreading among the common Japanese people. Sooner or later, this policy will be reviewed. If that happens, it will also be necessary to clarify about the national strategy of Japan in the 21st century. It is because if Japan chooses to exercise the right of collective defence, a clear answer that its neighbouring countries also approve of it, will be demanded regarding what commitment Japan can make to the world – military or otherwise. At the beginning of the 21st century and also in view of the forthcoming 50th anniversary of Japan's entry into the UN, it is felt that it will be extremely important for Japan to consider what kind of relation it ought to have with the UN.

In order to carve out the guidelines for future, it is necessary to analyse the present and grasp the lessons from history. The 20th

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century was replete with wars and conflicts between imperialistic nations, for colonisation, for independence, or civil wars. The growth of military science and technology saw a simultaneous increase in the scale of wars, not to forget the two World Wars.

With America and the erstwhile Soviet Union, the two giants of the Security Council armed with veto power confronting each other, the security functions of the UN were paralysed. However, nuclear weapons and the cold war could be considered a boon for mankind in certain respects. The fear of crossing the nuclear threshold restrained large-scale, medium and small-scale wars. The world order revolved around confrontation between East and West camps; the balance of power was controlled and stabilised at the macro level. This was something rare and it helped restrain many wars. During this period in the fields of ideology and of economic systems, the western countries including Japan pursued modernisation and democratisation or liberalism.

The demise of the cold war gave rise to hopes of permanent peace and order in the world. There was a hope that a bright future for mankind was a distinct possibility. However, the territorial, racial and religious disputes that were strongly suppressed under the cold war raised their ugly heads resulting in a highly unstable international situation. The search for a powerful system to sustain order at the world level began afresh. Gradually, at the end of the 20th century, a considerably reliable restraining system, the 'Joint Defence amounts to Group Defence amounts to use of the right of collective self defence amounts to reinforcement of regional deterrence amounts to shutting out war between nations', was built. It was based on cooperation between advanced nations and efforts of all

the countries. It seemed the world had overcome the "age of wars". There were many regions that were still politically and militarily unstable but the deterrent that worked on disputes between nations also became strong in these regions. And even if dispute occurred, possibility of peace being restored without much escalation increased.

The 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States of America made it clear that a large-scale terrorist act can be caused in any part of the world, including the most powerful country, as well as Japan. The enemy is invisible; it is unclear whether it is an individual, a group or a nation as such. No battle-lines are drawn and there is no distinction between battlefield and the rear base. A terrorist attack disregards all domestic and international laws and targets the military as much as the common citizens, indiscriminately. It is not known when the enemy will attack. It became clear then that the system to cope with terrorism was inadequate. Thus, along with continuing to bear responsibility for the war deterrence system, the challenge of restraining terrorism was also undertaken.

The world situation is in the midst of a transition. The direction of change is fluid, opaque and uncertain and mostly appears to be unpredictable. The age of great change is also the age of great instability and hidden risks. In such a period, when future is uncertain, one must guard against adventure. It will be better to act cautiously. However, in the age of big change, those who sail with the tide of the time change the existing frameworks and create new ones, both domestically and internationally. It is to be decided whether to maintain the current framework or see it as an opportunity for transformation to bring about a big change in

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a few years time. From such a perspective, the present can be said to be a period of hope and challenge. With no firm policy for the future, one must take the initiative and lead.

Principles of International Relations

Future societies must follow a few principles in international relations. The first principle is, "not to allow excessive egoism neither at the individual level nor at the national level". The second principle is that "lawlessness and disorderliness must be avoided at all costs". However, on the other hand, egoism i.e., desires of human beings, freedom of thought, and freedom of human activities etc is the driving force behind growth of mankind and excessive suppression of egoism gives rise to fascism. Hence, the third principle is "to respect egoism that does not excessively harm others".

In view of these principles, if there are more people or social groups that only make demands from the nation without thinking what they can do on their part for the people or nation, it is a foregone conclusion that tragedies will be repeated infinitely. This applies in relationship between nations too. Today, contribution, dedication and self-sacrifice of each person towards the nation or each nation towards the world are demanded. In order not to repeat the tragedies of the past, it is also the age when one should not just indulge in personal honour or profit and if necessary, while containing lawless or illegal use of violence by others through physical or non-physical powers, pay heed to their viewpoints or claims and have the courage and perseverance to pursue democratic and peaceful resolution of problems to the last. From such a viewpoint, rebuilding of morals transcending national

interests is also being demanded of the international society and the United Nations.

Changes in the Principles of National Rule

Until the 20th century, the world could mobilise people for aggression and hegemony based on rhetorics like religion, ideology, nationalism etc. However, the base of legitimacy of government today has moved towards attainment of economic growth. At the same time, majority of countries have realised that a large-scale war does not lead to economic growth; there is risk of shaking the very foundation of the government. Further, the conclusion that the world has reached at the end of the 20th century is that economic growth in the world is impossible based on the powers of one country alone or under a centrally controlled economy; it can only be achieved by linking free market economy to the international system. Even in China, which is yet to discard the political system of one party dictatorship, such principle of governance is being appreciated. In East Asia, North Korea is an exception but its state management is on the verge of bankruptcy. Islamic countries have also started understanding it. The inflow of funds into Islamic countries based on oil exports will continue till the oil resources dry up. There could be a viewpoint in some quarters that a government can be sustained without relying on economic growth but computerisation has rapidly spread the aforesaid awareness. Hence, it would be appropriate to think that the change is surprisingly fast.

Change in the Role of Military

Military has always been the trump card in international politics. Its main responsibility or role has been execution of war. It has been a tool to execute national policy and

demonstrate the authority or threat towards other countries. It is the means to impose one's own will on others. However, the viewpoint that such aggressive use of military is illegal under the international law regardless of declaration of war is taking roots in the present-day international society, based on tragic lessons of the past wars. The use of military force against an independent sovereign country led to Gulf War. It invites strict international sanctions. In the present day world a country is severely restrained regardless of its status.

As for war, for exercise of right of self defence to eliminate aggression, the view that the right of individual self defence and the right of group self defence should be legitimate, in accordance with the international law, is in the process of taking roots. Further, notwithstanding a clear-cut war for self defence, interpretation is that if an attack exceeds the objective of expulsion of aggression, and military power is used excessively; it violates the sovereignty of another country. There is a possibility of aggression happening on the pretext of self defence. This is an illegal act from the international law point of view. During the Gulf War, multinational army stopped the attack at the stage the Iraqi army was expelled from Kuwait, in consideration of the international opinion.

After the Second World War, the role of military as a deterrent has been assigned more importance than the use of right of self-defence. The idea is to maximise the power of self defence and restrain aggression by maximising the efficacy of readiness to use it immediately and, ultimately, do without the use of military power. If such readiness is established with cooperation from leading countries it can be ensured that in case of

some unstable factors arising, all countries would cooperate to restrain the situation from escalating. Stability then would be realised by using minimum military power. An understanding is spreading that such a system of stabilisation strategy is the cheapest and an assured method to maintain peace, than dreaming of having an unified World Federation of Nations or an International Policy Army.

The risk of crossing the nuclear threshold is omnipresent. An international awareness that wars do not pay for the execution of national policy has been rising. The peace and stability of each country is linked to peace and stability of a region or even the world. As a result, individual self-defence is fast becoming difficult and unrealistic in the traditionally neutral nations like Switzerland, Finland etc. or a political and military superpower like America. The mettle to defend one's country by oneself needs no mention but individual self-defence has become outdated - both as an effective deterrent as well as economically.

Today, there is a tendency to jointly develop important military weapon systems due to the high development costs of such activities. Further, if we observe the recent change in the role of military in the international security system, each country is focusing on ways to eliminate destabilising factors that hamper economic growth. The democratic and advanced nations are managing their military under group defence system in a manner that the objective of deterrence is realised while possessing high capability. They are also not using the military for actual but are shifting the focus towards international peace keeping operations, international emergency support operations and so on.

Initially, it is for such operational original job of the UN can be done by such activities. The UN has been gradually taking over one of the jobs of the UN. time, contributing through such a sublime obligation to the UN. Further to peacekeeping intervention is regarded as legitimate.

However, is a concept of the Security Council. However, there are among the permanent members of the Security Council operational priorities. forces have been army, independent army and so on will become universal countries that honourable place. One can say that it transcends the people of a particular towards world worrying about this will ultimately people in a world.

Threats to the

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Initially, it was felt that "the use of military for such operations other than war is not the original job of military but it is something that can be done by military alone". However, as such activities under the initiative of the United Nations have realised good results, countries are gradually positioning such activities as one of the jobs of military and at the same time, contributing to the international society through such activities. This is fast becoming a sublime obligation of member countries of the UN. Further, use of military is not confined to peacekeeping operations and even military intervention in troubled areas is being regarded as legal under the international law.

However, "Peace Making Operations" is a concept described in the UN Charter. However, there has never been an agreement among the permanent member countries of the Security Council regarding this as an operational principle of the UN Army. In fact, forces have been functioning as multinational army, independent American army, NATO army and so on. Such a role for the military will become unavoidable in the future for countries that are trying to occupy an honourable place in the international society. One can say that the world has entered an age where it is expected of military to transcend the role of maintaining safety of people of a particular country and contribute towards world peace and stability without worrying about their own lives. It is because this will ultimately bring about safety of the people in a wider sense.

Threats to the World in the 21st Century

When considering Japan's relations with the Security Council in the 21st century, it will be necessary to consider the threats. Militaristic threats in the 21st century that could threaten world peace can be enumerated as:-

- (a) China's militarisation and hegemony.
- (b) Russia's militarisation and hegemony.
- (c) Re-igniting the Middle-East dispute.
- (d) Regression of Japan towards militarism.
- (e) Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

China's military power, including nuclear war capability, is definitely a threat to the neighbouring small powers. However, in view of America's defence budget being much higher; mutual dependence through trade to achieve economic development; serious domestic problems in China – racial issues, divide between the rich and the poor, management of the free market with economy, communism as political system and so on, a war will not be in the national interest of modern China. If clash between China and Taiwan can be averted, China has less possibility of becoming a threat to world peace.

Russia continues to be a military power and possesses nuclear weapons but replacement of armaments is not progressing well and deterioration of weapon systems is noticeable. Middle East needs to be watched carefully. A system is gradually being evolved for achieving stability in Iraq.

When heads of the American Army and armies of the allies in the Asia-Pacific region meet they invariably seem to mention Japan as a potential future threat. The Japanese have a strange feeling towards this. However, Japan is a peculiar country. Its leaders admit

the mistakes of the past as a nation without any positive confirmation of facts or any counter argument, and repeatedly tender apologies. As a result, it is unable to win the genuine trust of the neighbouring countries. However, there are absolutely no elements in present day Japan that can lead to regression of Japan to militarism.

The risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons is surfacing and efforts are on to contain it worldwide. All the countries need to deal with this problem collectively. The chances of a large scale war are less. The reasons are many - elimination of ideological confrontation, world-wide awareness about the miseries of war, wide reach of media, increase in mutual dependence between leading countries of the world, development of science and technology, unipolarisation of the world order with America as the sole super power and so on.

As for nonmilitary threats, one can mention the explosive increase in population, shortage of food and problem of hunger. World population at the beginning of the 20th century was about 1.6 billion, which rose to about six billion at the beginning of the 21st century. By 2050, it is estimated to rise to 10 billion. According to recent surveys, this trend of rapid increase in population has slowed down. But the total production of grains that sustains the population, which was about 600 million tons in 1950 and reached about 1.8 billion tons in 1990, has since hit the plateau. Already, hunger has become a serious problem in various parts of the world with deaths due to hunger increasing in countries where the infrastructure for distribution is inadequate or the national system is closed as seen in China and North Korea. Unless adequate measures are taken, food shortage will become a serious threat for the survival of mankind.

Drying up of precious natural resources like petroleum, uranium etc. will also be a serious problem. If one sees the overall energy statistics for the year 2000, oil will last for another 41 years, natural gas for 62 years, uranium for 64 years and coal for 230 years. Even if new resources are discovered, with the progress of modernisation of backward nations, dependence on fossil fuel is going to increase and their drying up will be a serious threat for the survival of mankind.

The rise in the atmospheric temperature, depleting water level, environmental pollution, destruction and loss of forests, are serious threats to the ecological system. According to one estimate, average temperature of the globe will rise by about 2°C by the end of the 21st century. The sea water level will rise by 50 cm. This is likely to affect the habitation of at least 50 to 90 million people.

The deaths due to worldwide diseases like AIDS have surpassed deaths due to armed conflicts in recent years. According to a report made public in November 2002 by UNAIDS (United Nations AIDS Plan), the number of AIDS patients at the end of 2002 was 42 million. This is an increase of two million over the previous year and the number of deaths due to AIDS in 2002 were 3.1 million, an increase of 100,000 over the previous year. If mankind fails to resolve these issues, it will not be an exaggeration to say that by the end of the 21st century, millions or several billions of people will fall victims to it. For resolution of such problems wide-ranged collective efforts are essential. The UN too, based on past achievements, can exhibit its power in such fields in a big way. Japan too can play a big role under the UN umbrella. However, bringing people from diverse fields together will be impossible in a militarily and politically unstable environment.

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This is where the role of military of the leading countries will be to positively perform all kinds of conceivable roles, with politics focusing on the stabilisation strategy. Moreover, its role will be to guarantee a stable and peaceful military and political environment that can measure up to challenges for the resolution of various, serious, problems.

Strategic Options for Japan

The first possible choice could be a system centred around the UN. In case Japan opts for this system, it will aim at becoming a permanent member of the Security Council, make a political decision on the use of right of collective defence and if needed, participate in the UN Police Force, multinational army etc.

Whenever an aggression occurred or there was a possibility of its occurrence, phased international and collective actions – such as requests, advice, measures not accompanied by use of military force and measures accompanied by use of military force – were implemented. The prevention of aggression through efforts of the international community was the best system. This lesson was learnt by mankind through experience. Wisdom dictates that peace and security can be attained if countries collectively pursue such objectives and are willing to rise above selfish ends.

The idea of the UN-centred security as a worldwide security system has received overwhelming support. However, due to cold war equations, the Security Council had its limitations. Today, it has become possible to some extent to create conditions for activation of the world wide security system under the UN. But certain permanent member countries of the Security Council, released from the yoke of the cold war, are now following an

independent path to pursue their national interests. Extending support to promote fulfillment of conditions for the activation and realisation of security functions of the United Nations should prove profitable, for the world as well as for Japan. This concept, which was regarded as the ideal philosophy for mankind, especially in the common sentiment of the Japanese people, unfortunately has not seen much progress. In fact there has been a decline in this regard with the Iraq war. Conditions for the realisation of UN-centred security system have not been fulfilled, especially in Asia. Hence, as a realistic policy, it is not desirable to entrust the security of the nation to such a system.

The second option could be to build a new framework, centred around western style democracy. However, even if one leaves aside the Chinese opposition, it is not easy to work out norms for use of military power common to all the advanced nations. There is a strong resistance among Americans to place the American troops under an authority that transcends the 'Stars and Stripes'. Therefore, it is difficult to have this as an effective option.

Thus, the only practical option for Japan is one centred around the US. In the first half of the 21st century, there does not seem to be any country that can surpass America militarily. According to Professor Paul Kennedy of the Yale University, America's defence budget is equivalent to the total defence budget of the next 10 countries. In the next several decades, no country can match America in military power. Further, although the Japanese economy is said to be somewhat stagnant at present, no country can excel the economic might of the US and Japan put together. Consequently, as long as the US and Japan are linked together

strongly, other countries have very limited options. If there is an estrangement between the two, the other countries will need to carry out a highly complex political, diplomatic, and economic readjustment. This is especially true in case of East Asia where an international dispute can come about. The U.S.-Japan solidarity in its present form is inadequate. It is necessary to develop it into a strong military partnership that is allowed the use of right of collective defence as well as complement economic relationship against competitors. Even currency integration could be considered.

Japan can sustain its existence and prosperity only through world peace. Further, Japan as a leading economic power, a modern, advanced and free nation, has a high potential to contribute towards the challenges that threaten world peace, both economically and technologically. However, Japan's power and influence has its limitations. Its biggest weak point is that it has not been able to win the real trust of the neighbouring nations after the Second World War. Alliance with America thus is indispensable.

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FOURTH SESSION : SECOND PAPER**SHRI CHINMAYA R GHAREKHAN**

I have worked with the UN system for a good number of years. During those years I have had the privilege of getting to know and working with my Japanese colleagues. The Japanese diplomats enjoy very high reputation, and in my opinion they are among the most able diplomats in the world. Japan is the second largest contributor to the UN. In the regular, assessed, budget of the UN, Japan has a contribution of 20 per cent, while the USA has 22 per cent. If one were to put together all the funds that Japan is contributing to the voluntary programmes of the UN, Japan has the largest share.

As Lieutenant General Arai pointed out, public opinion considers the UN an institution where justice can be obtained. They are not alone in this regard. The public opinion in India to a great extent is on similar lines. Even though the Charter of the UN has the beginning - 'We the Peoples of the world ...', in fact the people of the world have nothing to do with the UN. In the drafting of the Charter, the peoples of the world were not given any opportunity to make any contribution. Diplomats and statesmen sitting in San Francisco haggling over words drafted it. It is more of an inter-governmental organisation. Consequently, its function unfortunately has been to defend the interests of member states, and to resolve disputes between member states. This is the assigned task. This is how one should approach the subject of the usefulness or otherwise, the relevance or otherwise, of the UN.

During the past decade or so, the UN has opened its doors to the civil society. There is more and more peoples' participation in the UN's activities. Avenues have been created and forums established which have given opportunities to the NGOs not only to

come and observe the proceedings, but also present their point of view and to influence the decisions made there. All the governments are not exactly happy with this development. This can sometimes create a peculiar situation. There may be opinions generated that may be contrary to the official position taken by the government of that country. This trend began during the tenure of Boutros Boutros Ghali as the UN Secretary General and has been enhanced further by Mr Kofi Annan, the present Secretary General.

Undoubtedly, the American intervention in Iraq has damaged the UN's credibility and reputation. Saddam was not as bright as he was ruthless, because if he were half as intelligent, he would not have made the mistakes that he did. His biggest mistake was the invasion of Kuwait, post cold war. Maybe an invasion during the cold war would have got overlooked, because, it is the end of the cold war that brought about the unity of the permanent members of the Security Council. It is known that the Americans got away with the resolution on Korea because the Soviet Union was not present in the Security Council chamber at the time the vote was taken.

Iraq in 1990, was the first opportunity since the end of the cold war for the Permanent Five (P5) to demonstrate their unity. Ironically, it was against Iraq that the disunity among the P5 became visible. The UN has been criticised for failing to prevent the war against Iraq in 2003. I do not think this to be a fair criticism of the United Nations. In my view, the Security Council should be given full credit for refusing to authorise the war against Iraq. It is known that the Americans and the British, especially Tony Blair, was extremely keen to have the so-

called second resolution. But Mr Bush was not really concerned whether there was a second resolution or not. In fact his neo-conservative advisor's intention was to avoid going to the UN and directly attack Iraq. Since Tony Blair wanted a second resolution desperately, they tried very hard to have a second resolution and it is to the ever lasting credit of the Security Council that they refused the second resolution. Even a close ally of the US like Germany, was opposed to the war and to go along with the second resolution. Chile and Mexico too refused to support the resolution. Hence, to say that non permanent members have no role to play at least on this occasion seems to have faltered. Of course, as the P5 were themselves divided, it was easier for the non permanent members to take independent positions. This is relevant in the light of the fact, as stated by the previous speaker, regarding the expansion of the Security Council, it is hoped that the new permanent members will not be there simply to tow the line of the other five. It is hoped that Japan or India will not have to tow the line of any country and can have an independent stand.

Now, the same government that snubbed the UN is requesting them to bail them out. Japan, for reasons of its own, has decided to send some peacekeepers to Iraq. Since the American presidential elections are round the corner, Bush does not want the bogey of Iraq around his neck. At the same time, he wants to show some success to his people. Mr Kofi Anan, on his part, has decided to send a team to Iraq to assess the situation and see whether or not, and in what form, the elections can be held before the end of June. That is the time when the reigns of the government can be handed over, symbolically, to the Iraqi people. One has to wait and see how the Secretary General handles this matter.

It is very easy to be critical of the United Nations or the Secretary General. It is simply not possible for either to play a game of tit for tat. The Secretary General may not have the luxury that we may have as individuals. He has to rise above, take a position, and do whatever is in the best interest of, in this case, the people of Iraq and certainly of the organisation that he is heading.

The war was not justifiable. Nothing the UN will do in the future should amount to legitimising the war ex post facto. The lack of legitimacy of the war is universally accepted. As we move ahead, there is a need to avoid taking positions or doing anything that would further weaken the UN. The aim should be to work out ways and means by which the organisation would be strengthened. The doctrine of preemptive strike is a very dangerous one. It should not find supporters. At the same time, it is not enough to criticise the UN for the position or actions that it has taken. It is necessary to be constructive.

Militarily and economically strong nations do not need the UN so much. But if one is idealistic and believes in the UN, then one must think of small vulnerable countries who still look upto the UN for help. The UN has done wonderful service for these weak countries. Where the big power interests are not involved, one can expect the unanimity of the permanent members to prevail and do something objectively.

The previous speaker suggested that in the coming century, the regional security organisations could be entrusted with the security of nations of the respective regions. On paper, this concept looks attractive but otherwise this is dangerous. Because, every region has a dominating power with its own national interests. Maintenance of peace and security by a regional organisation is fraught with serious consequences.

Air Marshal Vi

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Shri Chinmaya

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justifiable. Nothing the UN should amount to post facto. The lack of a universally accepted principle is a need to avoid legitimising anything that would be. The aim should be to strengthen the means by which the UN is strengthened. The preventive strike is a very old idea and will not find supporters. There is not enough to criticise the UN or actions that it has taken to be constructive.

economically strong and the UN so much. But if one believes in the UN, then one will support the vulnerable countries and call on the UN for help. The UN service for these weak countries and big power interests are not to expect the unanimity of members to prevail and do

maker suggested that in the regional security should be entrusted with the role of the respective regions. The UN looks attractive but not realistic. Because, every country is looking after its own maintenance of peace and organisation is fraught with difficulties.

Air Marshal Vir Narain, PVSM (Retd)

Thank you for a very lucid exposition. The difficulty of looking into the future is enormous.

Lieutenant General Tomohiro Okamoto (Retd)

On 2 October 2003, the Russian Defence Minister referred to the new doctrine and stated that as long as the WMD, the vehicles to carry these, and the missiles exist, and as long as the leaders who are ready to use them exist – Russia will resort to preventive attack strategy. The same policy China also follows – they refer to it as preventive self-defence. Of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, France has not made any statement. The new security doctrine states that as long as these conditions prevail, under the aegis of the UN resolution, such a preventive attack will be undertaken. If an armed attack occurs then an individual or collective self-defence, and a preventive one, is authorised. This comes under Article 51. All P5 agree to this. Hence, if the UN allows this, the WMD may be used and, missiles would be used. Can the UN continue to be as slow as it has been? Matters are bound to escalate resulting in more problems.

Shri Chinmaya R Gharekhan, IFS (Retd)

The right of self defence is inherent in Article 51. It talks of the inherent right of self defence – individual or collective. This right, therefore, is not there just because the Charter says so. This right is guaranteed to every country irrespective of the Charter. The Charter also states that this be so in the face of imminent armed attack. Then the matter

DISCUSSION

goes beyond self defence; it is actually war begun by one against the other. Self defence is applicable before one country has attacked another country. This is the Bush doctrine. This is unacceptable and equally objectionable, be it propounded by any country. All such use of preventive force should be proportionate to the threat that is to be posed by the other country.

The threats that the US declared they were facing from Iraq – there seems to have been no imminent threat of an armed attack by Iraq. There is no ex post facto justification for the so called exercise of right of self defence, or even a preventive war. This is a dangerous factor.

Lieutenant General Tomohiro Okamoto (Retd)

In the case stated by you, India can wait for Pakistan to attack and then retaliate. But, in case of Japan, if there is a nuclear threat from North Korea and if it were to wait for the UN resolution, Japan would be destroyed, as it is a small country. One wonders what would happen?

Shri Chinmaya R Gharekhan, IFS (Retd)

My answer is that Japan should have nuclear weapons too!

Lieutenant General Yasuo Ohkushi (Retd)

Creation of regional groups catering to each region could work as a kind of check and balance of power. It has been stated to be dangerous. In the present scenario, it is becoming increasingly difficult to understand regional issues and have a kind of common understanding or common values to address the problem at a forum like the UN. As stated

earlier, if Russia had been present, the UN would not have walked away with a resolution on Korean war. There are many such examples. Hence, in order to maintain peace and world order, a common organisation for regional solutions may be viable.

Shri Chinmaya R Gharekhan, IFS (Retd)

Take the case of Georgia. If the problem of this country were to be entrusted to a regional security organisation, Georgia would have been totally at the mercy of Russia. It is because of the UN, Georgian problem is now with the UN Security Council. Hence there is a check on vested interests. Another example is of West Africa. The ECOWAS got involved in the Liberian situation. Nigeria, a predominant regional power, called the shots there. If there was any region with no disputes or rivalry, then a regional organisation would be useful.

Lieutenant General Yasuo Ohkushi (Retd)

The regional problems cannot be solved within the present ambit of the UN. Hence some kind of regional framework for security matters is required.

Shri Chinmaya R Gharekhan, IFS (Retd)

Chapter VIII of the Charter provides for the Security Council to cooperate with regional organisations. Regional matters do get taken up in the UN Security Council. It does take a little time for the Council to act but it finally is able to do so, and there is ample scope for regional cooperation.

Lieutenant General Yasuo Ohkushi (Retd)

During the 1991 Iraq War, had the cold war been still active, Russia would have opposed the US's move in the UN.

Lieutenant General Bhupal Singh Malik, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

My question is to Lieutenant General Takashi Arai. In the Asian context, what kind of grouping did you have in mind? Further, when I visited Japan last year, I noticed a body of opinion being formed there, wanting to look towards West of Japan rather than East.

Lieutenant General Takashi Arai (Retd)

Japan's diplomacy has three features - UN centric; US-Japan alliance centric; and Asia oriented. Asia carries an important weight in this. In that respect, majority of the people prefer that Asia occupy an important part in Japan's diplomacy. However, there are limitations. Something on the lines of NATO is not possible in Asia because of differences in ideology, economic status, religion and so on. A two-nation alliance is more probable.

Though it may sound far-fetched a hegemonic and aggressive China is good for Japan because of over dependence of Japan on the US. The US will not dump Japan as long as China maintains these traits.

Also, Japan has extended large amount of ODA to China. It is high time that ODA is diverted from China to India so that it creates a counter balance to China.

Professor Tadamasa Fukiura

All sovereign nations are equal. There are the permanent members and the non permanent members of the Security Council. And there is the NPT, which is against this principle. What can India and Japan do together to reform the UN Security Council and its five permanent members?

Shri Chinmaya R Gharekhan, IFS (Retd)

When stating that all states are equal,

it should include in some respect and India shot on what kind of Brazil and India in New Delhi permanent member need to do that because there mind that India be the other way to be removed support each other process had been Security Council raring to get forgetting about work. Japan permanent member it at the same way to trust at India, Japan and The UN Security Council committed to Council with me

Lieutenant General

It is unfortunate the rest of the world to stop this process into the Security Council developing world not want such us to bring these do not stand Council seat at get it, to see real to their benefit

Another a of regional organisation

hupal Singh Malik, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

Lieutenant General in context, what kind of view in mind? Further, last year, I noticed a formation there, wanting of Japan rather than

akash Arai (Retd)

It has three features – alliance centric; and it has an important weight majority of the people play an important part in it. However, there are some on the lines of NATO because of differences in status, religion and so on. It is more probable.

It sounds far-fetched a massive China is good for the dependence of Japan. It will not dump Japan as it has these traits.

It extended large amount of high time that ODA is India so that it creates China.

Fukiura

Conditions are equal. There are members and the non-members of the Security Council, which is against this. India and Japan do not want the UN Security Council to have members?

harekhan, IFS (Retd)

at all states are equal,

it should include that they are basically equal in some respects and not in others. Japan and India should consult closely, together, on what kind of reform they are looking for. Brazil and India have issued a joint statement in New Delhi supporting each other for permanent membership. Japan and India need to do that at the highest level. I say this because there may be suspicion in Japan's mind that India wants to go it alone. It could be the other way too. These suspicions have to be removed. It would be a good thing to support each other's candidacy. When the process had begun for the expansion of the Security Council, Germany and Japan were vying to get into the Security Council forgetting about India and others. It did not work. Japan will not be able to get a permanent membership without India getting it at the same time. Inhibitions have to give way to trust and confidence in each other. India, Japan and Brazil should work together. The UN Secretary General is strongly committed to expansion of the Security Council with more permanent members in it.

Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (Retd)

It is unfortunate that not only the P-5 or the rest of the developed world that is trying to stop this process of entry of new nations into the Security Council; even in the developing world there are nations that do not want such a thing to happen. It is up to us to bring these nations, who know that they do not stand a chance to get a Security Council seat and do not want others also to get it, to see reason. The developed countries to their benefit could use such countries.

Another aspect of note is that the use of regional organisations to sort out aspects

of trade disputes is one thing, but the moment one refers to the use of force to resolve an issue – whereby you have the military of one state or a number of states entering another state, the endorsement of the Security Council is mandatory. Such issues should not be undertaken by any regional organisation. Further if regionalisation is resorted to, it suggests that the region that is facing problems should sort out the problems on their own, in their respective regions. In such a situation, the less developed countries would not have the resources, financial or equipment wise and they would be trying to deal with situations that are beyond them. Hence, the need for the developed world also to be involved in trying to address problems that have dimensions of international peace and security.

On the issue of history being different regarding the invasion of Kuwait, had the cold war been ongoing, it would be wrong to presume such a thing. It was a matter of one country invading another. What was there to stop Kuwait asking America for help? It was a question of self defence.

Major General Toshikatsu Suzuki (Retd)

To tackle international terrorism, there is research going on for use of Space. What is India's stand regarding this?

Shri Chinmaya R Gharekhan, IFS (Retd)

I am not aware that Americans are going to deploy satellites or missiles in Space to deal with terrorism. Terrorism implies an invisible enemy, whose weapons one is not aware of nor is one aware of his hideouts. However, what the world is united against is the weaponisation of outer space.

CLOSING REMARKS

PROFESSOR KOUJI OKAMOTO

LIEUTENANT GENERAL SATISH NAMBIAR, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (RETD)

CLOSING REMARKS**PROFESSOR KOUJI OKAMOTO**

There is one unfortunate commonality between India and Japan, that they have sustained democracy. This gives freedom of speech by which everybody can say what he or she wishes to and gets away with it!

Till 1950s, there was a high appreciation for India and its leaders, Nehru and Gandhi, and for Justice Pal, in Japan. After India lost to China in the 1962 War, the Japanese interest in India diminished. That was the reason why non-alignment advocated by Nehru, was not good enough for India to maintain its security. Subsequently, India's close alliance with Russia and that of Japan with the US made India and Japan drift apart. Politically, there was no reason for this drift. The other reason for the widening gap was the economic factor, the socialist pattern of economy followed by India did not succeed. Whereas, Japan achieved rapid economic growth, India accounted for only one per cent of the total world trade by Japan in the 1980s.

As far as Japan's overseas investments are concerned, India accounted for only 0.1 per cent of that. In the 1990s all this changed when India decided to liberalise her economy. The political binding factor of the cold war period also came to an end. Fixed notions are very tough to change. Hence the notion that was formed in the 1960s did not change soon. The image of India as a slow country remained. Of late, especially after the 11 September 2001 attacks, there is an increasing awareness in Japan about the importance of India. 90 per cent of the oil imported by Japan passes through the Indian Ocean. Further, the SDF also came to the Indian Ocean for the first time recently. Towards the end of the last century, when Prime Minister of Japan visited India, he spoke of global partnership in IT, to take Indo-Japanese relationship to a higher pedestal. And this conference is an important step for the two countries to come together and make it a true global partnership.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL SATISH NAMBIAR, PVSM, AVSM, VrC (RETD)

Director, USI

It has been a great pleasure to have our colleagues from Japan. I speak on behalf of all members, those present and those that are not here, that the discussions have been useful and satisfying from our points of view. It has helped us understand future perceptions. There was a mention about the disadvantage of democracy but I am sure both our countries are not sorry for it. We

have identified the areas of congruence on which strategic analysts from both countries can work together in moving forward, in pursuing our respective national interests. We have also discussed the international agenda in some detail. I am looking forward to a continuation of this dialogue. I am sure it will be to our mutual benefit.